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1.1 WELFARE STATES AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
Since the 1980s, many welfare state reforms have taken place in European
countries. The progressing European integration may have been one of the
factors that triggered or influenced these welfare state reforms. Although social
convergence has been an objective since the Treaty of Rome in 1957, it was
only in 1997 and 2000 that the European Council adopted labour market and
social policies, respectively. Consequently, it was not before then that European
integration became a relevant factor in the comparative welfare state literature
and that social and labour market policies entered the Europeanisation literat-
ure as interesting policy areas. However, in both strands of the literature, it
is still unclear to what extent European integration influences welfare state
policies, whether European integration has contributed to the convergence
of welfare state policies, and how it may explain the variation in welfare state
reforms across European countries.
European integration may have a number of effects on national social and
labour market policies. These effects follow from two types of European
integration, namely negative and positive integration, which is a conventional
dichotomy in the European integration literature. Negative integration refers
to ‘measures increasing market integration by eliminating national restraints
on trade and distortions of competition’, whereas positive integration refers
to ‘common European policies to shape the conditions under which markets
operate’ (Scharpf, 1996: 15; Tinbergen, 1965: 96-100).
The process of negative integration gained momentum with the adoption
of the Single European Act in 1986, putting forward a schedule to complete
the internal market. Many regulations were adopted in order to create a Single
Market by 1993, in which people, goods, services and money could move freely
across the borders of the EU’s member states. In contrast, the positive integra-
tion with regard to welfare state policies has taken place at different speeds.
Although convergence of social standards is an important and explicit goal
of the EU, it was not until 1997 that a major step was taken to achieve this goal
by formulating welfare state policies at the EU level. In 1997, The European
Employment Strategy (EES) was adopted at the Amsterdam Summit and further
operationalised at the Luxembourg Summit later that year. This strategy is
aimed at improving labour market performances in terms of lower un-
employment and higher employment levels. The launch of the EES was based
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on two motivations (Pochet, 2005). On the one hand, the EES was intended
to enhance a process of converging labour market policies to smoothen the
functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union. A more flexible European
labour market and more similar labour market conditions across the member
states provide a more univocal base for monetary policy. On the other hand,
the EES was considered as a social counterbalance for the progressing economic
integration.
Inspired by and based on the governance principles of the Broad Economic
Policy Guidelines of the EMU, the EES consists of a set of legally non-binding
means of governance, such as guidelines, targets, benchmarks and recom-
mendations. The EES is a form of ‘soft law’. Instead of exerting traditional
regulation based on institutional compliance, as is the case with ‘hard law’
such as directives, this new mode of governance is intended to influence
national welfare states by relying on mechanisms as policy learning and peer
pressure. At the Lisbon Summit in 2000, the instruments of the EES were
formalised as a more general governance means, which was called the Open
Method of Coordination (OMC). From this moment onwards, the OMC has also
been applied to other policy areas such as social inclusion, pensions, health
care, and care for the elderly. In sum, since 1997 the OMC has been the primary
EU policy tool that is supposed to influence domestic welfare state policies
in the EU member states.
In this study, the influence of positive and negative European integration
on domestic welfare state reforms will be examined. A first question that will
be analysed is whether European welfare state policies have actually con-
verged. It is a topic of scholarly debate whether welfare state reforms have
contributed to more similar social protection systems across the advanced
capitalist societies (Pierson, 2001; Hvinden, 2004; Montanari, 2001). Due to
the path-dependent character of welfare state institutions, the possibilities for
welfare state reform are limited and therefore few convergence could be
expected (Pierson, 2000). However, it has been well documented that despite
high levels of path dependence, major welfare state reforms have actually taken
place (i.e. Kuipers, 2006; Marier, 2008). The convergence analyses also con-
tribute to a broader empirical and methodological debate on the precise degree
and form of welfare state reforms (see Vis, 2010). Furthermore, if welfare state
policies have converged, should this be attributed to the impact of European
integration, or to domestic or global dynamics?
With respect to positive European integration, the impact of the OMC on
national social and labour market policies has been analysed in many studies
(i.e. De la Porte and Pochet, 2002; Zeitlin and Pochet, 2005; Kvist and Saari,
2007a). These studies have inductively identified a number of mechanisms
through which the OMC influences the national policy-making, such as policy
learning and external pressure. Nonetheless, the results in the OMC literature
are rather inconclusive with regard to the question whether and how this new
means of governance has influenced domestic welfare state reforms and how
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to explain the variation in the impact of European integration across countries
and over time.
Another characteristic of the OMC literature is that the possible influence
of negative integration on national policies seems to be forgotten. This is
remarkable, because the OMC has been regarded as a social counterbalance
against the economic character of European integration, and because in the
early days of the single market the influence of negative integration on social
policies has received considerable attention in the welfare state literature
(Pierson and Leibfried, 1995; Scharpf, 1999). Generally, economic integration
could have two effects on national welfare states. First, increased competition
among firms could lead to policy competition among governments, in which
they reduce non-wage costs in order to attract mobile production factors,
resulting in lower levels of social protection (Scharpf, 1999; Sinn, 2002). Second,
social protection systems may become more generous in order to compensate
the increased risks on the labour market (Rodrik, 1998). The results of empirical
analyses on the impact of economic integration in the current literature are
mixed, which is probably due to difficulty of disentangling both effects and
to a lack of data. Furthermore, due to the fact that negative European integra-
tion and globalisation are both forms of international economic integration,
it is a methodological challenge to separate these effects empirically.
In sum, there is still a number of theoretical, empirical and methodological
questions with respect to the impact of European integration on welfare states
in the convergence, comparative political economy and Europeanisation
literature. This study tries to contribute to the formulation of answers to these
questions. In addition to the scientific relevance, analysing the domestic influence
of European integration has also policy and societal relevance. In June 2010, the
European Council adopted the European 2020 strategy. Following up on the
Lisbon goals for 2010 and reacting to the world’s most severe recession since
the 1930s, the European Commission has put forward a strategy for ‘smart,
sustainable and inclusive growth’ (EC, 2010). Again, the Commission has put
forward the OMC as governance means for the achievement of this strategy.
Insight in the functioning of the OMC may contribute to improving its effect-
iveness.
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The aim of this study is to provide insight into whether and how social and
labour market policy reforms in the member states of the European Union
are influenced by European integration. The study attempts to identify to what
extent welfare state policies have converged over time and to explain the
patterns of differences and similarities in policy reforms. In sum, the research
questions of this study are as follows:
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Main question:
What is the influence of European integration on national social and labour
market policies across European Union member states and what factors can
explain differences in the extent to which member states have changed their
policies accordingly?
Subsequent questions:
1 To what extent have national social and labour market policies in European
Union member states converged?
2 What is the influence of European Union policy initiatives and European
economic integration on reforms of national social and labour market
policies?
To answer the research questions satisfactorily, the study consists of two parts.
In the first part, that is guided by the first sub-question, it will be examined
whether the occurred reforms have resulted in patterns of welfare state con-
vergence across the EU, or whether European welfare states show continuing
diversity. For that reason, convergence tests on several policy areas will be
employed. The second part of the study addresses the explanation of the
variation in policy reforms, guided by the second sub-question. Using
econometric methods, the relative importance of different European factors,
stemming from both negative and positive European integration, from global-
isation, and from national factors will be assessed.
This dissertation is a collection of refereed journal articles, published in
Journal of Common Market Studies (Chapter 2), Journal of European Integration
(Chapter 3 and Chapter 4) and European Union Politics (Chapter 5) and of a
paper that is under review (Chapter 6). The remaining sections of this intro-
ductory chapter will outline how these articles together provide answers to
the research questions.
1.3 THEORETICAL FOCUS
To understand the influence of European integration on domestic welfare state
policies, this dissertation draws from different strands of literature. The con-
vergence analyses are embedded in the convergence literature. With respect
to welfare state convergence, the study mainly focuses on the convergence
of policies, but also the convergence of welfare state regimes and the con-
vergence of policy outcomes such as poverty rates will be taken into account.
Policy convergence can be conceptualized as a tendency of policies to become
more alike over time (Bennett, 1991). As in most convergence studies, the units
of analysis in the convergence analyses of this study are countries, but they
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could also be municipalities, regions, or other jurisdictions. Convergence has
occurred when the variation across countries is smaller at the end than at the
beginning of a period. This implies that the concept of convergence does not
require that policies have become completely identical, although this could
be the end result of a convergence trend. In other words, convergence is a
dynamic concept that refers to a change in the degree of variation or similarity
instead of a static situation of either similarity or variation.
Convergence of welfare state policies across European countries requires
that welfare state reforms result in more similar policies. An important reason
to expect more similar policies is the influence of European integration on these
domestic reforms. The interaction between the EU-level and the member states
has been studied in two bodies of literature, namely the literature that deals
with European integration and the literature that is concerned with European-
isation. The European integration literature is focused on the development
of policies and institutions at the EU-level, thus on the progression of further
European integration (Vink and Graziano, 2007). In the field of welfare state
policies, this strand includes for example studies on why and how member
states have decided to develop social policy initiatives at the EU-level such
as the OMC (i.e. De la Porte, 2011). Subsequently, Europeanisation can be
generally conceptualized as the impact of European integration on member
states (Green Cowles et al., 2001; Radaelli, 2003; Börzel and Risse, 2003), or
more specifically, as the influence of EU-level policies on the domestic policy-
making. To put it differently, while the bottom-up process is the central object
of study in the European integration literature, the Europeanisation literature
is focussed on the top-down effect of the EU on the member states.
Since member states are obliged to implement EU regulations, most of the
theoretical work in the Europeanisation literature on the domestic impact of
positive European integration aims to explain the cross-national variation in
the implementation of EU-policies. Due to the legally non-binding character
of the OMC, in contrast, theories on the impact of the OMC also account for the
question whether the OMC influences member states at all. In this study, three
non-judicial compliance mechanisms through which the OMC could influence
the domestic policy-making of the EU member states will be examined. First,
the policy goals and targets of the OMC may have a normative influence on
the member states. The performances of the countries with respect to these
policy goals may cause external pressure on governments to change domestic
policies. Second, the OMC can influence the domestic policy-making through
cognitive mechanisms of policy diffusion. The exchange of information and
solutions for policy problems by policy makers, facilitated by the OMC, may
trigger or influence policy reforms. Third, the OMC can influence the domestic
policy-making by providing constraints and opportunities in the policy-making
arena. In this regard, actors such as politicians and social partners could use
the OMC strategically and selectively in domestic decision making processes.
In the analysis on the influence of the OMC, the OMC is embedded in a more
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general theoretical approach to welfare state reform, including political, institu-
tional and macro-economic variables. Since these variables are less usual in
the Europeanisation literature but more common in the comparative political
economy literature on welfare state reform, this study connects the European-
isation literature explicitly to the political economy literature.
For the theoretical approach to the impact of negative European integration,
the study builds on the political economy literature regarding international
economic integration. As outlined above, international economic integration
can trigger two opposing effects on welfare states. First, the reduction of
restrictions on international flows of goods and capital, and the increased trade
and capital mobility can lead to increased strategic behaviour of governments.
In order to increase employment and economic growth, governments aim to
attract firms by reducing non-wage costs and so social protection levels,
resulting in policy competition among governments. This proposition is known
as the efficiency hypothesis or as a ‘social race to the bottom’.
Although international economic integration may enhance a country’s
economic growth, it may also damage the labour market position of some
individuals. In this respect, a second effect of international economic integration
on welfare states may be that governments expand social protection systems
in order to compensate the increased economic uncertainty of people. Inter-
national trade and foreign investments make the demand for labour more
volatile, which leads to a higher demand for social insurance. This proposition
is known as the “compensation hypothesis”. A synthesis of the efficiency and
the compensation hypothesis suggests that economic integration leads to a
situation in which governments face an increased demand for social protection,
while they are simultaneously competing with other governments to reduce
non-wage costs. In the globalisation literature, scholars have referred to this
situation as the ‘globalisation dilemma’ (Rodrik, 1997). The resulting level of
social protection reflects the decision of the government in this dilemma and
empirical studies measure the net effect of economic integration on welfare
states. To isolate the effect of policy competition, earlier research focused on
the funding of welfare states. International economic integration may lead to
lower taxes on corporate profits and social security and payroll taxes (Swank,
1998; Slemrod, 2004; Devereux et al, 2008). However, little efforts have been
made to isolate the impact of international economic integration on the demand
for social insurance to test the compensation hypothesis. In order to isolate
the relationship between economic integration and the demand for social
security, this study focuses on private social security. The voluntary purchase
of private social security arrangements provides a direct indication of the
demand for social security. Other than in the case of public social security,
political mechanisms are not expected to interfere in the relationship between
economic integration and the demand for voluntary private social insurance.
As a private variant of the compensation hypothesis, it will be argued that
international economic integration leads to an increased demand for private
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social insurance. In contrast, the theoretical influence of European economic
integration on the demand for social security is on beforehand less univocal.
The reduction of trade barriers within the EU has increased the trade volumes
among EU countries. Hence, it could be expected that also European economic
integration leads to higher economic insecurity and increases the demand for
social protection. However, intra-EU trade is mainly intra-industry trade. In
line with the Heckscher-Ohlin and the Stolper-Samuelson theorems, it could
be expected that intra-industry trade leads to smaller economic adjustments
than inter-industry trade and so to less economic insecurity for employees.
Therefore, trade with other European countries may lead to relatively less
insecurity for people on European labour markets than trade with low-wage
countries. In other words, it could also be expected that trade among EU
countries leads to a relatively lower demand for social protection than trade
in general.
In addition to economic integration, other factors that will be taken into
account to explain the variation in the participation in private social insurance
plans across countries are the generosity of public welfare state arrangements
and policy changes which open up the markets for providers of private social
insurance schemes.
1.4 EMPIRICAL APPROACH
European integration may influence several types of national welfare state
policies and also the generosity of a country’s social protection system as a
whole. Therefore, the study starts with analysing trends of convergence for
a broad range of welfare state programmes, such as old age programmes,
incapacity-related benefits and family programmes.
Subsequently, the study focuses on a specific policy area, labour market
policies, in order to trace the impact of EU policies more directly. As discussed
above, the OMC has been used for the coordination of several welfare state
policy areas, including for instance employment, social inclusion and pensions.
Although all the OMCs are based on the same type of legally non-binding
governance instruments such as guidelines, benchmarks, recommendations
and peer review programmes, the precise institutionalisation of the OMCs
varies. Thus, the toolkit of the EES differs from that of the social inclusion OMC,
and the governance processes of the social inclusion OMC differ from those
of the pensions OMC (Zeitlin, 2005: 21). For instance, the European Commission
and the Council are authorised to issue recommendations to Member States
on their progression regarding the implementation of the EES and the Broad
Economic Policy Guidelines, but they are not in the case of other OMCs. Fur-
thermore, while in most other OMCs only common objectives are formulated,
the EES and the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines also provide detailed
guidelines for the realisation of the policy agendas. Another example is that
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the EES has fixed employment rate targets, whereas in the case of the social
inclusion OMC the member states are invoked to formulate national targets
for poverty reduction. Among the different OMCs on social and employment
policies, the EES is regarded as the one that is strongest institutionalised (Arm-
strong and Kilpatrick, 2006). This makes the EES a most-likely case for examin-
ing domestic influence. If the OMC influences domestic policy reforms, this
influence is most likely to be found in the case of the EES. Therefore, the study
examines the link between the EES and national labour market policies.
With the adoption of the EES in 1997, labour market policies were in fact
the first welfare state policies coordinated at the European level. Basically,
the rationale of the EES is that member states should make their domestic
labour market policies more activating in order to reduce unemployment and
to increase employment. As a result, national labour market policies should
converge towards common EU objectives. Several indicators will be used to
analyse whether and how member states have reformed their labour market
policies.
Whereas the largest part of the study is focused on public welfare state
policies, one part of the study is devoted to analysing the cross-national
variation in private social security. This type of social security consists of social
insurances which are provided by private institutions. From a theoretical and
methodological perspective, the investigation of private social security might
contribute to a better understanding of the influence of international economic
integration on welfare states, as has been discussed above. In addition, analys-
ing private social protection is also interesting from a purely empirical point
of view. Given that private arrangements have gained increased importance
in a number of western welfare states, the scholarly attention for the develop-
ments in private social security has remained surprisingly limited.
The study covers western EU countries and a number of other advanced
industrialist countries from the beginning of the 1980s to halfway the 2000s,
which is common in the comparative political economy and the Europeanisa-
tion literature. This time span covers the period before and after the launch
of the EU-level policy initiatives, allowing us to compare the developments
across the different periods in order to trace the impact of these policies. In
addition, many welfare state reforms have taken place during these years. With
respect to the sample of countries, the member states which entered the EU
after 2004 are firmly underrepresented in the current literature. With respect
to the quantitative methods oriented political economy literature, this is due
to the limited availability of quantitative data. However, also in the case study
oriented literature on the Europeanisation of welfare state policies the interest
in newly-acceded member states has been confined. As a result, little is known
about the impact of European integration on welfare state reforms in these
countries and whether the existing theories and empirical findings also hold
for this country-group. In addition, a pressing question is also whether the
accession of the new member states to the EU has led to convergence between
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the old and new member states. Therefore, in one part of the current study,
the welfare state developments in the member states which have entered the
EU in 2004 are investigated too.
1.5 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
In the comparative political economy literature, there is a lively debate going
on about the type of research design that should be used to examine and
explain the variation in welfare state reforms across countries (i.e. Shalev, 2007;
Rothstein, 2007; Swank, 2007). A first point of disagreement is about the
detection of causality. Proponents of a small-N approach are mainly focussed
on the causes of an effect, and on tracing causal relationships with an in-depth
analysis of a small number of cases, typically countries. In contrast, proponents
of a large-N approach analyse a relatively large number of cases, for instance
with regression analysis, in order to generalise the results, and they are more
focused on the effects of a cause. Both types of research have benefits and
drawbacks, and they contribute each in their own way to solving different
parts of the theoretical and empirical puzzles. Hence, it is cross-fertilisation
that may bring welfare state research further.
The existing literature concerning the Europeanisation of welfare states
consists almost entirely of small-N studies. To gain insight in the functioning
of the relatively new means of governance, scholars have investigated the
impact of the OMC on domestic policies in case studies, typically including
one to three countries. Based on process tracing, causal mechanisms through
which the OMC influences national policy reforms, such as mutual learning
and external pressure, have been identified inductively. The current study relies
on a large-N approach in order to examine whether the EU has influenced
domestic policies, what mechanisms are more or less important, and how to
explain the variation in the impact of European integration. In this regard,
a large-N approach makes it feasible to test whether the findings of the case
studies can be generalised across EU countries.
In the first part of the study, convergence analyses are employed to analyse
whether European integration may have contributed to the convergence of
welfare state policies across EU countries. In an ideal research design, one
would have a “large number of European Unions” with variation in the degree
of internal convergence on the one hand, and with different scopes of negative
and positive integration on the other, to capture the links between European
integration and convergence. Facing the reality of only one EU, the study first
relies on controls for global and domestic factors to assess whether trends of
convergence are EU-specific. In the second part of the study, pooled time series
cross-section regression analyses will be employed to investigate the links
between positive and negative integration and the cross-country and temporal
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variation in welfare state programmes, while controlling for other factors of
policy change as much as possible.
In addition, the large-N approach of this study aims to address the selection
biases in the OMC literature. Apart from the issue of the underrepresentation
of the new member states as discussed above, also among the old member
states there seems to be a selection bias against some countries, such as Por-
tugal, Ireland, Luxembourg and Greece. De la Porte (2010) has inventoried
the country-coverage in the case study literature, and found that Denmark,
Finland and Sweden were included in 23 studies, Germany in 20 studies,
France and the United Kingdom were also very well covered, and Belgium,
Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and Spain were included in five to seven
studies.1 This skewed distribution of cases is problematic, since it may in-
fluence the state of knowledge regarding the domestic impact of the OMC (Van
Vliet, 2008).2 For instance, it is well documented that the impact of the EES
has been limited in Sweden, because the pre-existing policies already met the
objectives and targets of the EES (i.e. Jacobsson, 2005). A disproportional
contribution of the results of case studies on Sweden could therefore lead to
a bias in the more general conclusions concerning the impact of the OMC, which
might have been different if for example more southern member states had
been selected.
In sum, given the fact that almost all existing research on the impact of
European integration on welfare states relies on a small-N design and is
focused on a select group of countries, the large-N approach of the current
study is at least complementary to the existing literature.
A second issue of debate in the welfare state literature is the selection of
the measures to compare welfare states with. This is known as the ‘dependent
variable problem’ (Clasen and Siegel, 2007). In the current study, several social
expenditure measures for the variants of the dependent variable will be used.
These measures make it possible to compare welfare states across a relatively
large number of countries and over a considerable period of time. The use
of social expenditure measures in international comparisons has been criticised,
since they do not reflect all qualitative characteristics of welfare state policies
(Siegel, 2007; De Deken and Kittel, 2007). First, a technical difficulty with the
use of expenditure measures may be that changes in public expenditures not
only reflect discretionary adjustments, the policy changes we are interested
1 Although this overview actually refers to studies on the Social OMC rather than to research
on the EES in particular, the representation of countries in the research on the EES seems
quite similar. A simple reason for this is that many case studies (i.e. Zeitlin and Pochet,
2005; Heidenreich and Zeitling, 2009) take both the Social OMC and the EES into account.
2 In Chapter 5, it will be discussed that for certain variables, Sweden could be regarded as
an outlier. Following the logic that outliers are interesting cases for in-depth studies, this
might justify the attention for Sweden in the case-study literature. However, since this
justification has actually not been given in the case studies, it is unlikely that Sweden is
overrepresented because it has been regarded as an outlier.
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in, but also non-discretionary dynamics, driven by cyclical and demographic
trends. However, the non-discretionary part of the expenditure can be
addressed with control variables on the right-hand side of the equations, or
with direct corrections to the spending measure itself.
More importantly, given the research question and the theoretical approach
of the current study, social expenditure indicators are accurate measures for
the dependent variable to capture trends at a higher abstraction level. In the
case of the EES for instance, governments have committed themselves to make
labour market policies more activating. However, due to the character of the
EES, countries are explicitly allowed to make those policy reforms that fit their
domestic situation, in terms of pre-existing policies and labour market con-
ditions, best. Thus, labour market policies varied across countries before the
introduction of the EES and, different from a case of harmonisation of regula-
tion, they will continue to vary after the introduction of the EES. Countries
can use different labour market policy instruments that are aimed at activation
and they can choose different configurations of large numbers of policy instru-
ments. To map the different configurations of policy instruments for which
governments have opted, and to assess whether policies are converged, a range
of non-expenditure indicators will be analysed. Subsequently, to analyse to
what extent these different policy configurations, consisting of large numbers
of policy instruments, are more activating, a more abstract measure of ex-
penditure on active labour market policies can give a good indication of the
general emphasis governments put on activation. In other words, a higher
abstraction level is needed to see the forest through the trees.
1.6 OUTLINE AND MAIN FINDINGS
The first three chapters of the dissertation, Chapter 2, Chapter 3 and Chapter 4,
are focussed on assessing to what extent welfare state policies and expenditures
have converged across the EU, and on analysing whether patterns of con-
vergence are EU-specific or not. Trends and patterns which are specific for EU
member states may indicate an impact of European integration. The remainder
of the study, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, examines the factors that may explain
these patterns of similarities and differences across countries and over time.
Here, Chapter 5 is related to positive integration, while Chapter 6 focuses on
negative integration.
Chapter 2, Patterns of Welfare State Indicators in the EU: Is There Convergence?,
co-authored with Koen Caminada and Kees Goudswaard, deals with the
evolution of welfare states over longer periods (1980-2003). First, it is discussed
why and how European integration, and also a legally non-binding EU govern-
ance means as the OMC, can be expected to lead to convergence of social
policies across EU Member States. Subsequently, the chapter provides a review
of the existing body of literature on convergence of European welfare states.
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It appears that indicators used in earlier research are difficult to compare across
countries, due to various problems such as differences in the tax treatment
of social benefits. The empirical part of this chapter aims to correct for most
of these problems, by using a variety of indicators. Several convergence tests
are employed for welfare state indicators at the macro level, for measures of
social programmes including for instance old age, disability, unemployment
and active labour market policies, and for individual level indicators, such
as minimum social assistance levels. Also poverty rates are included, to ex-
amine the development of social cohesion in the EU. The results indicate rather
strong convergence of public social expenditure in EU countries, corrected for
cyclical and demographic factors. However, when other factors, such as the
impact of the tax system and private arrangements, are taken into account,
the picture becomes less clear cut. This offers a starting point for the more
detailed research, tracing the different influences of European integration, in
the successive chapters.
Chapter 3, European Social Model: No Convergence From the East, co-authored
with Juraj Draxler, focuses on welfare state changes and convergence in Central
and East European countries, and addresses the selection bias against new
member states of the EU in both the convergence literature and the OMC
literature. The convergence analyses employed in this part of the study include
25 EU countries, both old (15) and new (10) member states. Focussing in
particular on West and East European countries, the results indicate that social
protection levels have not converged between these two country groups in
the period 2000-2006. This leads to the subsequent question whether only
generosity levels differ between West and East European countries, or whether
welfare states differ more fundamentally. A cluster analysis illustrates that
not only social protection levels, but also policy configurations differ across
east and west. An interesting finding with respect to the older member states
is that not only social protection levels and individual policy programmes have
converged, as will be shown in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4, but that there has
also been convergence in the configurations of several types of welfare state
policies.
In Chapter 4, Divergence within Convergence: Europeanisation of Social and
Labour Market Policies, the convergence analyses are focussed on the specific
period in which the EES and the OMC were adopted. The analysis starts with
another measure to correct social expenditures at the macro level for cyclical
and demographic factors than in Chapter 2, indicating that the results pres-
ented in Chapter 2 are robust for the use of an alternative indicator. Then,
the study zooms in at labour market policies, because if the EES is effective,
its influence will be most directly visible in this policy area. A number of
indicators is included for total expenditure on active labour market policies,
and for specific programmes such as employment services, labour market
training, youth programmes and subsidised employment. Furthermore, the
study includes a number of policy measures such as the level, duration and
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qualifying conditions of unemployment benefits, availability requirements and
benefit sanctions. The results indicate that most EU member states have made
shifts towards more activating national labour market policies, which might
have been influenced by the EES. Two other interesting findings emerge. First,
the results show that within this focus on activation, the member states have
opted for different configurations of labour market policy instruments, which
is actually in line with the subsidiarity principle of the EES. Second, some
countries reformed their labour market policies more than others. The analysis
presented in the next chapter is focussed on the explanation of this variation.
Chapter 5, Europeanisation and the Political Economy of Active Labour Market
Policies, co-authored with Ferry Koster, aims at explaining the variation in effort
devoted to ALMPs across countries and over time. Chapter 2 and Chapter 4
indicate that policy changes in member states have resulted in an EU-specific
trend of convergence towards more ALMPs. In this chapter, the study proceeds
with testing the impact of the EES on national labour market policy reforms,
using pooled time series cross-section regression analysis. Building on the
existing case-study literature, new indicators are proposed and investigated,
to analyse the variation in the impact of the EES across countries and over time.
In line with the findings of the convergence analyses carried out in the fore-
going chapters, the results presented in this chapter suggest that the EES has
contributed to increased emphasis on activation in national labour market
policies.
In Chapter 6, Private Social Security and International Economic Integration,
the impact of international economic integration on welfare states is examined.
A review of the large body of existing literature on this topic illustrates that
evidence has been found that economic integration may lead to both retrench-
ments and expansions of public social protection. This ambiguity is trouble-
some, and it is due to the largely indirect relationship between economic
integration and public social protection reforms. This relationship is indirect
because it is implied that economic integration influences the behaviour of
voters, which eventually results in policy changes. Instead, the impact of
economic integration could be analysed more directly by focussing on private
social security, where political mechanisms are not expected to interfere. Hence,
this chapter analyses the cross-country and longitudinal variation in the
participation in private social security plans, relying on pooled time series
cross-section regression analysis. Rather than tracing the direct impact of
European integration on European welfare states, this chapter relates to inter-
national economic integration more generally. However, among other indica-
tors of international economic integration, also an indicator is included to
measure the impact of European economic integration explicitly. The findings
of the study lend support for the fiercely debated hypothesis in the political
economy literature that international economic integration triggers expansion
of welfare state arrangements through an increased demand for social pro-
tection.
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In Chapter 7, Conclusions: Main Findings, Implications and Outlook, the
dissertation ends with a summary of the main results, and with a discussion
of their implications for the scholarship of the Europeanisation of welfare
states.
2 Patterns of Welfare State Indicators in the EU
Is There Convergence?
Abstract
Convergence of social protection objectives and policies in member states is
an explicit objective of the EU. Earlier research has shown that there has indeed
been a tendency of convergence of social protection levels over the last decades.
However, comparative studies frequently use indicators which may not be
representative as measures of the welfare state. In this article we have done
several convergence tests with the most recent data, using a variety of indi-
cators of social protection: social expenditures, both at the macro and at the
programme level, replacement rates of unemployment and social assistance
benefits and poverty indicators. Together, these indicators provide a broader
picture of the evolution of social protection. Our results are less clear cut than
earlier findings. We still find convergence of social expenditure in EU countries
over a longer period. However, this trend seems to have stagnated in recent
years. The evidence is mixed for the other indicators. Replacement rates of
unemployment benefits converged to a higher level, but social assistance
benefits did not. Poverty rates and poverty gaps have converged since the
mid-1980s, but the levels of both indicators have developed in the opposite
direction.
This chapter has been published in Journal of Common Market Studies, Volume
48, Issue 3, pp. 529-556, June 2010 (co-authored with Koen Caminada and Kees
Goudswaard) by Blackwell Publishing, All rights reserved. © Blackwell Pub-
lishing, 2010. The definitive version is available at www.wiley.com.
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2.1 INTRODUCTION1
Social progress has been a European objective since the Treaty of Rome in
1957. The founding fathers of the EU believed that economic integration would
promote progress in social protection across participating countries, such that
convergence of social protection systems would follow more or less spon-
taneously. However, the welfare state literature indicates that economic integra-
tion may also be harmful to social protection systems. Fears for a social race
to the bottom have been expressed. In the 1990s both the European Council
and the European Commission adopted a more active convergence strategy:
they proclaimed the objective of a convergence of social policies of member
states and the development of common objectives of social policies. In 2000
the European Council adopted the goal that besides economic growth, social
cohesion should also be strengthened in the EU (the Lisbon Agenda). The open
method of coordination was introduced as the means of spreading best practice
and achieving greater convergence towards the main EU goals. Social indicators
were developed to monitor the improvements with respect to the social co-
hesion. This Lisbon Agenda has renewed the interest in patterns of social
protection across member states. Thus, Europeanization may contribute to
social convergence.
In this article we will test the convergence hypothesis. Earlier research has
shown that there has been a tendency towards rather strong convergence of
social protection systems in the EU countries over the last decades (Cornelisse
and Goudswaard, 2002). However, the indicators used in earlier studies
– mostly public expenditure on social benefits – may not be representative
for the social security system at large. Indeed, there are several problems. Ex-
penditure ratio’s are determined to some extent by unemployment rates and
by the demographic structure in a country and thus do not fully reflect pro-
tection levels. Also, most analyses of social protection are focused on public
arrangements only. But social effort is not restricted to the public domain; all
kinds of private arrangements can be substitutes for public programmes
(Caminada and Goudswaard, 2005). Also, differences in the tax treatment of
social benefits make international comparisons of social protection systems
much more difficult. The OECD did a comprehensive study on social ex-
penditure, in which they account for private social benefits and the impact
of the tax system on social expenditure (Adema, 2001; Adema and Ladaique,
2005). But adjusted aggregate expenditure data can only provide a rough
indication of the degree of social protection offered by different welfare states.
More indicators, also at the programme level or at the microlevel are necessary
1 We thank Barbara Wolfe, Maroesjka Versantvoort, Michael Kaeding, Bart van Riel, Steffen
Osterloh and two anonymous referees of the Journal of Common Market Studies for their
helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of (part of) our research.
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to make an adequate comparison across countries and to test the social con-
vergence hypothesis.
In this article we will do several convergence tests using recent data on
social protection. To that end we use a variety of social indicators: (a) at the
macro level: total public social expenditure and total public and private social
expenditure (accounting for the impact of private arrangements and for the
impact of the tax system); (b) at the programme level: expenditures on various
social programmes, including old age, disability, unemployment, health, family,
active labor market programmes and various other social policy areas; and
(c) at the individual level: replacement rates of unemployment benefits, mini-
mum social assistance levels and poverty rates after social transfers. This
poverty rate is an official EU social cohesion indicator.
The article is organized as follows. In section 2.2 we discuss the European-
ization of social policies and the hypothesis of social convergence. In section 2.3
we introduce and discuss the welfare state indicators used, the data and the
σ and β convergence tests. Section 2.4 presents the results of several cross-
country analyses. Section 2.5 concludes the article.
2.2 THE CONVERGENCE HYPOTHESIS
Effects of economic integration
Should we expect social convergence in the EU? Theoretically, convergence
of social protection may occur both as a consequence of European economic
integration and more in particular the creation of a single market, and as a
consequence of the implementation of EU social policies (Leibfried, 2000). In
this section we discuss the effects of economic integration. The traditional
opinion – already expressed by the founding fathers of the EU – is that eco-
nomic integration promotes progress in social protection across participating
countries, such that convergence of social protection systems follows more
or less spontaneously. Theoretically, however, economic integration can be
both beneficial and harmful to social protection systems. On the one hand,
it can be argued that economic integration leads to more economic develop-
ment in relatively poor countries and economic development in turn
strengthens the need for an extended system of social protection as well as
the opportunity to fund it (Goudswaard and Van Riel, 2004). To insure them-
selves against the increased dynamics of the labor market due to international
economic integration, people desire higher levels of social protection (Agell,
1999: 154). On the other hand, internationalization goes along with higher
mobility of production factors. An increase in migration can cause adverse
selection problems: individuals who expect to be net beneficiaries will be
attracted to countries with generous social programmes, while net contributors
are deterred by the high tax burden in these countries. This puts pressure on
the generosity of social security systems, because the social expenditures rise
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and the tax base narrows (Sandmo, 2001). In the end, this results in con-
vergence to lower social protection levels (Sinn, 2002). This is a standard
argument for centralizing redistribution policies in an economic union,
although it can be demonstrated that centralization is not an inevitable con-
sequence (Wildasin, 1991). A second argument says that the competitive
position of countries with relatively generous protection systems may be
damaged through higher labour costs, especially in a single market (Sinn,
2003). Consequently, competition leads to lower standards of social policies,
the so-called ‘social race to the bottom’ or ‘social dumping’ (Scharpf, 1999).
This effect could even be strengthened by the fact that because of the EMU
criteria, countries can only increase their competitiveness with supply-side
strategies (Scharpf, 2002: 649). As a consequence, again social protection may
converge to lower levels.
At the national level, the indirect effects of European economic integration
can be explained by changing domestic opportunity structures. According to
this mechanism of Europeanization, domestic policies are not affected by
prescriptive EU requirements, but by redistribution of powers and resources
between domestic actors (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2002). This shift in national
political arenas may eventually lead to policy changes. The pressure on labour
costs due to international competition may limit certain actors to bargain on
expansions of social protection, while it may provide actors who are in favour
of retrenchments with more political power.
From the above discussion it can be concluded that theory does not tell
us clearly whether economic integration leads to more or less social protection
and whether there will be spontaneous convergence of social protection sys-
tems.
Europeanization
What is the role of EU policies as far as social convergence is concerned? In
the literature, several authors have pointed out that Europeanization and
convergence are not interchangeable concepts (Graziano and Vink, 2007).
Whereas Europeanization can generally be regarded as domestic change caused
by European integration (Vink, 2003: 63), convergence refers to a decrease in
variation across countries over time. Hence, convergence can occur as a result
of Europeanization (Radaelli, 2000), but Europeanization could lead to con-
tinuing divergence as well and it is therefore an empirical question whether
Europeanization leads to convergence.
In principle, member states of the EU are still autonomous when it comes
to the design and generosity of their social protection systems. Still, member
states have accepted a certain degree of commitment in terms of social pro-
tection. This commitment is embodied in two recommendations accepted by
the European Council in 1992. The first recommendation, of June 1992, dealt
with common criteria concerning sufficient resources and social assistance in
social protection systems (92/441/EEC). The second recommendation, of July
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1992, explicitly addressed the ‘convergence of social protection objectives and
policies’ (92/442/EEC). The motivation was that convergence seeks to
guarantee the continuation and stimulate the development of social protection
within the context of the completion of the internal market. And also that
member states face common problems, such as ageing of the population,
unemployment, changing family structures and poverty; common objectives
must act as pointers to the way social protection systems are modified to take
account of these problems. The desirability of convergence of member states’
policies has been reconfirmed in several reports of the European Commission,
such as the White Paper on European Social Policy of 1994 (Commission, 1994)
and reports on Social Protection in Europe. The 1998 Employment Guidelines,
as a result of the Jobs Summit in Luxembourg at the end of 1997, can partly
be seen as an implementation of the convergence strategy.
A new and important step was taken at the European Council in Lisbon
2000. For the EU the strategic goal was set for the decade ending in 2010 to
become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy with
sustainable economic growth and greater social cohesion. To achieve these
aims, the social model needs to be modernized. To ensure long-term sustain-
ability of the social security systems in the light of the ageing process, par-
ticipation rates should be increased.
The Treaty of Nice of 2001 took the social agenda forward. It was agreed
to advance social policy on the basis of the open method of coordination (OMC),
first employed with respect to employment policies. The method recognizes
that social policy remains the responsibility of member states, under the
principle of subsidiarity. It implies that member states define and evaluate
common objectives and learn from each other how to best reach these object-
ives. Best practices are disseminated and benchmarking is used. Coordination
is based on evaluation and peer pressure, but does not offer the option of
sanctions. In Nice it was decided that member states should implement action
plans for combating poverty and social exclusion and to define common
objectives on social indicators. The indicators encompass financial poverty,
income inequality, long-term unemployment, regional variation in employment
rates, life expectancy and poor health.
Some consider these common indicators and the national action plans for
social inclusion as significant progress towards integration along the social
dimension (Atkinson, 2002). Others question this form of coordination (Leib-
fried, 2002).
Because of the non-binding character, the impact of this new mode of
governance on national policies is highly debated in the literature (Zeitlin and
Pochet, 2005; Kvist and Saari, 2007b). Instead of Europeanization based on
institutional compliance (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2002), the structural coupling
between the European and national level brought about by the OMC relies on
other mechanisms. Firstly, the OMC may have a normative influence on national
policies. Objectives are normatively formulated and targets are defined. In
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addition, guidelines provide specific policy norms, stating that member states
should focus more on certain policies. To enforce these guidelines, member
states receive comments and recommendations from Commission services
annually on the progression in their policies regarding the guidelines and
objectives. By means of these norms, the OMC diffuses a paradigm of activation
and inclusion through the member states, aimed at influencing the domestic
policy-making arena’s.
A second Europeanization mechanism effected by the OMC is mutual
learning. In the peer review programme, an institutionalized setting of policy
learning, country representatives learn from the experiences of their inter-
national peers. Policies regarded as best practices will be imitated by policy-
makers, called policy mimicking. Recently, Heidenreich and Bischoff (2008:
516) even argued that this cognitive dimension is the prevailing influencing
mechanism of the OMC.
Although the differences in social protection systems across countries are
explicitly taken into account in the OMC, this new mode of governance can
certainly be expected to trigger convergence in social policies across the mem-
ber states. Following the idea of ‘contextualized learning’, the OMC does not
prescribe specific policy instruments, leaving room for countries to opt for
policy instruments that suit their domestic situations best. Therefore the OMC
will not lead to convergence in specific policy instruments, but as policy-
makers get influenced by the normative and cognitive mechanisms of the OMC,
policy areas may shift towards a certain direction, leading to a form of con-
vergence in the end. At least, this new mode of governance and the Lisbon
agenda in general, have renewed the debate on convergence patterns across
EU member states.
In line with the discussion above, we hypothesize that Europeanisation
has led to convergence of social protection systems across European countries.
This social convergence hypothesis we develop here has two components.
Firstly, we expect the dispersion across countries to decrease over time, leading
to convergence. The second component is the direction of convergence. As
a consequence of the policy initiatives at the European level, we expect con-
vergence of social protection and social inclusion at least to the middle, or
to higher levels.
Earlier findings
Over the past decades the attention for analysing convergence of social ex-
penditures has grown steadily. Early scholars as Wilensky (1975) show that
from the 1950s social expenditures have grown in rich countries. The hypo-
thesis is that due to similar developments such as industrialization and eco-
nomic growth public expenditures on welfare of modern societies will con-
verge. Montanari (2001: 470) called this the ‘old convergence’ hypothesis.
O’Connor’s (1988) study, however, does not confirm this old convergence hypo-
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thesis empirically. She concludes that there is minimal convergence in social
transfers and social expenditures among 17 countries in the period 1960-1980.
From the mid-1990s, the central argument is that globalisation and
Europeanisation led to a downward convergence of social expenditures. This
argument is what Montanari (2001: 470) called the ‘new convergence’ hypo-
thesis. Empirically, scholars found no evidence supporting this hypothesis.
Greve (1996) assesses the impact of European integration on social policies
and he finds upward convergence of the expenditures on social protection
in 12 EU countries in the period 1980-1993. Cornelisse and Goudswaard (2002)
find not only an upward convergence in social benefit expenditures, but also
in gross replacement rates of unemployment benefits. Their study shows that
EU countries as well as non-EU OECD countries converged between 1960 and
1980, but that between 1980 and 1999 only the EU countries converged. Gouds-
waard and Caminada (2006) also find a strong upward convergence in Euro-
pean social spending and gross replacement rates of unemployment benefits.
Castles (2004: 37) found for social expenditures upward convergence across
21 OECD countries between 1960 and 1998. Whereas for social expenditures
controlled for ageing and unemployment he found downward convergence
in the period 1980 and 1998. Bouget (2003) divides the period 1980-1998 into
three sub periods. He finds in an EU-14 sample as well as in an OECD-21 sample
convergence between 1980 and 1990, divergence between 1990 and 1993 and
again convergence between 1993 and 1998. Pestieau (2006) concludes that there
was a limited tendency towards convergence in spending during the period
1980-2001. Adelantado and Calderσn Cuevas (2006) found that European
welfare states were converging towards the middle in terms of public ex-
penditure, social protection expenditure, income inequality and the risk of
poverty between 1992 and 2001. Alsasua et al (2007) show a picture of con-
vergence across EU-member states between 1985 and 1999. Van Vliet (2010a)
found convergence of social expenditure controlled for unemployment and
ageing across the EU between 1995 and 2002, while he found divergence across
seven non-EU OECD countries. These results possibly demonstrate an effect of
European integration.
All in all, although many qualitative guided researchers favour arguments
that show continuing national diversity (Pierson, 2001; Taylor-Gooby, 2001;
Daguerre and Taylor-Gooby, 2004; Hvinden, 2004; Martinsen, 2005), the overall
result of quantitative studies seems to be that there is convergence in social
expenditures across European countries over the last 25 years.
2.3 RESEARCH DESIGN
Expenditure indicators
Most comparative and convergence studies of social protection use social
expenditures as a measure of the level of social protection in different coun-
tries. We use data from the most recent OECD Social Expenditure Database
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(2007b). This database contains aggregate and disaggregated data on social
expenditures. The main social policy areas included are old age, survivors,
incapacity-related benefits, health, family, active labor market programmes,
unemployment, housing and some others. Both cash benefits and benefits in
kind are included. In this study we will perform convergence tests both at
the aggregate level and at the programme level. At the aggregate level, the
social expenditure indicator has its limitations (Kühner, 2007). Changes in
expenditure ratio’s may not be caused by policy changes, but simply by the
number of beneficiaries as a result of an ageing population or changes in
unemployment levels due to cyclical factors. For this reason, we will control
for cyclical and demographic factors. When the data are controlled for cyclical
and demographic effects, it seems more plausible that patterns of convergence
can be attributed to policy changes which are influenced by processes of
economic integration or Social Europe. However, several methods to ‘standard-
ize’ total social expenditures to control for changes in welfare demand (the
number of beneficiaries) are criticized because of bias.2 An attractive method
put forward in the literature by Kühner (2007: 16) is simply to include inde-
pendent variables measuring the unemployment rate (for cyclical factors) and
the ratio of the elderly population (for old age pensions) in respective
regression estimations to control for cyclical and demographic factors.
To indicate whether it is Europeanization rather than globalization that
has had any impact on the convergence of social expenditures, we include
not only EU member states, but also other OECD countries. These non-EU OECD
countries control for the effects of globalization.
Other problems with social expenditure as an indicator for differences in
social protection across countries are related to differences in the public/private
mix in the provision of social protection and differences in tax features. Adema
(2001) has developed indicators that aim to measure what part of an economy’s
domestic production recipients of social benefits really draw on – net total
social expenditure. This requires capturing private social benefits and the
impact of tax systems on social effort. For private programmes to be considered
‘social’, they need to have a social purpose and contain an element of inter-
personal redistribution.3
The impact of the tax system on the social effort is threefold. In some
countries cash benefits are taxable as a rule, in other countries they are not.
2 See for example Castles (2002), Castles (2004), Clayton and Pontusson (1998), Van Vliet
(2010a).
3 Private social programs can be mandatory or voluntary. Mandatory private benefits are
often incapacity related. For example, in several countries employers are obliged to provide
sickness benefits. Occupational injuries and accidents are sometimes covered by mandatory
private insurances. A number of EU-member states have supplementary employment-based
pension plans with mandatory contributions, based on a funding system. Voluntary private
social security covers a wide range of programs, of which private pension plans and private
social health insurance constitute major components.
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In the former countries net social effort is less than suggested by gross
spending indicators. Indirect taxation of consumption by benefit recipients
is another factor that may blur the picture. When indirect taxes are higher,
benefit recipients have less effective purchasing power. And thirdly, the tax
system can be used for social purposes. Tax deductions (for example, family
tax allowances) replace direct expenditures in some cases. The Earned Income
Tax Credit in the United States is a good example of a tax break, which has
the features of a social protection programme. To control for the impact of
tax systems on social spending, we will use the OECD data on net social ex-
penditure. Unfortunately, these data only cover a relatively short time period
(1993-2003) and are not available for all EU member states.
Generosity and poverty indicators
Several comparative studies of social security systems have turned to the use
of replacement rates as measures of the level of benefits in different countries
and therefore of the degree of social protection offered by different welfare
systems (Caminada and Goudswaard, 2001 and 2002). However, replacement
rates can also only be seen as limited indicators of the generosity of benefit
systems (Whiteford, 1995). Some of the limitations are: (1) replacement rates
are based on entitlement rules and often represent only the maximum payment
available in the circumstances specified; (2) benefits are often not fully indexed,
implying that benefits represent a decreasing percentage of wages; (3) not all
relevant benefits may be reckoned with (such as housing subsidies or health
care); and (4) taxation can blur the picture. To monitor social policy develop-
ments, one should ideally calculate a variety of replacement rates (differ-
entiated by, for example, earnings levels, family situations and duration of
spells). The basic approach adopted by the OECD to measure replacement rates
is to compute the total benefit payable in a year of unemployment for a variety
of ‘typical’ worker and household cases (for example, OECD, 2002, 2004, 2006).
We use the mean of these gross replacement rates, which is taken to represent
a summary measure of benefit entitlements.
The OECD also calculates net replacement rates. Unfortunately, these data
are only available for a few data years (2001-2005), so we cannot use them
for our time series analysis. But we do have another time series of net replace-
ment rates, based on Cantillon et al. (2004). They calculated replacement rates
for the basic social benefits: net social assistance benefits, as a proportion of
average earnings.4 These figures, available for the period 1992-2001, give a
good indication of the generosity of the welfare systems at the minimum level
in different countries.
Next, we use an important EU indicator for social cohesion: the at-risk-of-
poverty rate after social transfers. This rate is defined as the share of persons
with an equivalised disposable income below the risk-of-poverty threshold,
4 The figures are derived from standardized calculations from national informants.
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which is set at 60 percent of the national median equivalised disposable
income. For this indicator Eurostat data are available for the period 1995-2006,
but not for all member states. This poverty rate reflects the extent to which
welfare states offer protection against poverty, although obviously poverty
rates are also influenced by other factors than welfare state programmes.
Finally, for a further comparison, we will also use the OECD poverty indicators:
the poverty rate and the poverty gap. The OECD poverty rate is defined as the
proportion of individuals with equivalised disposable income less than 50
percent of the median income. The poverty gap is the percentage difference
between the average income of the poor and the 50 percent of median income
poverty threshold. These OECD poverty data are available from the mid-1980’s
until the mid-2000s.
σ- and β-convergence tests
One of the most simple methods for estimating convergence of social protection
levels is using the standard deviation as a statistical yardstick (σ-convergence).
With this method it is possible to examine how the dispersion between social
protection levels, or other social indicators, has changed. A property of the
standard deviation is that its value rises with the average value of the data
set to which it is applied. To account for this, we also use the so-called co-
efficient of variation, defined as the standard deviation divided by the value
of the mean of the corresponding data set. Cornelisse and Goudswaard (2002)
apply the term relative convergence (divergence) when observing a drop (rise)
in the value of the coefficient of variation and the term absolute convergence
(divergence) when using the standard deviation as criterion.
We also employ β-convergence tests. β-convergence implies that con-
vergence occurs when the regions with lower social protection levels tend to
record a greater rate of growth in social protection.5 In other words, the
relatively backward regions tend to catch up with the relatively advanced
regions on the indicator of interest.
It should be noted that β-convergence has a twofold connotation, absolute
and conditional convergence.6 The absolute convergence hypothesis is usually
tested for homogeneous groups of economies such as the EU, where character-
istics such as preferences and institutions are relatively similar. Therefore, we
employ the absolute convergence hypothesis. We test β-convergence on social
5 Usually, the concept of β-convergence refers to the speed at which the income per capita
of a poor region approaches the level of a rich one. The ‘economic convergence literature’
is typified by the seminal papers of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992 and 1995), exploring
β-convergence. See also Sala-i-Martin (1996a and 1996b) survey on this literature, and Quah
(1993, 1996a, and 1996b) for criticism.
6 The former implies that the process of convergence can be observed regardless of other
socio-economic characteristics of the regions that are compared. The observed process is
defined ‘conditional convergence’ in case convergence is observed holding constant a
number of other ‘conditioning’ variables; see Quah (1996b) and Sala-i-Martin (1996b).
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protection levels as follows. In line with the work of Sala-i-Martin (1996a and
1996b), we linearly regress the annual growth rate of several social protection
indicators on the initial level of the social protection indicator at the beginning
of the period. The coefficient for absolute β-convergence is estimated using
an ordinary least square regression model of cross-sectional data. If the co-
efficient β is negative (positive), we say that there is absolute convergence
(divergence) in social protection levels across countries. The higher the value
of β, the faster the social protection indicator in the poor region converges
toward the level of the rich one. The hypothesis to test is that coefficient β
is negative.7
7 β-convergence is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for σ-convergence (see Barro
and Sala-i-Martin, 1992; Sala-i-Martin, 1996a and 1996b).
  





1980 1990 2000 2003 
change  
1980-2003 
Australia 10.9 14.1 17.9 17.9 7.0 
Austria 22.6 23.7 25.3 26.1 3.5 
Belgium 23.5 25.0 25.3 26.5 3.0 
Canada 14.1 18.4 16.7 17.3 3.1 
Denmark 25.2 25.5 25.8 27.6 2.4 
Finland 18.4 24.5 21.3 22.5 4.1 
France 20.8 25.3 27.6 28.7 7.9 
Germany 23.0 22.5 26.3 27.3 4.3 
Greece 11.5 18.6 21.3 21.3 9.8 
Ireland 16.8 15.5 13.6 15.9 -0.8 
Italy 18.0 19.9 23.2 24.2 6.2 
Japan 10.3 11.2 16.1 17.7 7.4 
Luxembourg 23.6 21.9 20.4 22.2 -1.4 
Netherlands 24.1 24.4 19.3 20.7 -3.5 
New Zealand 17.1 21.8 19.1 18.0 0.9 
Norway 16.9 22.6 22.2 25.1 8.2 
Portugal 10.8 13.7 20.2 23.5 12.7 
Spain 15.5 20.0 20.4 20.3 4.8 
Sweden 28.6 30.5 28.8 31.3 2.7 
Switzerland 13.9 13.5 18.0 20.5 6.6 
United Kingdom 16.6 17.2 19.1 20.6 4.1 
United States 13.3 13.4 14.6 16.2 2.9 
      
Mean OECD-22 18.0 20.1 21.0 22.3 4.4 
Standard deviation  5.16 4.94 4.07 4.23 -0.93 
Coefficient of variation 0.287 0.245 0.194 0.189 -0.098 
      
Mean EU-15 19.9 21.9 22.5 23.9 4.0 
Standard deviation  4.94 4.27 3.85 3.86 -1.08 
Coefficient of variation 0.248 0.195 0.171 0.161 -0.087 
      
 
Note: EU-15: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.  
 







Gross public social expenditure
Table 2.1 indicates a strong σ-convergence of gross social protection ex-
penditure, both relatively and absolutely, especially within the European
Union. Between 1980 and 2003 the standard deviation of public social spending
of EU countries declined by 22 percent, while the coefficient of variation
showed a decrease by 35 percent. The EU average level of social spending
increased by 4.0 percent points of GDP in the period 1980-2003, which does
not indicate a social race to the bottom. On the contrary, especially the Mediter-
ranean countries, with rather low levels of protection in 1980, caught up
rapidly in terms of social expenditure, in particular Portugal. This largely
explains the rather strong social convergence in the EU. However, convergence
seems to have slowed down in recent years. When other OECD countries are
included, social expenditure levels converge to a slightly lesser extent than
within the EU only.
Social policy areas
We also show social expenditures on the various programmes; see Figure 2.1
and Table A2.1 in the appendix. Expenditures on most social security functions
have increased quite smoothly, except disability and survivors benefits. Ex-
penditures on public old age pensions show a rather strong divergence from
1980 to 2003. Apparently, governments respond in different ways to the
common problems of ageing of populations. However, expenditures on health
care, which are also related to ageing of populations, have converged over
the last two decades. Also for other functions a convergence tendency can be
observed. Expenditures on active labor market programmes and on unemploy-
ment, both related to labor market developments, converged rather strongly.
  























Source: OECD Social Expenditure Database (OECD 2007b); and authors’ own calculations. 
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6: Active labor  











































     
 
a: “1980” data refer to the year 1985 for Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Ireland, and Norway. 
b: “1980” data refer to the year 1985 for Ireland. 
c: “1980” data refer to the year 1985 for Denmark. 
 
Note: OLS-regression; t-statistics in parentheses. ** Significant at the 0.01 level; * significant at 0.05 level 
 
Source: OECD Social Expenditure Database (OECD 2007b); and authors’ own calculations. 
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We also estimated β-convergence of public social expenditure. This is done
by regressing the annual growth of gross public social expenditure as per-
centage of GDP on the initial level of social spending as percentage of GDP.
The results, which are presented in Table 2.2, indicate a β-convergence of 1.8
percent per year for the period 1981-2003 for OECD-22, and a β-convergence
of 2.3 percent per year for EU-15. This means that the difference of a country
with respect to the OECD or EU average declines by 1.8 rep. 2.3 percent per
year. For the EU, the functions survivors, incapacity related, health, active labor
market programs, unemployment and others show statistically significant β-
convergence.
  
Table 2.3 β-Convergence of public social expenditures in EU-15 controlled for cyclical 
and demographic effects, 1985-2003 
 
    
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
    






    




    
Population aged 65 and above  0.213 
(0.49) 
 







    
    
adj. R2 0.258 0.502 0.534 
    
 
Note: OLS-regression; t-statistics in parentheses. ** Significant at the 0.01 level; * significant at 0.05 level 
 
Source: (a) Gross public social expenditures: OECD Social Expenditure Database (OECD 2007b); 
 (b) Population aged 65 and above as percentage of total population: The World Bank: World Development 
Indicators; 
 (c) Unemployment rate: the number of people unemployed as percentage of the labor force: The World 
Bank: World Development Indicators; Unemployment rate Germany (1985), New Zealand (1985) and 
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Control for cyclical and demographic effects
As discussed before, convergence of social expenditure ratio’s may simply
be caused by the number of beneficiaries as the result of ageing of the popula-
tion or changes in unemployment levels due to cyclical factors, rather than
by globalization or Europeanization. To control for these factors, we again
estimate β-convergence of gross public social expenditure by regressing the
annual change of gross public social expenditures on the initial level of gross
public social expenditures (1985), the annual change of the unemployment
rate (1985-2003) and the annual change of the percentage of population aged
65 and above (1985-2003).8
The estimations are presented in Table 2.3. In the second column we see
that although we controlled for cyclical and demographic effects, we still find
a pretty good fit of β-convergence. Note that the coefficient of changes in the
unemployment rate – as a proxy for cyclical factors – is significant, but the
effect of the percentage of population aged 65 and above does not significantly
differ from 0. This means that parallel developments in the unemployment
rate across countries partly explain the growth in social spending, while the
ageing of populations, in contrary to what usually is assumed in the literature
(Castles, 2004; Kühner, 2007), cannot. These results are in line with the results
of our analysis of the individual social protection programs as presented above,
which show a strong convergence of unemployment benefits, and divergence
of public old-age pensions.
Net total spending
Table 2.4 presents figures on the net social expenditure as percentage of GDP,
based on the figures of Adema (2001), Adema and Ladaique (2005), and the
2007 edition of the Net Social Expenditure data. The table shows all countries
for which information is available on net social spending indicators for the
period 1995-2003. The data indicate that accounting for the impact of taxes
and of private social expenditure has an equalizing effect on levels of social
effort across countries. Net social expenditures declined on average in the
period 1995-2003, especially in the EU member states included in Table 2.4.
The countries also show a substantial divergence of expenditures. This surpris-
ing result can partly be explained by the fact that the Mediterranean welfare
states are not included. Interestingly, the net social expenditures of the Scandi-
navian countries decreased sharply.
Replacement rates
Compared to expenditure data, replacement rates are a better indicator of the
generosity of welfare systems, although certainly not a perfect indicator. Table
2.5 shows that gross replacement rates of unemployment benefits increased
8 Due to missing data for several countries in the early 1980’s, we used data for the period
1985-2003.
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on average by 4.9 points in the EU in the period 1981-2005. The figures indicate
a quite strong σ-convergence of gross replacement rates, both relatively and
absolutely, more within the EU than in the OECD. Between 1981 and 2005 the
standard deviation of gross replacement rates of EU countries declined by 35
percent, while the coefficient of variation showed a decrease by 45 percent.
Again, especially the Mediterranean countries, with rather low levels of pro-
tection in 1981, caught up rapidly in terms of gross replacement rates. Denmark
and the Netherlands, the two countries with the highest replacement rates
in 1981, show the sharpest decreases, which partly explains the trend of
convergence. The upward convergence of replacement rates means that the
upward convergence of public social expenditure on unemployment (see Table
A2.1) not only depends on the number of unemployed people, but is also
related to the level of protection for each unemployed individual.
  




 1995 1997 2001 2003 
Change  
1995-2003 
Australia 20.3 20.4 21.1 20.6 0.3 
Austria 25.7 22.0 21.8 22.2 -3.5 
Belgium 25.3 25.4 23.2 26.0 0.7 
Canada 20.6 18.9 20.3 21.2 0.6 
Czech Republic 16.6 17.2 18.5 19.8 3.2 
Denmark 24.5 23.5 22.5 21.6 -2.9 
Finland 23.6 22.1 20.0 20.6 -3.0 
Germany 25.7 26.1 27.6 27.6 1.9 
Ireland 17.9 16.5 12.5 14.3 -3.6 
Korea 5.7 8.3 10.0 8.0 2.3 
Netherlands 22.5 21.5 22.1 23.1 0.6 
Norway 22.8 21.7 20.9 21.7 -1.1 
Sweden 28.1 27.3 26.0 26.1 -2.0 
United Kingdom 23.3 21.8 23.3 24.6 1.3 
United States 22.4 21.8 23.1 25.2 2.8 
      
Mean OECD (15) 21.7 21.0 20.9 21.5 -0.2 
Standard deviation 5.18 4.44 4.38 4.79 -0.39 
Coefficient of variation 0.239 0.212 0.210 0.223 -0.016 
      
Mean EU-15 Members (9) 24.1 22.9 22.1 22.9 -1.2 
Standard deviation 2.68 3.01 4.01 3.75 1.07 
Coefficient of variation 0.111 0.132 0.181 0.164 0.053 
      
 





Patterns of Welfare State Indicators in the EU. Is There Convergence? 31
Also our β-convergence test implies that convergence occurs (see Table 2.6).
The coefficient for absolute β-convergence indicates a significant convergence
of 2 percent per year during the period 1981-2005.
In Table 2.7 we show net replacement rates of social assistance benefits.
Perhaps surprisingly, welfare benefits have declined rather substantially in
a number of countries: Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the
United Kingdom. Also average welfare benefits have fallen between 1992 and
2001. The data on the computed average of the net replacement rates of social
assistance benefits do not show a σ-convergence.  
Table 2.5 Average gross replacement rates unemployment benefits, 1981-2005 
 
  
1981 1991 2001 2005 
change 
1981-2005 
Australia 22 26 25 22 -0.1 
Austria 29 31 32 32 2.5 
Belgium 45 42 38 41 -3.8 
Canada 18 19 15 12 -6.2 
Denmark 54 52 51 49 -5.3 
Finland 24 39 35 35 11.6 
France 31 38 44 39 7.7 
Germany 29 29 29 24 -5.1 
Greece 6 13 13 13 7.3 
Ireland 28 29 30 34 5.5 
Italy 1 3 34 33 31.8 
Japan 9 10 9 8 -1.0 
Netherlands 48 53 53 35 -12.6 
New Zealand 29 30 28 26 -2.3 
Norway 29 39 43 34 4.6 
Portugal 9 34 41 40 31.0 
Spain 28 34 36 36 8.1 
Sweden 25 29 24 24 -1.3 
Switzerland 13 22 38 33 19.9 
United Kingdom 24 18 17 16 -8.6 
United States 15 11 14 13 -1.1 
      
Mean OECD-21 24.5 28.6 30.8 28.5 3.9 
Standard deviation 13.26 12.94 12.15 10.85 -2.41 
Coefficient of variation 0.540 0.452 0.394 0.381 -0.159 
      
Mean EU-15 Members (14) 27.2 31.6 34.0 32.1 4.9 
Standard deviation 14.69 13.33 11.04 9.48 -5.21 
Coefficient of variation 0.539 0.422 0.325 0.295 -0.244 
      
 
Note: A simple average of replacement rates is taken to represent a summary measure of benefit entitlements. In all 
cases benefit entitlements have been estimated for two earnings levels (average earnings and two-thirds of 
average earnings of an Average Production Worker), three family situations (single, with dependent spouse, 
with spouse in work) and three durations of unemployment spells (one year, 2 to 3 years, 4 to 5 years out of 
work). The columns show the unweigthed averages of these replacement rates. The computations assume 
standard circumstances such as 40 years of age, involuntary loss of the former job, long previous work record. 
etc. For further details, see OECD (1994). Pre-2003 data have been revised. 
 







Finally, we investigated trends in several poverty indicators; the poverty rate
and the poverty gap. Table 8 shows that the poverty indicator used by the
EU as a measure of social cohesion did not decline on average between 1995
and 2006. Poverty rates after social transfers even rose in Denmark, Finland,
Luxembourg, Spain, and Sweden between 1995 and 2006. The dispersion in
poverty rates between EU-15 countries declined by 29 percent according to
the coefficient of variation during this period. Since the adoption of the Lisbon
Agenda in 2000, poverty rates after social transfers in the EU-15 rose on aver-
age, but show a rather strong converging trend.9
9 This result should be interpreted with caution, because there is a disruption in the time
series of poverty indicators presented in Table 2.8. Until 2001, data were provided by the
European Community Household Panel survey (ECHP). Since 2005 all EU-15 countries
provide data from the new European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions
(EU-SILC). During the transitional period poverty indicators were provided by national
sources which were harmonized ex-post as closely as possible with EU-SILC definitions
by Eurostat. Despite the fact that most EU-SILC variables are defined in the same way as
the corresponding ECHP variables, some differences arise; see Guio (2005). See for more
details the paper on ‘The continuity of indicators during the transition between ECHP and
EU-SILC’ by Eurostat (2005).
  






















    
 
Note: OLS-regression; t-statistics in parentheses. ** Significant at the 0.01 level; * significant at 0.05 level 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Next, we also include several non-EU-15 countries into our analysis to indicate
whether it is Europeanisation rather than globalisation that has had any impact
on the convergence of poverty rates. We use the OECD definition of poverty
(threshold of 50 percent of median income). Poverty rates in the EU show a
rather substantial increase from the mid-1980s until the mid-2000s (Table 2.9).
From the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s the unweigted average of poverty rates
across OECD countries increased by 0.6 percentage point. In the decade from
the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s poverty rates increased again on average by
0.6 point to almost 11 percent of the population.
Over the entire period from the mid-1980s to the mid-2000s, poverty
increased in most of the OECD countries. Across the OECD countries for which
data are available, the cumulative increase was around 1.1 points. Also, we
find a convergence of poverty rates in EU countries: both the standard deviation
and the coefficient of variation have fallen during this period. After including
a number of other OECD countries, we find the same pattern: on average higher
poverty rates, but a convergence trend. So, the OECD data on poverty rates
do not show evidence for the theory of Europeanisation.
The poverty gap on the other hand has on average been reduced in the
EU from the mid-1980s until the mid-2000s. The reduction of the poverty gap
has been smaller in OECD countries outside the EU. Also, we find convergence  




1995 2000 2003 2006 
Austria 13 12 13 13 
Belgium 16 13 15 15 
Denmark 10 10 12 12 
Finland 8 11 11 13 
France 15 16 12 13 
Germany 15 10 15 13 
Greece 22 20 21 21 
Ireland 19 20 20 18 
Italy 20 18 19 20 
Luxembourg 12 12 10 14 
Netherlands 11 11 12 10 
Portugal 23 21 19 18 
Spain 19 18 19 20 
Sweden 8 9 11 12 
United Kingdom 20 19 18 19 
     
Mean EU-15 Members 15.4 14.7 15.1 15.4 
Standard deviation  4.80 4.16 3.70 3.44 
Coefficient of variation 0.312 0.283 0.245 0.223 
     
 
Notes: Poverty rates are measured as the proportion of individuals with equivalised disposable income less than 60 
percent of the median income of the entire population. Slightly different data years for Denmark 2000 (2001), Finland 
1995 (1996), Italy 2003 (2004), Sweden 1995 (1997), Sweden 2000 (2001), and Sweden 2003 (2004). 
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– more in the EU-15 than in the OECD group of countries – which is in line with
our hypothesis that Europeanization has led to convergence, at least at a
constant level; see Table 2.9.
As far as poverty is concerned, our data show mixed results. Both poverty
rates and poverty gaps clearly converged since the mid-1980s; however, the
levels of both indicators have developed in the opposite direction (see OECD,
2008: 129).
Table 2.9 OECD poverty rates and poverty gap 
 









Austria 6.1 7.4 6.6 0.6 -0.7 
Belgium 14.6 10.8 8.8 -5.8 -2.0 
Canada 10.7 9.5 12.0 1.3 2.5 
Denmark 6.0 4.7 5.3 -0.7 0.6 
Finland 5.1 4.9 7.3 2.2 2.4 
France 8.3 7.5 7.1 -1.2 -0.4 
Germany 6.3 8.5 11.0 4.8 2.5 
Greece 13.4 13.9 12.6 -0.8 -1.2 
Ireland 10.6 11.0 14.8 4.2 3.8 
Italy 10.3 14.2 11.4 1.1 -2.8 
Japan 12.0 13.7 14.9 2.9 1.2 
Luxembourg 5.4 5.5 8.1 2.7 2.6 
Mexico 20.7 21.7 18.4 -2.3 -3.3 
Netherlands 3.5 7.1 7.7 4.2 0.6 
New Zealand 6.2 8.4 10.8 4.6 2.4 
Norway 6.4 7.1 6.8 0.4 -0.3 
Spain 14.1 11.8 14.1 0.0 2.3 
Sweden 3.3 3.7 5.3 2.0 1.7 
Turkey 16.4 16.2 17.5 1.1 1.4 
United Kingdom 6.2 9.8 8.3 2.1 -1.5 
United States 17.9 16.7 17.1 -0.8 0.4 
      
Mean OECD-21 9.7 10.2 10.8 1.1 0.6 
Standard deviation 4.8 4.5 4.0 -0.8 -0.5 
Coefficient of variation 0.500 0.439 0.374 -0.127 -0.065 
      
Mean EU-15 (14) 8.1 8.6 9.2 1.1 0.6 
Standard deviation 3.7 3.3 3.0 -0.7 -0.3 
Coefficient of variation 0.460 0.378 0.325 -0.135 -0.053 




Convergence of social protection systems may occur both as a consequence
of the implementation of EU social policies and Europeanization mechanisms
and as a consequence of economic integration. Theoretically, however, eco-
nomic integration may be beneficial or harmful to social protection systems.
The former theory says that economic convergence will be followed by social
convergence, while the latter theory says that policy competition and migration
flows will put social protection systems under increased pressure, resulting
in a social race to the bottom. Thus, empirical research should shed some light
on the actual patterns of social protection.
Earlier research concluded that social protection levels in the EU have
shown a pattern of convergence to higher levels since the early 1980s. The
convergence of EU welfare states has been stronger than in other OECD coun-


















Austria 27.6 20.7 27.4 -0.2 6.7 
Belgium 37.3 38.8 20.4 -16.9 -18.4 
Denmark 19.4 20.2 24.3 4.9 4.1 
Finland 25.9 21.8 20.3 -5.6 -1.5 
France 42.7 28.2 24.4 -18.3 -3.8 
Germany 28.4 32.9 29.7 1.4 -3.2 
Greece 32.8 29.9 26.7 -6.0 -3.2 
Ireland 18.3 7.4 25.7 7.5 18.3 
Italy 42.2 35.5 33.3 -8.9 -2.2 
Luxembourg 18.1 17.7 20.1 2.0 2.4 
Mexico 36.4 37.3 37.9 1.6 0.7 
Netherlands 22.4 18.9 20.9 -1.4 2.1 
New Zealand 41.2 34.3 33.6 -7.6 -0.7 
Norway 22.0 29.0 29.4 7.4 0.4 
Spain 41.4 36.0 32.0 -9.4 -4.0 
Sweden 25.7 30.7 24.8 -1.0 -5.9 
United Kingdom 16.2 19.9 24.8 8.6 4.9 
United States 33.6 34.1 38.3 4.7 4.2 
      
Mean OECD-18 29.5 27.4 27.5 -2.1 0.1 
Standard deviation 8.9 8.4 5.6 -3.3 -2.8 
Coefficient of variation 0.301 0.306 0.204 -0.097 -0.102 
      
Mean EU-15 (14) 28.5 25.6 25.4 -3.1 -0.2 
Standard deviation 9.1 8.6 4.1 -5.0 -4.5 
Coefficient of variation 0.319 0.334 0.161 -0.158 -0.174 
      
 
Notes: Poverty rates are measured as the proportion of individuals with equivalised disposable income less than 50 
percent of the median income of the entire population. Poverty gaps are measured as the percentage difference 
between the average income of the poor and the 50 percent of median income poverty threshold.  
 
Source: OECD (2008); and authors’ own calculations 
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bottom has been found. However, the welfare state indicators used in earlier
studies are difficult to compare across countries and entail various problems.
In this article we have done several σ- and β-convergence tests with the most
recent data, using a variety of indicators of social protection: social ex-
penditures, both at the macro and at the programme level, also corrected for
the impact of the tax system and for private social arrangements, replacement
rates of unemployment benefits and social assistance benefits and three poverty
indicators. Together, these indicators should provide a broader picture of the
evolution of social protection.
Our results are less clear cut than earlier findings. We still find a quite
strong convergence of social expenditure in EU countries over a longer period
(not caused by cyclical or demographic factors). However, this trend seems
to have stagnated in more recent years, possibly under the influence of welfare
state reforms. For net total social expenditure (public and private), we even
find divergence since 1995 for nine EU member states for which these data
are available. Replacement rates of unemployment benefits clearly converged
to a higher level, but net social assistance benefits have fallen in several coun-
tries since 1992 and do not show convergence. As far as poverty is concerned,
our data show dissimilar results. Both poverty rates and poverty gaps clearly
converged since the mid-1980s; however, the levels of both indicators have
developed in the opposite direction. Only poverty gaps converged to a lower
level, which is in line with our hypothesis.
So our analysis provides rather mixed evidence on social convergence,
especially for recent years. It is too early to conclude that a trend to lower
protection levels and higher poverty rates has started. But our results do
suggest that recent EU initiatives regarding social protection and inclusion are




Table A2.1 Mean and σ-convergence tests of gross public expenditure by social policy 
areas (% GDP), 1980-2003 
 
  1980 1990 2000 2003 
change  
1980-2003 
Total Mean OECD-22 18.0 20.1 21.0 22.3 4.4 
 Coefficient of variation 0.287 0.245 0.194 0.189 -0.098 
 Mean EU-15 19.9 21.9 22.5 23.9 4.0 
 Coefficient of variation 0.248 0.195 0.171 0.161 -0.087 
1. Old age Mean OECD-22 5.8 6.8 7.2 7.4 1.6 
 Coefficient of variation 0.340 0.332 0.362 0.378 0.039 
 Mean EU-15 6.3 7.5 8.1 8.2 1.9 
 Coefficient of variation 0.301 0.290 0.335 0.352 0.050 
2. Survivors Mean OECD-22 1.1 0.8 0.8 0.8 -0.3 
 Coefficient of variation 0.782 0.709 0.817 0.832 0.050 
 Mean EU-15 1.4 1.0 0.9 1.0 -0.4 
 Coefficient of variation 0.691 0.655 0.766 0.762 0.071 
3. Incapacity-related 
benefits 
Mean OECD-22 2.5 2.6 2.5 2.7 0.1 
Coefficient of variation 0.580 0.543 0.462 0.505 -0.075 
 Mean EU-15 3.0 2.9 2.6 2.8 -0.3 
 Coefficient of variation 0.468 0.476 0.398 0.446 -0.022 
4. Health Mean OECD-22 5.1 5.3 5.7 6.3 1.2 
 Coefficient of variation 0.219 0.183 0.128 0.121 -0.098 
 Mean EU-15 5.4 5.5 5.7 6.2 0.8 
 Coefficient of variation 0.219 0.181 0.146 0.144 -0.074 
5. Family Mean OECD-22 1.7 1.8 2.1 2.3 0.6 
 Coefficient of variation 0.576 0.607 0.476 0.455 -0.121 
 EU-15 2.0 2.0 2.3 2.5 0.5 
 Coefficient of variation 0.516 0.546 0.407 0.385 -0.131 
6. Active labor market 
programmes a 
Mean OECD-22 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.2 
Coefficient of variation 0.836 0.575 0.581 0.529 -0.307 
 Mean EU-15 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.2 
 Coefficient of variation 0.739 0.501 0.502 0.446 -0.293 
7. Unemployment b Mean OECD-22 1.0 1.3 1.1 1.3 0.2 
 Coefficient of variation 1.110 0.775 0.700 0.676 -0.434 
 Mean EU-15 1.2 1.5 1.3 1.5 0.3 
 Coefficient of variation 1.110 0.750 0.639 0.609 -0.443 
8. Housing Mean OECD-22 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.1 
 Coefficient of variation 1.240 1.087 1.043 0.977 -0.263 
 Mean EU-15 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.2 
 Coefficient of variation 1.280 1.025 0.981 0.961 -0.319 
9. Other social policy 
areas c 
Mean OECD-22 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.1 
Coefficient of variation 1.167 1.161 1.007 0.848 -0.319 
 Mean EU-15 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.2 
 Coefficient of variation 1.217 0.803 0.615 0.500 -0.626 
 
Notes: a 1980 data refer to the year 1985 for Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Ireland, and Norway. b 1980 data 
refer to the year 1985 for Ireland. c 1980 data refer to the year 1985 for Denmark. 
Source: OECD Social Expenditure Database (OECD 2007b); and authors’ own calculations. 
3 European Social Model: No Convergence
from the East
Abstract
Quantitative evidence based on social expenditure suggests that since Esping-
Andersen’s seminal study on welfare regimes, there has been a certain general
convergence towards a European Social Model (ESM). The data, controlled for
cyclical and demographic effects, shows that in recent years, social expend-
itures of EU-15 member states have converged, whereas in the mature non-EU
welfare states this has not been the case. In this long-term quantitative view,
a tentative suggestion would be that Europeanisation might be prevailing over
path dependence of distinct models. However, the data also show a certain
deviation from the model – the post-communist new member states (NMS) form
a distinct group. This is confirmed by a cluster analysis based on social benefit
generosity. To provide a background to these findings and, especially, to
highlight the avenues for further investigation, the paper also looks at the
institutional arrangements in the NMS. In particular, it draws attention to
pension systems as a particularly sizeable component of the welfare state to
illustrate how far most of the post-communist EU members diverge in terms
of the institutional arrangements of their welfare systems. It seems, then, that
while the ‘deepening’ of European integration in other policy areas has been
accompanied by a convergence towards a ESM in the EU-15 countries, the
‘widening’ of the EU has meant, at the same time, that there is now a group
of states within the EU that diverge significantly from the dominant model.
This chapter has been published in Journal of European Integration, Volume 32,
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Is there convergence in social policy in the EU? In particular, following two
recent waves of enlargement, in 2004 and 2007, have the convergence efforts
of the newly acceded member states in the legislative and economic sphere,
driven by hard policy making (the adoption of acquis communautaire) been
accompanied by social policy convergence?
In this paper, we subsume three relatively distinct areas of scholarly interest
– Europeanisation/convergence, social policy regimes, and social policy in
Central and Eastern Europe – under the general theme of EU deepening and
widening. The paper summarizes the changes taking place in the East – in the
post-communist new member states (NMS) – and discusses the results in terms
of EU integration processes.
Traditional social policy models in the West have been in flux and seem
to be converging (Cornelisse and Goudswaard, 2002; Bouget, 2003; Starke et
al., 2008; Caminada et al., 2010; Van Vliet, 2010a). Moreover, one of the most
quoted social policy hypotheses of recent years, the ‘race to the bottom’ pro-
position,1 has not been borne out by evidence. The countries in the older part
of the EU have converged in their social expenditure more by ‘racing to the
top’ than anything else (Cornelisse and Goudswaard, 2002; Bouget, 2003; Starke
et al., 2008).
However, a puzzling phenomenon has emerged. The NMS exhibit levels
of social expenditure well below those of the EU-15 area. In this paper, we
provide updated empirical evidence for this. We analyze social expenditure
data, controlled for demographic developments and unemployment, and add
a cluster analysis based on social benefit generosity to identify convergence
and divergence patterns.
We examine the issue in the context of European integration and regime
convergence. The first question is how much the EU dimension (‘Europeanisa-
tion’) may have influenced social policy formation in the post-communist NMS.
Both the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), which was introduced to
achieve convergence towards EU goals, and the economic integration may have
influenced the social protection systems of the NMS – not necessarily in the
same direction.
The OMC is an intergovernmental method of cooperation. To achieve
common objectives, the individual member states evaluate each other (using
benchmarking and discussion of best practice) to achieve peer pressure. The
European Commission’s role is limited to the surveillance of the process. The
OMC was originally developed as part of the Luxembourg (employment policy)
1 ‘Race to the bottom’ refers to the notion that due to the pressures of international economic
integration, states will engage in competitive cutting of tax rates, with the natural outcome
that they will also have to decrease social protection, which they will not be able to finance
at previous rates.
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process, starting in 1997. In 2000 the OMC was defined as one of the instruments
of the Lisbon strategy. It is used for the areas where the member states retain
strong national competences, especially employment, social protection and
education.
Secondly, we try to relate our findings to broader literature on welfare
regimes. The empirical welfare regime literature has focused mainly on West
European (EU-15) and other Western countries (Bonoli, 1997; Gough, 2001;
Saint-Arnaud and Bernard 2003; Powell and Barrientos, 2004; Jensen, 2008).
Only two recent empirical studies examined the emergence of a Central and
East European (CEE) welfare regime. The evidence presented in them is in-
conclusive: Vasconcelos Ferreira and Figueiredo (2005) found evidence for
converging welfare regimes, whereas Fenger (2007) found evidence for a
distinct CEE welfare regime in the same period.
Welfare regime studies have continued to be a popular research area ever
since Esping-Andersen’s The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990). ‘Welfare
regimes’ refer to institutional arrangements between the market, the state and
the family, in which the state has a central role by enacting social policies to
protect individuals against market risks.
In this paper, we deal with social policy only. We do not include any
discussion on industrial relations and other wider arrangements. When we
refer to welfare regimes, we mean regimes as proxied by social policy.
Our analysis contributes to the existing studies that look at both old and
new EU member states (Vasconcelos Ferreira and Figueiredo, 2005; Fenger,
2007) in three ways. First, it aims to improve the reliability of the results by
correcting the spending measures for cyclical and demographic effects. Second-
ly, it increases the robustness of the results by including all 25 countries.2
Thirdly, data from the period after the accession capture better the EU effect
and update the results.
3.2 DEEPENING AND WIDENING IN THE CONTEXT OF SOCIAL POLICY
Europeanisation and convergence studies
In the context of EU integration studies, ‘deepening’ tends to be defined as
a process of ‘gradual and formal vertical institutionalisation’ (Schimmelfennig
and Sedelmeier, 2002: 502). ‘Widening’, on the other hand, is ‘a process of
gradual and formal horizontal institutionalization’ (ibid.). The latter is usually
interpreted as ‘enlargement’, in the geographical sense, in other words as
something coterminous with the neo-functionalist geographical spill-over
(Faber, 2006: 4). It is this interpretation that we will be using here.
2 From the EU-25, the following countries are not included in Fenger (2007): Cyprus, Ireland,
Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal and Slovenia; in Vasconcelos Ferreira and Figueiredo (2005)
these are: Cyprus, Malta and Luxembourg.
42 Chapter 3
In this paper, we try to identify whether the EU member states have con-
verged toward a certain European Social Model (ESM). The ESM is usually
defined as an ideal type that ‘refers to the institutional arrangements compris-
ing the welfare state (transfer payments, collective social services, their financ-
ing) and the employment relations system (labour law, unions, collective
bargaining)’ (Ross and Martin, 2004: 11). Various authors have come up with
precise definitions focusing on the minimum generosity of the system and
the existence of particular minimum social protection mechanisms. However,
we use the term simply as denoting a common model which shows (or does
not) in the analyses of convergence/divergence. In other words, rather than
being concerned with defining an ideal type, we are concerned with the
question whether a certain dominant model has come into existence as a result
of convergence processes. This is because our main research question concerns
the deepening and widening dimension of social policy in the EU.
EU enlargement has been noted as a potential complicating factor to the
gradual emergence and stabilization of a common ESM (Scharpf, 2002; Vaughan-
Whitehead, 2003). Changes effected by deepening and widening bring with
them new governance challenges or, indeed, they change the ‘identity’ of
Europe as perceived by its citizens and other audiences. European integration
has so far mostly been analysed in terms of explanations why national govern-
ments have been ceding sovereignty to the European level (Faber, 2006: 4).
In contrast, the analysis of the dual processes of deepening and widening
(Faber and Wessels, 2006; Faber, 2006) is less concerned with the nation-state
and more meant to determine how the heterogeneity and complexity of the
EU as a whole changes as a result of EU integration.
The effect of, specifically, widening on the EU’s heterogeneity and complex-
ity has to date mostly been dealt with in the growing body of ‘Europeanisation’
literature. Europeanisation usually denotes the ‘top-down’ effects of enlarge-
ment, i.e. the impact of the Union on its member states. This can mean the
general impact of the Union on member states’ political processes (Goetz and
Hix, 2000; Featherstone and Radaeli, 2003; Vink, 2003; Börzel, 2005). A different
strand of Europeanisation studies looks at the ‘top-down versus bottom-up
effect’, assessing the compliance of the member states with centralized EU rule-
setting (Falkner et al., 2006; Mastenbroek and Van Keulen, 2006).
Some studies have looked at the effect of Europeanisation specifically on
the acceding CEE states (Lippert and Umbach, 2004; Goetz, 2005; Schimmel-
fennig and Sedelmeier, 2004; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005). Some
have looked at social policy harmonisation (Falkner, 2006; Linos, 2007). And
some have even specifically analysed the case of Europeanisation and social
policy in the NMS (Vatta, 2001; Lendvai, 2004).
The general conclusion of these studies is that the EU has clearly played
the standard-setting role through hard policy making in certain welfare-related
policy areas, e.g. gender and elderly anti-discrimination legislation as part
of labour standards. But what has been the impact of Europe on, specifically,
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social policy? Here, authors usually point out that on the one hand, the project
of social policy harmonisation has long been abandoned (Hantrais, 1995), while,
at the same time, national welfare states are constrained by ‘European rules
of economic integration, liberalization, and competition law, and they must
operate under the fiscal rules of the Monetary Union’ (Scharpf, 2002).
Nevertheless, the EU level does play a role, most famously through such
soft-policy measures as the OMC. However, to date, only a small number of
studies in the Europeanisation literature examined the impact of the OMC on
the social security systems of the NMS (Ferge and Juhász, 2004; Potůček, 2007;
Wóycicka and Grabowski, 2007). These studies have found little evidence for
the OMC to be influencing national social policy making.
Some areas of social policy are also affected by regulation spill-over from
common market policies – this is notably the case of funded pensions, which
are regulated according to the free flow of capital principle. The EU also plays
a role in coordinating transferability of pension rights in publicly administered
systems. And, last but not least, the EU level is also important in promoting
common research and sharing of expertise (Draxler, 2009). Nevertheless, since
Europeanisation in terms of soft policy making (the OMC), seems to be a weak
force, our initial expectation is that of weak or no convergence.
Welfare regimes
In 1990, Esping-Andersen analysed the role of the state according to the level
of decommodification of risks and social stratification that the welfare state
produces. His main focus was on the way societies develop their own ways
of dealing with personal risks (which can be left to market forces or, instead,
decommodified and handled at the aggregate, social level). The implication
of his exercise is that regimes are subject to certain institutional inertia and
path-dependency.
Since Esping-Andersen, others have produced or reproduced similar
typologies. Most of these exercises used cluster or factor analysis, based on
either social expenditure (Bonoli, 1997) or on a range of characteristics (for
a summary and meta-analysis, see Arts and Gelissen, 2006). Following the
addition of the Southern model to the widespread Esping-Andersen’s three-
world typology (Ferrera, 1996), recent debates in Europe have focused, for
example, on the question whether the Netherlands belongs to the Continental
or the Nordic regime. One of the most recent classifications has been drawn
up by Sapir (2006). He identifies four European welfare regimes: Nordic
countries (Denmark, Finland, Sweden and the Netherlands), Anglo-Saxon
countries (Ireland and the United Kingdom), Continental countries (Austria,
Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg) and Mediterranean countries
(Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain).
These classification exercises have had their critics, who pointed out that
identification of models might carry little analytical information about the
socio-economic context (Baldwin, 1996; Abrahamson, 1999; Kasza, 2002). Here,
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we concur with the view that the stability and the path-dependency of regimes
should not be a priori assumed. This is particularly true of fast-reforming
regimes which exist in a socio-economic context that is generally in flux, as
has been the case with the post-communist NMS.
Indeed, one complication of identifying models, particularly in the context
of fast-changing socio-economic environments, such as the NMS, is that complex
measurements will often include pre- and post-reform characteristics in the
same measure. In the cases, where the reform has created a sharp break with
the past, this might be problematic. This is most dramatically the case of
pension reforms, where the NMS have en masse adopted a model specifically
designed to contain future social expenditure. An analysis that tries to capture
the institutional characteristics of the system might end up using the character-
istics of the new system (for example whether it is funded or not), with the
characteristics of the old system (current benefits). This has happened, for
example, with Soede and Vrooman’s recent study (2008). In that case, the
authors compared all pension regimes in the EU. Here, since we want to focus
largely on social policy in the NMS, we use current social expenditure and
discuss institutional characteristics separately.
But, methodological and epistemological difficulties notwithstanding, we
consider classification exercises to be a useful starting point for a comparative
analysis of social policy. Moreover, the issue of regimes has a special pertinence
in connection with EU integration studies, since the existence of a particular
dominant model influences how EU integration, and indeed the wider identity
of the EU, is viewed.
Social policy in the New Member States
The evolution of the post-communist welfare state has always been a little
bit of a puzzle. In the early stages of transition, some authors have hypo-
thesized that after a transition period the post-communist welfare regimes
would gravitate towards some of the Western models (Deacon, 1992). In fact,
many have focused on the transient use of social policies in this period to
balance out the radical economic reforms (Lipton and Sachs, 1990a; Lipton
and Sachs, 1990b; Åslund, 2007).
However, first, as we have seen, the Western models themselves have been
in flux, making it harder to see towards what particular models the NMS would
have the option to gravitate. And, secondly, the governments in the region
have, in the later stages of transition, actually often carried their economic
radicalism over to social policy. This has raised the question whether post-
communist welfare regimes were really a transient phenomenon, or whether
they have acquired certain particular characteristics, which might be here to
stay (Draxler, 2007).
To some extent, the expectations on the development on the post-com-
munist welfare states have been informed by wider debates on how much
the transition to capitalism was influenced by path-dependencies (Pierson,
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2000) – in other words how it could be viewed as a series of reconfigurations
and recombinations of pre-existent structural features of society (Hausner et
al., 1995; Stark and Bruszt, 2001). Advocates of the path-dependency view such
as Beyer and Wielgohs (2001), rejected suggestions that the transition to capital-
ism was happening in an ‘institutional vacuum’, as had been proposed by
Karl and Schmitter (1991).
As mentioned before, in trying to determine the level of convergence of
NMS social policy, two research papers based in the welfare-regimes tradition
of cluster analysis have come up with slightly contrary outcomes. Vasconcelos
Ferreira and Figueiredo (2005) found evidence for converging welfare regimes;
Fenger (2007), on the other hand, has confirmed the existence of a distinct NMS
model.
Using a more descriptive approach, Manning (2004) found that the CEE
countries are catching up with the West while simultaneously the variation
between these countries has increased. Cerami (2006) has simply described
the post-communist welfare state as a distinct model with pre-communist
(Bismarck social insurance), communist (universalism, corporatism and egalitar-
ianism) and post-communist (market-based schemes) components. Myant and
Drahokoupil (2010) also concentrate on the mixed nature of social policies in
the region. Despite these recent efforts to analyse social policy regimes in the
NMS, some of the recent comprehensive literature on social policy regimes still
tends to overlook the region, ignoring the enlargement (Clift, 2007).
3.3 INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF CEE SOCIAL POLICY AND ITS EU
CONTEXT
The social policy mix in the region
In order to understand the long-term development of the welfare regimes in
the region, one needs to look at the particular institutional arrangements in
place, to estimate how much the regimes are driven by inertia and path-
dependencies and how much by various pressures to reform.
An analysis taking into account all aspects of institutional arrangements
of social and healthcare policies would be too complex to undertake here. We
provide a synthesis based on existing literature. We particularly draw attention
to the most distinct part of the post-communist welfare regimes – the pension
system.
In terms of institutional mechanisms employed, these countries present
a mixed picture (Berglund et al., 2004). First, their healthcare policies are fairly
uniform (Rys, 2001). This means that they retain the typical features of pre-
transition, universalist approach. Market-based provision of healthcare is very
limited, almost all the population is covered by public healthcare and all, in
theory, entitled to the same level of treatment (Bite and Zagorskis, 2003;
Golinowska et al., 2003; Gál et al., 2003; Cerami, 2005). One notable short-term
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exception to the rule was Slovakia. Its healthcare reforms of 2003-2004 intro-
duced modest but widely applied patient co-payments and, more significantly,
transformed the non-profit health insurance companies into profit-making joint-
stock companies, thus introducing a model unique in the EU. This reform,
however, proved to be clearly the least popular of all public sector reforms
introduced by the reformist government of 2002-2006 (Jevčák, 2006). The new
government quickly abandoned the co-payments and changed the legal status
of health insurance companies back to not-for-profit bodies. Similarly, in the
neighbouring Hungary, co-payments were enacted in a 2007 reform bill, to
near-universal opposition from the public, and the reform bill was quickly
revoked in 2008 (Edelényi, 2008).
Other policies, on the other hand, exhibit a wide intra-regional variability.
Unemployment benefit generosity, entitlement periods and access requirements
differ widely (Cerami, 2005; Myant and Drahokoupil, 2010). Family policies
and social assistance present a similar diverse reform patchwork, with govern-
ments trying out new mechanisms, such as tax credits or negative income taxes,
and the picture on active labour market policies is also somewhat mixed.
However, there is one area of social policy where the post-communist NMS
exhibit an almost uniform pattern, and that is pension policy. All of the post-
communist NMS, except for the two richest, Slovenia and the Czech Republic,
adopted the World Bank-sponsored ‘multi-pillar model’. The World Bank
involvement has been threefold: in some cases (e.g. Poland, Hungary) limited
to providing an inspiration and a blueprint, in others extending to technical
assistance (e.g. Slovakia); and, in yet other cases, the reform was linked directly
to further financial assistance (e.g. Bulgaria).
In fact, the eight post-communist NMS which have implemented the radical
multi-pillar reforms3 are the only reformers, besides Sweden, in the EU to take
such a radical, ‘paradigmatic’ measure (Draxler, 2009). Or, formulated different-
ly, these eight, and Sweden, are the only EU member states that have divided
their public pension schemes into two pillars, the first remaining publicly
administered and pay-as-you-go, the second offering funded individual
accounts (Social Protection Committee, 2008).
This flies in the face of path-dependency theory. Why such a region-wide
policy shift? One way of approaching this question would be to list the
exogenous (globalisation, Europeanisation) and endogenous (policy transfer
mechanisms, reform capacity, stakeholder preferences and balances of powers,
etc.) conditions for the adoption of the particular policy mechanisms. Some
areas would not even neatly fit the exogenous-endogenous axes (e.g. search
for a stable economic growth model). We cannot provide a detailed analysis
here, but outline some of the most important considerations in the next section.
3 Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia.
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Endogenous and exogenous pressures to reform
The economic framework offered by the European Union is pinned on two
institutional mechanisms: (a) the Maastricht convergence criteria/Stability and
Growth Pact and (b) the OMC. Prior to the entry to the Economic and Monetary
Union, the EU member states are constrained in their spending by the limits
of Maastricht criteria, after their entry by the Stability and Growth Pact. In
striving to contain their spending, the NMS do not have much leeway to extend
their social protection programmes. The Integrated Guidelines for Growth and
Jobs, issued within the OMC, on the other hand, act as the instrument of the
Lisbon Agenda, which, particularly with the re-launch in 2005, is primarily
concerned with promoting employment and growth.
The OMC is generally sparse on social protection policies. It stipulates
certain conditions on social standards, for example in terms of social exclusion
and minimum pension adequacy. On the other hand, the OMC does not serve
to impose particular institutional mechanisms. It also omits some areas of social
policy, for example childcare (Ferrera, 2005a).
What key considerations play a role in the NMS in assessing whether to
adopt a certain radical policy reform? We suggest two conditions: policy
mechanism variability and policy success. Healthcare and unemployment,
social assistance and family policies do not present a range of discrete, clearly
identifiable policy tools. Pension policies, on the other hand, have for some
time been packaged as choices between defined-contribution and defined-
benefit, pay-as-you-go and funded, public and private solutions.
In the case where no clear ‘paradigmatic’ policy recipes have been offered,
the NMS have either stuck to old approaches (healthcare) or have been trying
out from the panoply of new mechanisms offered in policy recipes, none of
them dominant (family policies and social assistance, unemployment benefits,
active labour market policies).
In the case of policy recipes that are, in contrast, clearly delineated and
put forward as fostering economic growth, the NMS have been eager to embrace
them. It is the adoption of these recipes, rather than actual results (which will
not be visible for many years until the payout phase), which is considered
a policy success (in the case of pension reform on the basis of contained
projected social expenditure). Commentators have focused on the influence
of international organisations, mostly the World Bank (Deacon, 2000; Sengoku,
2004; Orenstein, 2008). In social policy, this is the case with pension reforms,
widely promoted by the World Bank precisely as the tool for assisting general
economic growth (Stiglitz and Orszag, 1999; Barr, 2001; Draxler, 2009).
In the matrix of paradigmatic reforms, radical pension policy reforms
correlate with the other radical public policy reform adopted in the region,
the flat rate personal income taxation – almost all of those countries that
undertook radical pension reforms have also joined the ‘flat rate revolution’
(Hungary, Bulgaria and Poland being the exception). This suggests, again, that
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these reforms are chosen as part of the process of fumbling for high growth
and convergence (Draxler, 2007; Myant and Drahokoupil, 2010).
The NMS might change course in the future. One possible pressure from
deeper integration might come from the completion of the internal labour
market – in May 2009, only Germany and Austria chose to continue constrain-
ing access to their labour markets to the 2004 enlargement citizens. Wider
limitations still apply to the citizens of Bulgaria and Romania, which joined
in 2007.4 Also, the EU provides a forum for mutual policy comparison and
learning not only at the stage of the OMC but among wider stakeholder groups
and the public, and this could ultimately also influence social policy.
Social policy remains dominantly controlled by the individual nation-states.
It is only marginally subject to hard laws, mostly as a result of regulatory spill-
overs, for example when investments by funded pension schemes are regulated
under the common market principle. At the same time, the soft policy-making
mechanisms, such as the OMC, remain focused on policies for growth. The post-
communist NMS have, in recent past, rapidly opened up their economies to
foreign investment and trade. They also remain constrained by the rules
guiding accession to and the membership of the European Monetary Union.
Under these circumstances, ‘Europeanisation’ effects in the area of social policy
are weak.
Viewed from this institutional perspective, our expectation is that the
‘widening’ of the EU has also meant that the convergence towards an ESM has
been complicated by enlargement. The addition of the NMS may have
dampened the prospects for creating a ‘pan-European solidarity space’ (Ferrera,
2005b: 217). As we have seen, this expectation had been supported by our
summary of literature suggesting that ‘Europeanisation’ and convergence
effects have been weak, while, on the other hand, empirical analyses so far
have been inconclusive. Let us now see the results of a quantitative exercise
to identify general convergence processes in the EU and, specifically, to whether
there has or has not been a convergence towards the ESM among the NMS.
3.4 CONVERGENCE
Data and measures
Social expenditures are widely used as a measure of the level of social pro-
tection in different countries in comparative and convergence studies in the
welfare state literature. This study relies on the most recent Eurostat (2009a)
data, which includes aggregate and disaggregate data on social expenditures.
4 With each recent enlargement, existing member states could apply a transitional period
of up to 7 years of curbing access to their labour market to the citizens of newly acceding
countries.
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Table 3.1 Total social expenditures (% GDP) 
 




Austria 28.40 29.20 29.30 28.50 0.10 
Belgium 26.50 28.00 29.30 30.10 3.60 
Cyprus 14.80 16.30 18.10 18.40 3.60 
Czech Republic 19.50 20.20 19.30 18.70 -0.80 
Denmark 28.90 29.70 30.70 29.10 0.20 
Estonia 14.00 12.70 13.00 12.40 -1.60 
Finland 25.10 25.60 26.60 26.20 1.10 
France 29.50 30.40 31.30 31.10 1.60 
Germany 29.30 30.10 29.80 28.70 -0.60 
Greece 23.50 24.00 23.50 24.20 0.70 
Hungary 19.30 20.40 20.80 22.30 3.00 
Ireland 13.90 17.50 18.20 18.20 4.30 
Italy 24.70 25.30 26.00 26.60 1.90 
Latvia 15.30 13.90 12.90 12.20 -3.10 
Lithuania 15.80 14.00 13.30 13.20 -2.60 
Luxembourg 19.60 21.60 22.20 20.40 0.80 
Malta 16.90 17.80 18.60 18.10 1.20 
Netherlands 26.40 27.60 28.30 29.30 2.90 
Poland 19.70 21.10 20.10 19.20 -0.50 
Portugal 21.70 23.70 24.70 25.40 3.70 
Slovakia 19.40 19.10 17.20 15.90 -3.50 
Slovenia 24.20 24.40 23.40 22.80 -1.40 
Spain 20.30 20.40 20.70 20.90 0.60 
Sweden 30.10 31.60 32.00 30.70 0.60 
United Kingdom 26.40 25.70 25.90 26.40 0.00 
      
Mean EU-25 22.13 22.81 23.01 22.76 0.63 
Standard deviation 5.29 5.57 5.87 5.93 0.64 
Coefficient of variation 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.02 
      
Mean EU-15 24.95 26.03 26.57 26.39 1.43 
Standard deviation 4.51 4.06 4.09 3.96 -0.56 
Coefficient of variation 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.15 -0.03 
      
Mean CEEC-8 18.40 18.23 17.50 17.09 -1.31 
Standard deviation 3.25 4.19 4.05 4.30 1.04 
Coefficient of variation 0.18 0.23 0.23 0.25 0.07 
      
 
Note: EU-15 are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,  
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom. 
CEEC-8 are Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia.  
 
Source:  Eurostat (2009a); and authors’ own calculations. 
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The included policy areas are healthcare, incapacity-related benefits, old age,
survivors, family, unemployment, housing and social inclusion. An important
advantage of the Eurostat database is that social spending data are available
for twenty-five EU countries. To date, most studies which used social spending
measures relied on OECD databases, which contain only four NMS.5 An ad-
vantage of the OECD data, compared to Eurostat data, is that also a number
of non-EU countries are included. This makes it possible to examine whether
patterns of convergence may indicate an effect of European integration (Cor-
nelisse and Goudswaard, 2002; Caminada et al., 2010; Van Vliet, 2010a). In
sum, the choice between Eurostat and OECD data is a trade-off between NMS
and non-EU countries. Since the present study is focused on the NMS, this study
uses Eurostat data. For the reason of data availability, the dataset includes
data for all twenty-five EU member states in the period 2000-2006.
One limitation of the social expenditure indicator is that changes in social
spending indicate changes in the number of beneficiaries rather than policy
changes. Especially trends of convergence may be attributed to symmetrical
trends of ageing populations and of unemployment across countries. As put
forward by Clayton and Pontusson (1998) and Castles (2004), social expenditure
ratios can be corrected for these trends by dividing them by the sum of the
unemployment rate and the percentage of the population aged sixty-five and
above. It seems more plausible that changes in social expenditures reflect policy
changes when these are corrected for cyclical and demographic effects.
In order to assess whether social protection levels have converged across
member states, the study relies on simple variance measures. Changes in the
standard deviation and the coefficient of variation indicate to what extent the
dispersion of social protection levels has been decreased, as an indication of
sigma convergence. The coefficient of variation controls for the sensitivity of
the standard deviation for the value of the mean of the corresponding dataset.
Results
Table 3.1 shows that the average level of social spending in the CEE member
states is considerably lower than in the old member states and the variation
within the EU-15 is, over the whole period, smaller than the distance between
the EU-15 mean and the CEE member states. Furthermore, social expenditures
increased by 1.43 percentage points in the EU-15 between 2000 and 2006.
Countries with large increases are, for example, Belgium, Ireland, The Nether-
lands and Portugal. In contrast, the average level of social spending has fallen
in the CEE countries by 1.31 percentage points and has not converged towards
the level of social spending of the old member states. Neither did the old
member states converge towards the NMS. In fact, the enlargement of the EU
5 Another remarkable difference is that the total public social expenditures measure of the
OECD includes spending on active labour market policies, whereas the Eurostat measure
does not.
European Social Model: No Convergence from the East 51
has led to divergence of social protection systems in the EU as a whole, which
can be seen from the increases in both the standard deviation and the co-
efficient of variation for all twenty-five member states. However, the variance
measures indicate that the fifteen old member states have converged, which
means that the converging trend of the 1980s and the 1990s has continued.
Within the group of the eight CEE member states, in contrast, there has been
divergence.
Figure 3.1 shows that when social expenditures are corrected for the
unemployment rate and for the share of the population aged sixty-five and
older, to control for cyclical and demographic effects, the results still hold.
Firstly, the social protection systems in the CEE member states are less generous
than in the old EU member states. Secondly, the level of social spending of
the group of CEE member states has not converged towards the social spending
level of the older EU member states.6 Furthermore, the correction for cyclical
and demographic effects seems to have offset the decline in social spending
across the CEE countries.
6 However, slight declines in the variance measures for the corrected data for the 25 countries
in the last two years (not shown here), may indicate a start of a converging trend.
  
























Data, measures and method
The convergence analysis has shown that the generosity of the social policies
of the NMS differs strongly with the generosity level of the old member states
and that the social policies of the NMS did not converge towards the policies
of the old member states. This raises the question whether the NMS form a
new welfare regime within the EU. To examine whether the NMS can be
categorised along the lines of the existing European welfare regimes or whether
the enlargement has led to a distinct welfare regime within the EU, this study
uses a hierarchical cluster analysis. Based on patterns of similarities and
dissimilarities, this method aims to explore groups of cases (countries) in a
dataset.
Therefore, hierarchical cluster analysis is particularly useful in identifying
welfare regimes empirically and, as such, it has often been used in the literat-
ure (Saint-Arnaud and Bernard, 2003; Powell and Barrientos, 2004; Jensen,
2008). Concerning the cluster analysis, three further methodological choices
have been made. First, the values are computed into z-values in order to create
a common scale across the variables and to neutralise the impact of the ab-
solute values. In the hierarchical cluster analysis, the clustering process starts
with combining cases that are closest together into a cluster. Thereupon, these
clusters are merged further until all cases are joined in one cluster. As a
measure for the distance between the cases within a cluster, the second de-
cision, the squared Euclidean distance has been used. Thirdly, the Ward
method is used for the clustering of the cases. This method maximises the
homogeneity within groups and the differences between groups (Everitt et
al., 2001: 60).
As discussed above, in the present study we are mainly interested in the
impact of the accession of the EU on social policy changes in the NMS. This
means that in the conceptualisation of welfare regime, we focus on the public
policy dimension. The decision of which variables to include in the cluster
analysis is guided mainly by the limited availability of comparable data for
both the old and the NMS. As a result, the analysis is based mainly on social
expenditure data. The use of social expenditures is quite conventional in the
empirical welfare regime literature, although many studies additionally use
some policy indicators (Gough, 2001; Saint-Arnaud and Bernard, 2003; Powell
and Barrientos, 2004). However, in other studies (Bonoli, 1997; Jensen, 2008)
only two social spending variables are used to cluster welfare regimes.
The present study uses ten social spending variables and one policy setting
variable. First, as an overall indicator for the generosity of a country’s social
protection system, the same total social expenditure indicator is included as
in the convergence analysis. Then, disaggregated spending data at the pro-
gramme level are included, indicating the configuration of social policies.
Variables are included for the policy areas of healthcare, incapacity-related
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benefits, old age, survivors, family, unemployment, housing and social inclu-
sion. Furthermore, spending on active labour market policies (ALMPs) is
included. Although ALMPs do not, strictly speaking, fall under social protection,
Powell and Barrientos (2004) found that ALMPs are an important feature to
distinct welfare regimes. In addition, ALMPs take a central place in the social
and employment policies of the EU. If the European Employment Strategy
influences the national welfare states, then labour market policies can be
expected to converge (Van Vliet, 2010a).
Finally, a policy setting indicator is included, namely the pension income
replacement rate. This is the ratio of the median individual gross income from
pensions of persons aged between sixty-five and seventy-four years and
median individual gross income from work of persons aged between fifty and
fifty-nine years.
Again, the spending indicators, all measured as a percentage of GDP, are
corrected for cyclical and demographic effects. The total social expenditures
indicator is corrected in the same way as in the convergence analysis. The
expenditures on old age are corrected for ageing by dividing them by the
percentage of the population aged sixty-five and above. To correct for cyclical
effects, the expenditures on unemployment and active labour market policies
are divided by unemployment rates.
The study relies for all measures on Eurostat (2009a; 2009b) data. The values
of the variables are averages of the values for the years 2005 and 2006. These
years are selected because they reflect the situation of the welfare regimes in
the EU after the enlargement. Averages are used to improve the robustness
of the results.
Results
Figure 3.2 shows the results of the hierarchical cluster analysis. In the pro-
cedure of this analysis cases are joined into clusters, starting with as many
clusters as cases. Going from the left to the right, this clustering process can
be represented graphically with a dendogram. While a vertical line in a dendo-
gram represents a cluster, the horizontal lines connect the different clusters.
The longer a horizontal line, the larger the distance between two clusters and
the greater the dissimilarity. Since the clustering process finally results in one
large cluster, an essential decision is when to stop the clustering and
consequently the number of resulting clusters. Acknowledging that hierarchical
cluster analysis is an exploratory method, this decision is informed by both
the statistical results and the theoretical interpretability of these results.
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Figure 3.2 indicates that the structure in the data can be best represented by
two clusters, because here the distance between the two clusters is clearly the
largest. More substantively, the NMS and the old member states are merged
into two separate clusters. Also at a lower aggregation level, subgroups of
countries are recognisable. Within the NMS cluster, there is a clear division
between the three Baltic states (Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia) and the other
countries. Interestingly, the four countries of the Southern welfare regime (Italy,
Spain, Portugal and Greece) are all in the NMS cluster. Another interesting
observation that can be made about the Southern countries is that they are
not grouped together. Also, welfare regimes are observable in the old member
state clusters. The continental welfare states (Germany, France, Belgium,
Austria, Luxembourg) are all grouped together. The Nordic countries are not
merged into one subgroup, but the Netherlands do not seem to belong to the
continental regime anymore, supporting Sapir’s recent typology (2006). Further-
more, an Anglo-Saxon (or, more precisely, Anglo-Irish) regime (United King-  
Figure 3.2 Hierarchical cluster analysis 2005-2006 
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  Lithuania           15   ─┼─────────────┐ 
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  Poland              20   ───┘   │       │                                 │ 
  Czech Re             4   ─┐     │       │                                 │ 
  Malta               18   ─┤     ├───────┘                                 │ 
Greece              11   ─┤     │                                         │ 
  Slovakia            24   ─┼─┐   │                                         │ 
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  Belgium              2   ───┘   ├─────┐       │ 
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  Austria              1   ───┬─┘       ├───────┘ 
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  Cyprus               3   ─────┬───┐   │ 
  Ireland             13   ─────┘   ├───┘ 
  United Kingdom      25   ─────────┘ 
 
 
Note:  Dendogram is based on Ward Method as amalgation method; distance measure: squared Euclidean distance 
  
European Social Model: No Convergence from the East 55
dom and Ireland) can be observed – with Cyprus, which is the only NMS in
the old member state cluster.
The most important finding is that the cluster analysis generates two
clusters with old and new member states, which supports our earlier findings
from the convergence analyses. However, this might simply be due to the fact
that in both the convergence and the cluster analyses the same indicator of
total social spending has been used. Therefore, we also performed the cluster
analysis without the variable total social expenditures, as a robustness check.
The results of this analysis (not shown here) are quite similar to the results
of the original analysis. The only difference is that now also Cyprus and
Ireland also belong to the NMS cluster.7 In sum, the cluster analysis shows
that not only the aggregated level of generosity, but also the policy configura-
tions of the social protection systems differ strongly across the old and new
member states.
3.6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Our key finding is that the social protection level in the NMS is considerably
lower than the social protection level in the old member states and that these
two levels have not converged between 2000 and 2006. At the same time, social
spending levels have converged across the old member states, meaning that
the converging trend of the 1980s and 1990s has continued. In sum, the results
indicate that the widening of the EU has at least slowed down the process of
deepening.
Earlier studies (Caminada et al., 2010) found that the converging trend
is stronger within the EU than across the mature welfare states in general. The
effect might therefore be attributed to European integration. On the other hand,
the absence of a converging trend of the social protection level of the NMS to
the old member states may indicate that the social policy initiatives at the EU
level, like the OMC, have not influenced the national policies of the NMS much.
Some scholars would argue that this lack of influence is in line with the results
for a number of old member states. An explanation more strongly focused
on the NMS could be that the NMS gave priority to the implementation of the
hard law of the acquis communautaire, rather than to the soft law. After all, the
NMS have participated in the Lisbon process only since 2004, ten years after
the Copenhagen criteria of accession (Potůček, 2007: 140). Another possibility
is that the NMS have converged towards the old member states in the 1990s,
for which no comparable data is available.
As noted above, the results for the old EU member states indicate that the
converging trend of the last couple of decades has continued. In fact, relative
7 More precisely, Cyprus and Ireland are in the sub cluster of Spain and Hungary.
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to the foregoing decades the converging trend seems to have accelerated. This
is demonstrated by the declines in the standard deviation and the coefficient
of variation of respectively 0.56 and 0.03 points in a period of only seven years.
Compared to the findings of Caminada et al. (2010) – declines of respectively
1.08 and 0.09 points in a period of twenty-four years (1980-2003) – the results
of the present study indicate a rather strong converging trend. Since the
examined period 2000-2006 of the present study coincides with the period in
which the new means of EU governance as the OMC were effectuated, the
accelerating trend of convergence may indicate an effect of the EU policy
initiatives.
A second notable finding is that when a broad range of social policy areas
are included, the NMS appear to differ strongly from the old member states.
This result of the cluster analysis is in line with Fenger’s (2007) study. In our
cluster analysis too, the old and new member states were grouped into two
separate clusters. Furthermore, the Baltic states were grouped together, as in
the present study. However, an important difference between Fenger’s and
the present study is that in Fenger’s study the South European countries are
grouped as a sub-cluster in the old member states’ cluster.
One possible explanation for this difference is that Fenger’s study includes
data from five years earlier. A second explanation might be that Fenger’s study
also includes indicators for two other dimensions of welfare regimes, namely
societal situation and political participation. This would imply that with
regards to social policies the Mediterranean countries share the most similar-
ities with the NMS. But if the societal and political dimensions are included,
the Mediterranean countries have more characteristics in common with the
other old member states.8
The results of the cluster analysis replicated the European welfare regimes.
However, the Nordic and continental countries seem to have been merged
into one welfare regime. When Nordic and Continental countries belong to
the same welfare regime, this solves the debate in which regime The Nether-
lands should be counted. This merging of welfare regimes might be the result
of the ongoing process of convergence within the EU-15. This would break
a trend, since Bouget (2003) has found that convergence did not distort the
distinction between the welfare regimes in the period 1980-1998.
This continued convergence of the EU-15 welfare regimes is thus ac-
companied by an addition of the group of the CEE (the post-communist NMS)
states that tend to operate along different lines. It is clear that much more
detailed analysis is needed to identify the individual reasons, and combinations
of them, of this East-West schism. We have already suggested that social policy
reforms in the CEE operate in the space opened up by EU’s accent on promoting
the common market and economic growth. The NMS are in the periphery
8 A third difference between the two studies is that in Fenger’s study Slovenia, Cyprus, Malta
and Portugal are not included.
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position to the advanced economies and they have been trying to adopt policies
offered to them as high-growth, convergence policies. These entail fast fiscal
consolidation that might make it difficult to expand social policy at the time
when funds are still needed for other projects (e.g. infrastructure). Or, it might
simply be that a certain level of economic development is a precondition for
certain social policies and that the NMS will start converging at some later stage.
We have also noted that one reason why social convergence can be
expected is production factor mobility and price equalization due to migration.
However, an argument might be built: it might be that due to the constraints
of access to the labour markets of the old member states, this factor price
equalization has not taken place.
Another line of analysis could look at social relations in the old and new
member states. It might be that the two groups have fundamentally different
employment relations, domestic politics or voter preferences. Also, social
transformations in the CEE might have produced a power distribution in the
society where actors favouring one institutional arrangement have a
‘hegemony’ over those favouring another. This would be, for example, the
argument along Marxist lines where the small entrepreneurial elite favours
laissez-faire solutions and is able to impose them, in cooperation with inter-
national institutions imposing ‘neo-liberal’ policies. Of course, the complication
is explaining away not only the near-uniform imposition of some solutions
across the region (the introduction of funded pension schemes) but, at the same
time, the entrenchment of other mechanisms (old-style, universal healthcare)
and large intra-regional differences in others (for example in unemployment
benefit generosity).
These explanations would need to look at several key variables that might
yield some clues. For example, at the expense of what exactly is social policy
neglected in public finances? In other words, a comparison of the composition
of state budgets in old and new member states might be helpful. And so would
be a look at the distribution effect: which social groups are the main bene-
ficiaries of social policies? One explanation could be there is no ‘middle class
capture’ in the CEE since there is no well-defined middle class in the region.
Therefore the key constituency for the expansion of the welfare state in the
West (as some authors argue) is lacking in the East,
Conversely, it is not at all clear what is behind the seemingly weakening
path dependencies in the old member states. Is the regime convergence in this
group the result of commonly shared internal developments or have they
become more sensitive to exogenous pressures?
Our analysis based on expenditure data, then, confirms that the post-
communist EU member states tend to show certain resilience to convergence
with a generalized ESM. They spend less on social policy. At the same time,
most of them have reformed the biggest component of social policy – the
pension system – in a very radical way designed to contain expenditure in
the future.
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Future convergence of these two groups is, of course, possible. NMS might
find their priorities changed as their economies converge more strongly with
those of the EU-15 group, and as they find it convenient to spend more on
social protection in proportion to other projects, for example on infrastructure.
However, for the time being, it seems ‘Europeanisation’ is a weak force and
that the widening of the EU has complicated the process of social policy con-
vergence.
4 Divergence within Convergence
Europeanisation of Social and Labour
Market Policies
Abstract
Since the adoption of the European Employment Strategy and the Lisbon
strategy, convergence of social protection goals and labour market policies
across EU countries features prominently on the European agenda. Embedded
in convergence, Europeanisation and welfare state literature, this paper ex-
amines the role of European integration in changing social policies. It shows
that since 1995 social expenditures of EU member states have converged and
increased on average, whereas those of non-EU countries have diverged,
corrected for cyclical and demographic effects. This EU-specific convergence
pattern of social expenditures leads to the subsequent question whether or
not national policies have also converged. Relying on disaggregated expend-
iture data and policy indicators, this study shows an EU-specific trend of
increasingly active labour market policies. However, within this scope of
activation, countries have opted for different mixes of policy instruments.
This chapter has been published in Journal of European Integration, Volume 32,
Issue 3, pp. 269-290, May 2010 by Routledge, All rights reserved. © Routledge,
2010. The definitive version is available at www.tandf.co.uk.
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4.1 INTRODUCTION1
Over the last decade, the European Commission has revitalized the debate
about convergence patterns across EU member states. Policy initiatives like
the European Employment Strategy (EES) and the Lisbon strategy were
launched to strengthen social cohesion within the EU. The underlying, relatively
new and intergovernmental means of EU governance, the open method of
coordination (OMC), is based on voluntary cooperation of its member states.
It is expected to facilitate the convergence of national social policies towards
the common EU goals. These European goals are intended to function as a
double-edged sword. On the one hand, governments should increase the level
of social protection to reduce poverty and to combat social exclusion. On the
other hand, increasing labour market participation supports Europe’s
competitiveness, while converging labour market policies (LMPs) smooth the
functioning of the single market.
Earlier quantitative research has shown a convergence of social protection
systems in the EU countries over recent decades (Greve, 1996; Bouget, 2003).
However, it is not clear to what extent this convergence can be attributed to
any European influences, because most scholars have not taken into account
domestic and global dynamics. This study extends the existing research by
examining whether these patterns of convergence can be attributed to the
process of European integration or not. It combines a set of tools to account
for the overall question of how countries have adjusted their social security
policies to an integrating economy in a globalising world. By correcting social
expenditures for cyclical and demographic factors, we try to separate the effects
of parallel but independent domestic developments from globalisation and
Europeanisation effects. The selection of EU and non-EU countries corrects for
the effect of European integration more specifically (Caminada et al., 2010).
These data illustrate that the degree of convergence has been more pronounced
in EU countries than across other OECD countries.
This EU-specific convergence pattern of social expenditures gives rise to
the subsequent question of whether national policies also have converged.
With the adoption of the EES in 1997, LMPs became in fact the first social
policies to be coordinated at the European level. Basically, the rationale of the
EES is that member states should use more active labour market policies
(ALMPs) in order to reduce unemployment and to increase employment. As
a result, national employment policies should converge towards common EU
objectives. Countries can use a broad range of policy instruments to increase
the labour market participation of unemployed people. Therefore, this study
1 I thank the participants of the Dutch ESPAnet Research Day, Tilburg 2009, and Koen
Caminada, Kees Goudswaard, Beryl ter Haar, Michael Kaeding, Ferry Koster, Willem Molle,
Barbara Vis and two anonymous referees of the Journal of European Integration for their
helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
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includes indicators for many instruments in order to assess the convergence
of ALMPs. This approach allows the identification of different approaches to
the achievement of the same goal. In contrast to the findings of the expenditure
studies, many qualitatively oriented researchers favour arguments that show
continuing national diversity (i.e. Daguerre and Taylor-Gooby, 2004). This
study’s goal is to narrow the methodological gap between large-n, quantitative
expenditure studies on the one hand and qualitative policy studies on the
other, by relying on quantified characteristics of LMPs as well as expenditure
data.
4.2 SOCIAL CONVERGENCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
Direct and indirect Europeanisation of national social policies
In the field of social policy, Europeanisation of national social security entails
direct and indirect effects (Leibfried, 2000). Direct effects refer to the imple-
mentation of EU social policies, while indirect effects refer to the impact of
the creation of a single market on national social policies.
In 2000, the European Council adopted the goal that besides economic
growth, social cohesion should also be strengthened within the EU. The open
method of coordination (OMC) was introduced as the means of spreading best
practice and achieving greater convergence towards the main EU goals. Taking
the differences of the European welfare states into account, the OMC is a set
of non-binding instruments, like the adoption of guidelines, indicators, re-
commendations and national action plans.
Indirect effects of European integration on national social security systems
refer to the effects of economic integration. Three of these effects are dis-
tinguishable. First, European integration leads to the increasing mobility of
production factors. Migration of employees may be harmful when it is
triggered by differences in generosity of welfare systems. Countries with
generous social benefits accompanied by a high tax burden stimulate net payers
to go abroad and at the same time attract net receivers from abroad resulting
in convergence to lower social protection levels (Sinn, 1990). Second, increased
international competition forces governments to reduce their social standards
to offer attractive, competitive conditions for companies in order to keep them
within their borders and stimulate employment. This leads to a policy com-
petition between governments, resulting in a social race to the bottom (Scharpf,
1999). Empirically, scholars have found no evidence supporting this hypothesis.
In contrast to these first two effects, a third indirect effect of European integra-
tion may be that social protection systems become more generous in order
to compensate for the increased dynamics of the labour market (Rodrik, 1998).
And economic growth stimulated by European integration makes it possible
to finance more generous social security systems (Cornelisse and Goudswaard,
2002).
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Europeanisation of active labour market policies
ALMPs are policies aimed at labour market participation of citizens. Hence,
passive policies can be understood as policies that entitle unemployed people
to benefits (Van Berkel and Hornemann Møller, 2002). Governments can
intervene in the labour market with several ALMPs, such as labour market
training and services of employment agencies, like job search guidance. Never-
theless, passive policies could be made more active by changing tax and benefit
schemes. Whereas the foregoing instruments are oriented at the supply side
of the labour market, ALMPs can also be focused on the demand side, for
instance through wage subsidies for employers.
According to the guidelines of the EES, which are mainly focused on ALMPs,
activation is not only aimed at reducing unemployment, but also at increasing
employment and combating social exclusion. Like the OMC, the EES is a set
of non-binding instruments such as guidelines and recommendations. Because
of the emphasis of the European Commission on ALMPs, it is hypothesised
that national LMPs are shifted from a passive towards a more active approach
and that national ALMPs have converged. Therefore, the first way in which
national policies may have been influenced is through European employment
policies.
The second path of European influence on national LMPs is via European
monetary integration. Since the Maastricht convergence criteria have come
into effect, the members of the European Monetary Union (EMU) are con-
stricted in the application of economic policies to boost their economies in
order to reduce unemployment levels. First of all, for national authorities of
euro countries it is no longer possible to stimulate the economy by increasing
their competitiveness via monetary policies. Second, the EMU criteria limit
budget deficits and inflation rates, meaning that member states are limited
in the application of budgetary policies. To summarise, the EMU has limited
the repertory of the responses of policy makers to economic shocks to supply-
side strategies such as ALMPs, lower tax burden deregulation, flexibilisation,
wage differentiation and welfare cutbacks to reduce the reservation wage
(Scharpf, 2002: 649). Therefore, since governments will use more ALMPs to
combat unemployment, an increase in ALMPs due to the EMU may be expected.
Policy convergence
Generally, convergence can be understood as a decrease in variation of policies
across countries over time. This paper focuses on convergence of policy out-
puts, referring to the policy programmes adopted by governments with which
policy makers attempt to actively influence society and the economy (Holzinger
and Knill, 2005). Within the scope of outputs, convergence can be measured
at different levels, ranging from abstract policy goals to detailed specifications
in law.
There is no consensus in literature regarding the question at what policy
level convergence is most likely to occur. On the one hand, authors argue that
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changes in the settings of policy instruments are easier to achieve than adopt-
ing new policy goals, because the latter requires a politically demanding major
shift in the policy paradigm of a whole polity (Hall, 1993). On the other hand,
Radaelli (2005) argues that it is easier to adopt new policy ideas across coun-
tries than to converge on the implementation of policy instruments, because
the implementation depends on diverging national political contexts.
Publications on the Europeanisation of social protection also debate the
relationship between changes of policy goals and policy instruments. In the
EES, formal targets are set by the European Commission and the choice of the
instruments to achieve these ends is left to the member states. Therefore, many
authors did not find instrumental changes in LMPs on the national level as
a result of the EES. Instead, they found changes of goals, paradigms and
discourses. For example, Serrano Pascual (2004) found that most of the Euro-
pean countries have incorporated the concept of activation, but that methods
and principles diverged, due to different political and welfare state institutions.
Since countries can choose several instruments to make a shift towards ALMPs,
it is possible that although all countries activate their LMPs, these policies do
not converge. Furthermore, to assess the degree of convergence across the EU,
all EU countries should be included. However, most studies concerning con-
vergence of LMPs focus only on a small number of countries, probably due
to data availability.
Although changes in policy goals do not necessarily lead to congruous
changes in policy instruments, it is quite imaginable that convergence of policy
goals across member states ultimately leads to convergence of policy instru-
ments. After all, mechanisms of the EES like mutual learning on best practices
and the yearly council recommendations on national performance are focused
on policy instruments. Therefore, Europeanisation of LMPs may lead to con-
vergence of ALMP instruments. However, we should note that convergence
is not the same as Europeanisation (Radaelli and Pasquier, 2007: 39). Con-
vergence of national policies could be a consequence of Europeanisation. After
all, in the convergence literature transnational communication, which is a
mechanism in the EES, is considered an important explanatory mechanism for
convergence (Holzinger and Knill, 2005). However, convergence is not neces-
sarily the equivalent of a European impact, and divergence does not necessarily
mean the absence of Europeanisation. After all, policy convergence could also
be the result of globalisation, influences of international organisations such
as the OECD, or equivalent but independent responses of political actors to
parallel problem pressures (Holzinger and Knill, 2005: 786). Therefore, to
examine the extent to which Europeanisation may be related to convergence
of social and employment policies, the study corrects for global and domestic
dynamics.
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4.3 MEASURES AND METHOD
Social expenditures
Firstly, the level of social expenditures as a percentage of GDP indicates the
financial efforts of social provision.2 Secondly, the expenditures on ALMPs are
used as a measure of the effort countries make to avoid high levels of un-
employment. Data from the OECD Social Expenditure Database (2007b) is used.
This database contains data at different aggregation levels. In comparative
and convergence studies of welfare states, the level of social expenditures is
a widely used indicator of the financial efforts of social provision. However,
social expenditures as indicators for policy outputs have their limitations.
First, since expenditures are measured at a high level of aggregation, it
is not clear which policies trigger the changes in expenditures. Therefore, four
indicators of ALMP expenditures at a lower abstraction level, guided by the
content of the EES, are also included. They are public employment services,
special programmes for youth when in transition from school to work, labour
market training and subsidised employment. Second, changes in levels of
expenditures expressed as percentages of GDP not only indicate changes in
social expenditures, but also in GDP, which is called the denominator effect.
Therefore, ALMP expenditures are also expressed as a percentage of total LMP
spending, including both passive and active LMPs, indicating shifts in efforts
that countries make between passive policies and ALMPs.
Third, changes in expenditure ratios may be due to changing numbers of
recipients resulting from changes in unemployment levels or ageing popula-
tions, rather than policy reforms. To correct for these changes in demand for
benefits, social expenditure ratios are divided by the unemployment rate plus
the percentage of people aged 65 and over (Clayton and Pontusson, 1998;
Castles, 2004). An obvious deficiency of this indicator is that it seems that only
two groups of beneficiaries influence the social spending levels (Castles, 2004:
36). However, the reason to correct for these two groups is that in European
countries ageing and unemployment often follow the same trends simul-
taneously, probably leading to convergence in social expenditures. Hence, a
convergence pattern would then erroneously be ascribed to Europeanisation.
Although other groups of welfare recipients, such as disabled people, certainly
also influence social expenditures, there are no reasons to assume that these
groups simultaneously follow the same trends across EU countries, leading
to convergence in social spending.
Since ALMP expenditures are sensitive to unemployment levels, two indica-
tors are included. First, expenditures on ALMPs are expressed as a percentage
of total LMPs, since passive LMPs and ALMPs are both influenced by unemploy-
2 These expenditures include the following nine social policy areas: old age, survivors,
incapacity-related benefits, health care, family, ALMPs, unemployment, housing, other social
policy areas.
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ment levels. Second, an indicator is included that corrects ALMP spending for
unemployment levels by dividing the expenditures by the unemployment rate.
A fourth limitation of social spending indicators is that the impact of the
tax system on social spending differs across countries, because in some coun-
tries cash benefits are taxable, while in other countries they are not. This
complicates the comparability of the net social efforts. Furthermore, tax instru-
ments like earned income tax credits can be applied for purposes of activation.
Although the study includes an indicator for income tax rates, which will be
discussed below, specific tax instruments are neither captured by ALMP ex-
penditures nor by tax rates indicators.
Characteristics of unemployment benefits
Governments can use unemployment benefit schemes to activate unemployed
people. Less generous benefit schemes increase the incentives to work, because
the reservation wage of an unemployed person will be lower. This study
includes several policy indicators for changes in benefit schemes. First, the
number of weeks of insurance required to qualify for unemployment benefits
is used to indicate the qualifying or entitlement conditions. When this number
is higher, it is more difficult to receive benefits and people will accept jobs
sooner, in order to ensure an income. Second, the waiting period is measured
as the number of days people must wait to start receiving benefits after becom-
ing unemployed. The rationale of a waiting period such as this is that it
discourages people from quitting their jobs and becoming unemployed
(Schmid, 1995). Third, the duration is indicated by the number of weeks of
benefit entitlement.3 Shortening the duration may encourage unemployed
people to accept jobs sooner (Layard et al., 1991). For the above-mentioned
three indicators the study uses the Welfare State Entitlements Data Set
(Scruggs, 2005). A limitation of these indicators is that differences due to work
history are not taken into account.
Next, the level of benefits is important. High levels of unemployment
benefits function as disincentives for unemployed people to find work. As
an indicator of the benefits level, replacement rates are used, indicating the
proportion of income from work replaced by unemployment benefits. In most
studies, replacement rates are used as measures of benefit generosity. However,
replacement rates can only be seen as limited indicators of the generosity of
benefit systems (Whiteford, 1995): not all relevant aspects of benefit systems
(i.e. housing subsidies) may be taken into account, taxation can complicate
the comparability across countries,4 and replacement rates are based on entitle-
ment criteria and often represent only the maximum payments available in
3 This excludes periods of means-tested assistance. When relevant, it was assumed that the
worker is aged 40 years and has paid insurance for twenty years.
4 Net replacement rates are therefore more accurate, but data are only available from 2001
onwards.
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the circumstances specified. Although the latter limitation is indeed problematic
for measuring benefit generosity, it is less problematic for this study, since
here the interest actually lies in changes in the underlying policies like entitle-
ment criteria. Gross replacement rates from the OECD (2006) are used, represent-
ing a variety of previous incomes, households and durations of unemployment.
Income tax rates
Besides ALMPs like training, fiscal instruments like income tax credits are
effective activation measures (Whitehouse, 1996). The rationale behind fiscal
instruments is to increase the attractiveness of work by increasing the differ-
ence in income levels between working and being unemployed, often referred
to as ‘making work pay’. Ideally, specific tax instruments and reductions in
payroll taxes targeted at low-income groups should be included as indicators.
However, due to data availability, the study relies on OECD (2005) data on
income tax plus employee contributions less cash benefits as a percentage of
gross wage of a single-earner family with two children and an ‘average pro-
duction worker’ wage.
Availability requirements and benefit sanctions
An important characteristic of ALMPs is that people have to comply with certain
conditions to receive benefits, usually entailing that people have to be available
for the labour market. Therefore, people have to actively seek jobs, they have
to participate in training programmes, and they have to accept suitable job
offers. These requirements can be enforced through benefit sanctions, implying
temporary reductions in benefit payments. To compare availability require-
ments across countries and over time, this study includes an index of availabil-
ity requirements constructed by the Danish Ministry of Finance (Ministry of
Finance Denmark, 1998; Hasselpflug, 2005). The index is composed of a
weighted average of scores on five indicators, measuring the demands concern-
ing job search activity, occupational mobility, geographical mobility, acceptance
of job offers and participation in activation programmes. The index ranges
from 1 to 5. The higher the score on the index, the stricter the conditions.
To measure changes in benefit sanctions, another index from the same
dataset is included. This index is composed of a weighted average of scores
on three indicators, measuring benefit sanctions applied in cases of voluntary
resignation from jobs, refusal to participate in activation programmes and
refusal of job offers without valid reasons. Like the availability requirements
index, the benefit sanctions index ranges from 1 to 5 and the higher the score,
the stronger the sanctions.
Analysing convergence and Europeanisation
Since a main problem in the Europeanisation literature is how to examine
whether domestic changes have been caused by EU-level factors rather than
global or domestic dynamics (Haverland, 2006), this study includes not only
EU but also non-EU countries. These non-EU countries correct for the effects
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of globalisation and influences of other international organisations.5 Like the
EU countries, these non-EU countries are advanced societies and capitalist
economies. Unfortunately, the new EU member states cannot be included due
to lack of data availability. However, since the study runs until 2003 and the
new member states entered the EU only in 2004, there is no real substantive
reason to include these countries either (but see Draxler and Van Vliet, 2010).
The study covers the years from 1994 up till 2003, for two reasons. First,
a period starting a few years before the introduction of the EES in 1997 and
ending a few years after the introduction of the EES and OMC (in 2000) makes
it possible to trace the effect of the EU governance means most clearly. Second,
the study is constrained by the availability of data years.
Several types of convergence can be distinguished. The most common type
is σ-convergence, analysing the decrease in the variation of domestic policies.
Since this study is interested in the variation of social policies over time,
β-convergence is used. To assess the development of convergence, the standard
deviation and the coefficient of variation6 are calculated for several years. A
decrease over time in these variation measures indicates convergence, while
an increase indicates that the settings of the policy instrument diverged.
Furthermore, the development of the mean signifies the direction, more or
less active, of the convergence or divergence. To increase the robustness of
the results, three-year averages are presented wherever possible.
4.4 ANALYSIS
Total social expenditures
The left-hand columns in Table 4.1 present total social expenditures. The right-
hand columns show expenditures divided by the sum of the unemployment
rate and the percentage of people aged 65 and over. The resulting ratios give
‘a crude measure of welfare generosity, theoretically to be interpreted as the
percentage of GDP received in welfare spending for every 1 per cent of the
population in need’ (Castles, 2004: 36). Although the decreasing average levels
of raw social spending seem to indicate a race to the bottom between 1995
and 2002, the corrected data indicate a race to the top in both the EU and non-
EU countries. Furthermore, the corrected data illustrate an interesting difference
between EU and non-EU countries with respect to the convergence patterns.
Both the standard deviation and the coefficient of variation indicate that the
EU countries have been converging since 1995, while the non-EU countries are
diverging.
5 However, European non-EU countries such as Switzerland or Norway may also be influen-
ced by European integration, for example via policy competition.
6 The coefficient of variation is defined as the standard deviation divided by the mean of
the corresponding data set. Because the standard deviation rises with the mean of the data
set, it is valuable to use both the standard deviation and the coefficient of variation.
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Total social expenditures  
 
Total social expenditures controlled for 




1995 2002 Change  1995 2002 Change 
Australia 16.83 17.59 0.76  0.84 0.95 0.11 
Austria 26.60 25.74 -0.86  1.40 1.30 -0.11 
Belgium 26.56 26.11 -0.45  1.05 1.08 0.03 
Canada 19.25 17.28 -1.96  0.88 0.85 -0.03 
Denmark 28.83 26.96 -1.87  1.28 1.39 0.11 
Finland 27.87 21.92 -5.95  0.94 0.90 -0.04 
France 28.36 28.04 -0.32  1.03 1.10 0.07 
Germany 26.60 26.86 0.26  1.11 1.04 -0.07 
Greece 19.44 21.64 2.20  0.80 0.79 0.00 
Ireland 16.18 15.28 -0.90  0.66 1.01 0.35 
Italy 20.83 23.77 2.94  0.74 0.85 0.10 
Japan 13.70 17.35 3.65  0.77 0.74 -0.03 
Luxembourg 23.46 21.20 -2.26  1.42 1.28 -0.13 
Netherlands 22.73 20.02 -2.71  1.14 1.17 0.03 
New Zealand 19.11 18.28 -0.83  1.03 1.07 0.04 
Norway 23.42 24.28 0.86  1.12 1.28 0.16 
Portugal 18.01 22.20 4.19  0.82 1.02 0.20 
Spain 21.67 20.24 -1.43  0.57 0.73 0.16 
Sweden 33.15 30.33 -2.82  1.23 1.35 0.12 
Switzerland 17.67 19.56 1.89  0.98 1.06 0.08 
United Kingdom 20.32 20.30 -0.02  0.82 0.98 0.16 
United States 15.28 15.79 0.50  0.85 0.89 0.04 
        
Mean OECD-22 22.08 21.85 -0.23  0.98 1.04 0.06 
Standard deviation 5.00 4.10 -0.90  0.22 0.19 -0.03 
Coefficient of Variation 0.23 0.19 -0.04  0.23 0.18 -0.05 
        
Mean EU-15 24.04 23.37 -0.67  1.00 1.07 0.07 
Standard deviation 4.55 3.79 -0.75  0.25 0.19 -0.06 
Coefficient of variation 0.19 0.16 -0.03  0.25 0.18 -0.07 
        
Mean OECD-7 17.89 18.59 0.70  0.92 0.98 0.05 
Standard deviation 2.91 2.55 -0.36  0.11 0.16 0.05 
Coefficient of variation 0.16 0.14 -0.03  0.12 0.17 0.04 
        
 
Notes: EU-15: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.  
 OECD-7: Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, United States. 
 Means of t-1, t, t+1.  
  
Source: (a) Total social expenditures: OECD Social Expenditure Database (OECD 2007b); 
 (b) Population aged 65 and above as percentage of total population: The World Bank: World Development 
Indicators; 
 (c) Unemployment rate: the number of people unemployed as percentage of the labour force: The World 
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Table 4.2 Expenditures on active labour market policies, three-year averages 
 
  
Expenditures on ALMP 
as  % of GDP 
  
Expenditures on ALMP 
as ‰ of GDP divided by the 
unemployment rate  
 
 
Expenditures on ALMP as % 







1995 2002 Change 
 
1995 2002 Change 
Australia 0.7 0.4 -0.3  0.8 0.6 -0.2  34.7 32.0 -2.7 
Austria 0.4 0.6 0.2  0.9 1.5 0.6  22.1 38.0 15.9 
Belgium 1.3 1.2 -0.2  1.4 1.7 0.3  29.6 27.3 -2.3 
Canada 0.6 0.4 -0.2  0.6 0.5 0.0  29.1 33.5 4.4 
Denmark 1.8 1.7 -0.1  2.5 3.7 1.3  28.5 35.6 7.1 
Finland 1.6 0.9 -0.7  1.0 1.0 -0.1  28.7 30.0 1.3 
France 1.3 1.1 -0.1  1.1 1.3 0.2  43.2 41.0 -2.2 
Germany 1.2 1.1 -0.1  1.5 1.3 -0.1  41.4 40.7 -0.8 
Greece 0.3 0.2 -0.1  0.3 0.2 -0.1  41.2 32.2 -9.0 
Ireland 1.6 0.7 -0.9  1.2 1.7 0.5  44.5 44.5 0.0 
Italy 0.2 0.6 0.4  0.2 0.7 0.5  24.4 58.4 34.0 
Japan 0.3 0.3 0.0  1.0 0.6 -0.4  44.9 37.2 -7.7 
Luxembourg 0.2 0.2 0.0  0.7 0.9 0.3  28.5 23.2 -5.2 
Netherlands 1.1 1.1 0.0  1.6 3.5 1.9  28.4 45.0 16.6 
New Zealand 0.7 0.5 -0.3  1.1 0.9 -0.2  38.1 33.1 -5.1 
Norway 1.3 0.8 -0.5  2.5 2.0 -0.6  54.7 56.7 2.0 
Portugal 0.8 0.7 -0.1  1.1 1.3 0.2  43.6 42.5 -1.1 
Spain 0.5 0.7 0.3  0.2 0.7 0.5  12.8 25.2 12.4 
Sweden 2.4 1.4 -1.0  2.5 2.7 0.1  50.9 55.1 4.3 
Switzerland 0.5 0.6 0.1  1.3 1.9 0.5  29.0 45.2 16.2 
United 
Kingdom 0.5 0.5 0.1 
 
0.5 1.1 0.6 
 
34.3 60.8 26.5 
United States 0.2 0.1 -0.1  0.4 0.3 -0.1  35.2 25.6 -9.6 
            
Mean 
OECD-22 0.9 0.7 -0.2 
 
1.1 1.4 0.2 
 
34.9 39.2 4.3 
Standard 
deviation  0.6 0.4 -0.2 
 
0.7 0.9 0.2 
 
9.8 10.8 1.0 
Coefficient of 
variation 0.7 0.6 -0.1 
 
0.6 0.7 0.1 
 
0.3 0.3 0.0 
            
Mean EU-15 1.0 0.9 -0.2  1.1 1.5 0.4  33.5 40.0 6.5 
Standard 
deviation 0.6 0.4 -0.2 
 
0.7 1.0 0.3 
 
10.0 11.3 1.2 
Coefficient of 
variation 0.6 0.5 -0.2 
 
0.6 0.6 0.0 
 
0.3 0.3 0.0 
             
Mean  
OECD-7 0.6 0.4 -0.2 
 
1.1 1.0 -0.1 
 
38.0 37.6 -0.4 
Standard 
deviation 0.3 0.2 -0.1 
 
0.7 0.6 0.0 
 
8.5 9.5 1.0 
Coefficient of 
variation 0.5 0.4 -0.1 
 
0.6 0.7 0.1 
 
0.2 0.3 0.0 
            
 
Source:  (a) Expenditures on ALMPs: OECD Social Expenditure Database (OECD 2007b). 
 (b) Unemployment rate: The World Bank: World Development Indicators; and own calculations. 
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Expenditures on active labour market policies
The first column in Table 4.2 shows a decrease in the average ALMP spending
within the EU as a percentage of GDP. This seems remarkable, given the grow-
ing attention to ALMPs on the European agendas. However, this decrease in
spending is probably due to lower unemployment, since the expenditures that
are corrected for unemployment on average show an increase at the EU level.
Moreover, this increase is EU-specific, since the expenditures per unemployed
person decreased in the non-EU countries. Also in relative terms, the ex-
penditures on ALMPs as a share of all LMPs increased by 6.5 percentage points,
compared to a decrease of 0.4 percentage points in the other OECD countries.
To summarise, although the three indicators do not indicate an EU-specific
convergence pattern, there does seem to be a specific European trend towards
more ALMPs.
The expenditures on specific ALMP areas are shown in Table 4.3. The EU
average of expenditures on employment services increased by 2.4 percentage
points. Since public employment services function as gatekeepers for ALMPs,
they are considered key actors in the implementation of the EES. In addition,
the expenditures on labour market training increased at the EU average.
Strikingly, the expenditures on youth programmes decreased. This is remark-
able since youth is one of the main target groups in the EES and the Lisbon
strategy. In fact, the first employment guideline starts with ‘tackling youth
employment’. However, although many countries note in their national action
plans that they have started with special youth programmes, such as the ‘The
New Deal for Young People’ in the United Kingdom, the data illustrate that
the activation of unemployed youth did not have the highest priority across
the European countries. Instead, countries redirected their focus from youth
policies to other areas, such as subsidised employment in Portugal for instance.
To some extent, however, these shifts will also be due to differences in classi-
fications across countries and over time. Finally, the expenditures on subsidised
employment increased in the EU. Interestingly, none of the ALMP areas con-
verged within the EU. In fact, they diverged.
Settings of policy instruments
Table 4.4 continues with the settings of the policy instruments. Obviously,
reducing income taxes has been on the agenda of almost all countries.
Although the initial employment guidelines of 1998 did not refer to taxes,
guidelines 2 and 4 of the 1999 employment guidelines state that member states
will review their tax systems to actively support employment and to provide
incentives for unemployed people to seek work. Also the council made several
recommendations for the reduction of income taxes. In line with the EES, EU
countries decreased income taxes by 3.9 percentage points.
The EU average level of the replacement rates shows an increase of 1.1
percentage points of the last received income. Although higher replacement
rates do not indicate increased activation, due to reduced incentives for people
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to accept jobs, there seems to be an EU-specific pattern. Replacement rates
increased and converged in the EU, while they decreased and diverged in the
non-EU countries.
Most countries have not changed the duration of the entitlement rights.
Naturally, the duration changes less over time in countries with unemployment
assistance rather than unemployment insurance. Table 4.5 also shows that the
qualifying conditions and the waiting period remained the same in the majority
of the countries. Apparently, countries have not chosen to change these settings
of the unemployment benefits to activate unemployed people. Finally, the
availability requirements have, on average, become slightly more demanding,
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.4 Tax and Benefits, three-year averages  
 
 
Income tax and employee 






Duration of unemployment 
benefit entitlements 
  1995 2002 Change  1995 2002 Change  1995 2002 Change 
Australia 16.2 13.6 -2.6  27 23 -3.5  999 999 0 
Austria 8.9 8.7 -0.2  33 32 -1.0  30 30 0 
Belgium 19.0 21.0 2.0  39 40 1.6  999 999 0 
Canada 17.0 14.4 -2.6  19 15 -4.1  38 38 0 
Denmark 30.8 29.9 -0.9  65 50 -14.7  329 208 -121 
Finland 26.0 23.0 -3.0  36 35 -0.5  100 100 0 
France 14.2 14.7 0.5  37 41 4.0  130 130 0 
Germany 23.4 18.9 -4.5  26 29 3.1  52 52 0 
Greece 16.6 16.9 0.3  15 13 -1.8  : : : 
Ireland 17.4 -0.7 -18.1  26 37 10.7  65 65 0 
Italy 18.3 14.3 -4.0  19 34 14.6  26 26 0 
Japan 9.2 13.4 4.2  10 8 -1.8  30 30 0 
Luxembourg 0.7 -2.2 -3.0  : : :  : : : 
Netherlands 29.5 18.8 -10.7  52 53 0.5  95 104 9 
New Zealand 21.0 18.3 -2.7  27 28 0.8  999 999 0 
Norway 14.5 17.9 3.4  39 38 -0.6  80 156 76 
Portugal 9.3 5.7 -3.6  35 41 5.6  : : : 
Spain 12.8 10.1 -2.7  39 36 -2.8  : : : 
Sweden 23.4 21.3 -2.1  27 24 -2.8  60 60 0 
Switzerland 8.8 8.4 -0.4  30 35 5.8  43 30 -13 
United 
Kingdom 17.8 10.0 -7.9 
 
18 16 -1.3 
 
43 26 -17 
United States 18.7 10.9 -7.8  12 14 1.8  26 26 0 
            
Mean  
OECD-22 17.0 14.0 -3.0 
 
30.1 30.7 0.6 
 
230.3 226.6 -3.7 
Standard 
deviation 7.0 7.3 0.3 
 
14.0 13.3 -0.7 
 
329.1 327.5 -1.6 
Coefficient 
of variation 0.4 0.5 0.1 
 
0.5 0.4 0.0 
 
1.4 1.4 0.0 
            
Mean EU-15 17.9 14.0 -3.9  33.4 34.5 1.1  175.5 163.6 -11.8 
Standard 
deviation 7.8 8.6 0.7 
 
15.1 13.6 -1.5 
 
246.0 241.6 -4.4 
Coefficient 
of variation 0.4 0.6 0.2 
 
0.5 0.4 -0.1 
 
1.4 1.5 0.1 
             
Mean  
OECD-7 15.1 13.9 -1.2 
 
23.4 23.2 -0.2 
 
316.5 325.4 9.0 
Standard 
deviation 4.3 3.3 -1.0 
 
9.5 10.5 1.0 
 
432.0 428.1 -3.9 
Coefficient 
of variation 0.3 0.2 0.0 
 
0.4 0.5 0.0 
 
1.4 1.3 0.0 
       
 
Note:  The value ‘999’ means an unlimited duration of benefit entitlements. Therefore the meaning of the mean, 
standard deviation and coefficient of variation is limited. The replacement rates are calculated as unweighted 
averages of several situations in which benefits are estimated for three durations of unemployment spells (1, 
2 to 3, 4 to 5 years of unemployment), three family situations (single, with dependent spouse, with spouse in 
work), two earning levels (average earnings and two-thirds of average earnings of an average production 
worker).  
  
Source:  (a) Income tax and employee contributions: OECD Taxing Wages 2003 / 2004 (OECD, 2005). 
  (b) Unemployment replacement rates: OECD Benefits and Wages (OECD, 2006). 
  (c) Duration: Welfare State Entitlements Data Set (Scruggs, 2005); and own calculations.  
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Policy mixes
The changes in a majority of the considered policy instruments indicate a trend
towards a more active approach to LMPs in the EU. However, this is not a
converging trend, since the EU countries converged on only a few indicators.
One explanation for the limited convergence is that countries opt for different
combinations of ALMP instruments, while all combinations designate more
activation. The approach of this study makes it possible to trace such policy
mixes.
First of all, several countries adopted a strategy of activation through a
broad range of policy instruments more active. Austria increased the ALMP
spending, lowered income taxes, lowered replacement rates and made the
availability requirements more stringent. Denmark increased its ALMP spending
also, but focused particularly on subsidised employment. Clearly, Denmark
reformed the tax and benefit schemes with lower income taxes and substantial
cuts in the level and duration of benefits. Interestingly, in addition to slightly
increasing its ALMP spending and introducing a more active tax and benefit
scheme, Finland opted to change the conditions people have to comply with
to receive benefits. Finland is the only country that increased the qualification
conditions and waiting period, as well as the strictness of the availability
requirements and benefit sanctions. A third Nordic country, Sweden, also
increased its ALMP spending and made its tax and benefit scheme more active.
However, it eased the availability requirements and benefit sanctions. With
a relative shift from passive to active spending of 26.5 percentage points and
a level of 60.8 percent, the UK is a clear outlier. Interestingly, 64.9 percent of
the country’s total ALMP budget is spent on employment services. The UK’s
tax and benefit scheme has become more active and the benefit sanctions have
been increased. Furthermore, the UK and Denmark are the only countries that
cut the duration of benefits. However, the shift towards activation policies
in the UK results from domestic politics rather than from European influences.
After its victory in 1997, the Labour Party launched work-oriented New Deal
programmes. And although this focus on work meant a break with the Labour
tradition, this shift in the party programme was more influenced by the US
than by the EU (Clasen, 2005).
Secondly, a number of countries focused on ALMP programmes and less on
tax and benefit schemes. Italy, for instance, greatly increased the expenditures
on ALMPs. As a result of pressure from the EES, the traditionally passive LMPs
were made more active in the 1990s. Employment services were decentralised
and the number of participants in activation programmes more than doubled
between 1996 and 2001 (Graziano, 2007). Furthermore, income tax decreased,
but the replacement rate increased and the number of waiting days diminished
to zero. The Netherlands also increased its ALMP spending substantially.
Furthermore, income tax decreased and qualifying conditions and availability
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made less active by increasing the level and duration of the benefits. A third
group of countries have chosen to put less emphasis on ALMP programmes
in combination with more active tax and benefit schemes. For example, Ger-
many, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg and Portugal lowered the level of income
taxes or changed the settings of other instruments, but reduced their ALMP
spending. Therefore, decreased ALMP expenditures do not necessarily mean
less active LMPs.
A fourth group of countries made their LMPs less active. Belgium spent
relatively less on ALMPs, increased the income tax, increased the level of
benefits and made the availability requirements and benefit sanctions less strict.
Also, France changed most of its LMPs into a more ‘passive’ direction. ALMP
expenditures have been decreased and the levels of income tax and the replace-
ment rate have been increased. However, the number of waiting days has been
increased and benefit sanctions have been tightened. Within the ALMP budget,
expenditures on employment services and subsidised employment have been
increased. These results are supported by Barbier (2005), who found that the
activation strategy of France was mainly focused on the demand side of the
labour market by subsidising employers, and not on the supply side. Interest-
ingly Belgium and France, two countries that made their LMPs less active, are
both continental welfare states. The continental welfare states therefore did
not catch up with the ALMPs of the liberal and Scandinavian welfare states,
which possibly explains the limited convergence of ALMPs. Another interesting
finding is that Belgium and France both increased their expenditures on public
employment services and subsidised employment and focused only on the
demand side of the labour market.
4.5 DISCUSSION
With the adoption of the EES and the Lisbon strategy, convergence of social
protection goals and policies across EU countries have become important
objectives. The two consecutive analyses in this paper both show EU-specific
patterns. First, social expenditures in EU countries have converged and have
increased on average, whereas non-EU countries have predominantly diverged.
Corrected for cyclical and demographic factors, it seems plausible to ascribe
these policy changes to European integration. Since the expenditure data do
not clarify which of the social policies have converged, the next step was an
extensive analysis of ALMPs.
Since the expenditures on ALMPs in EU countries have increased while the
expenditures in non-EU countries have decreased, it seems, again, that national
policies are influenced by European integration. Furthermore, at a lower
aggregation level, the policies of EU countries tend to follow EES guidelines
and recommendations. However, at this level of abstraction policies appear
to converge less. Methodologically, one explanation for the differences in
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aggregation levels found, is that it is self-evident that more differences will
be noticed when observations are more detailed. This also explains the gap
between the results of the quantitative expenditure-based studies and case
studies. However, this study provides evidence for a more substantive explana-
tion, i.e. although most countries adopted a more activate approach towards
LMPs, they chose different configurations of policy instruments.
A remarkable finding is the decline in expenditures on youth programmes.
How to reconcile this with the high level of European attention to policies
focused on preventing youth unemployment? The most plausible explanation
is that some youth measures are not covered by ALMP expenditures on youth
programmes. For instance, the increases in spending on employment services
and on labour market training might be due to more attention to youth un-
employment. Another possibility is that governments have focused on normal
education systems, on family policies or on incentives in the tax system. Future
studies will have to address this puzzling finding in more detail.
Another ongoing puzzle is the difference in policy reforms among countries.
Some countries seem not to be affected by the EES at all, since they have made
almost all ALMP instruments less active. In continental welfare states, activation
initiatives have faced substantial resistance. As a consequence, activation has
been targeted at the assistance margins, rather than on the insurance core of
the unemployment benefit systems (Clegg, 2007: 607). This increases and
reproduces the distance between labour market insiders and outsiders, which
is illustrated by the Dutch case, where benefits are extended while qualifying
conditions have been tightened. Still, with its emphasis on activation, the
Netherlands has broken with the continental trajectory. The fact that other
countries did not follow is not only due to continental welfare institutions,
but also to country-specific factors. For instance, the lack of activation in
Belgium can be explained by the fact that benefit administration is a federal
competence, while employment service is a competence of the regions (Clegg,
2007: 609). However, the study presents some evidence of convergence, to a
certain extent, of LMPs across EU member states. This ‘divergence within
convergence’ is exactly in line with what one could expect from the EES.

5 Europeanisation and the Political Economy
of Active Labour Market Policies
Abstract
Previous studies show that reforms in labour market policies differ across
countries. This may be partly owing to the impact of European integration
on these policy reforms. Whereas most of these studies are qualitative case
studies, the present study aims at explaining cross national variation in ex-
penditures on active labour market policies (ALMPs) quantitatively. Relying
on pooled time series data, the study tests whether and how Europeanisation
influenced activation. The analyses lead to the conclusion that the European
Employment Strategy (EES) has contributed to shifts from passive to active
labour market policies. Using new indicators, we trace the impact of specific
mechanisms of the EES, resulting in evidence for the influence of mutual
learning through the peer review programme.
This chapter will be published in European Union Politics, Volume 12, Issue 2,
June 2011 (co-authored with Ferry Koster) by SAGE, All rights reserved. © SAGE,
2011. The definitive version will be available at eup.sagepub.com.
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5.1 INTRODUCTION1
The impact of European integration is a widely discussed topic in the com-
parative welfare state literature. This has especially been triggered by the
launch of the European Employment Strategy (EES) in 1997 and the Lisbon
Strategy in 2000. To contribute to the overarching goal of increasing Europe’s
competitiveness and social cohesion, the EES aims at higher employment and
lower unemployment levels by advocating active labour market policies
(ALMPs). In order to achieve this, the EES relies on legally non-binding instru-
ments like guidelines, benchmarking, recommendations and mutual learning
organised as a peer review programme, since member states of the EU are,
in line with the principle of subsidiarity, responsible for their own labour
market policies. At the Lisbon summit in 2000, the instruments of the EES were
institutionalised as a more general governance means, called the Open Method
of Coordination (OMC), which has since also been applied to other policy areas
such as social inclusion, pensions and health care.
In this paper, we focus on the Europeanisation – conceptualised as the
impact of European integration on member states (Radaelli, 2003) – of national
labour market policies. Two central questions in earlier research, consisting
of national case studies, are whether and through which mechanisms the EES has
influenced national policies. A broadly supported finding in the case studies
is that the EES has contributed to increased emphasis on activation in national
labour market policies, although its influence on ALMPs varies considerably
across countries and over time (Mosher and Trubek, 2003; Zeitlin and Pochet,
2005; Heidenreich and Zeitlin, 2009). In analysing this influence, three types
of mechanisms have been identified (Heidenreich and Bischoff, 2008); mechan-
isms of external pressure, stemming from evaluations and recommendations,
which exert normative influences (Hamel and Vanhercke, 2009); cognitive
mechanisms of policy diffusion such as policy-learning (Visser, 2009); and the
strategic and selective use of the EES by domestic actors (Visser, 2005).
Compared with the transposition of directives, which forms the lion’s share
of the Europeanisation literature, assessing the impact of the EES is a method-
ological challenge, since it cannot be measured directly owing to its non-
binding character (Zeitlin, 2009). In addition, although the case-study literature
insightfully depicts country-specific factors and developments, not much
attention has been paid to the generalisation of the findings through a system-
1 Earlier versions of this article were presented at workshops of the 6th ESPAnet Conference
(2008), NIG Conference (2008), SIG Researchers Day (2008), Dutch Political Science Confer-
ence (2009), and an AIAS seminar (2009). We thank all participants of the workshops and
Paul de Beer, Koen Caminada, Kees Goudswaard, Marloes de Graaf-Zijl, Beryl ter Haar,
Michael Kaeding, Duane Swank, Maroesjka Versantvoort and three anonymous referees
of European Union Politics for their helpful comments and suggestions on earlier versions
of this article.
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atic comparison of the developments across the member states, while con-
trolling for other factors of policy change. Hence, it is difficult to assess to what
extent increased emphasis on activation in labour market policies can be
ascribed to the EU and how to explain the variation in the impact of European
integration. In this regard, Kröger (2009) argues that the OMC-literature is over-
determined. Therefore, the research question of the present study is how to
explain the variation in effort devoted to ALMPs across countries and over time.
We aim to complement the existing studies by analysing ALMP expenditure
data from 22 OECD countries, allowing us to examine the different relevant
mechanisms indicated by the case studies and to control for other variables
in a single analysis. Earlier comparative political economy research on the
variation in ALMP spending focused on corporatism (Martin and Swank, 2004),
government partisanship (Rueda, 2007; Huo et al, 2008), and international
economic integration (Franzese and Hays, 2006; Gaston and Rajaguru, 2008).
Armingeon (2007) analysed the impact of the EES and found that the EES has
led to relatively higher spending on ALMPs in EU countries. With respect to
Armingeon’s study, we seek to make three contributions. First, in investigating
whether the EES has influenced national ALMPs, we also take the constraining
effect of Economic and Monetary Union into account (Dyson, 2000). Second,
we examine the normative and cognitive mechanisms through which the EES
is expected to influence national policy-making (Heidenreich and Bischoff,
2008). Here, we zoom in on specific governance means like the Council recom-
mendations to analyse the variation in the impact of the EES across countries
and over time. Furthermore, we examine the role of domestic actors like social
partners in the policy-making process (De la Porte, 2007). Third, the study
relies on new data and updates Armingeon’s study from 2002 to 2005.
5.2 EUROPEANISATION OF ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET POLICIES
Active labour market policies
ALMPs are policies aimed at increasing labour market participation, whereas
passive policies can be understood as policies which entitle unemployed people
to benefits (Van Berkel and Hornemann Møller, 2002). The policies through
which governments try to get people to work include programmes ranging
from labour market training, services of employment agencies, youth pro-
grammes and subsidised employment, to programmes for the disabled.
Although ALMPs are typically oriented towards the supply side of the labour
market, some programmes focus on the demand side as well, which is for
example the case with subsidised employment. It should be noted that the
effectiveness of ALMPs is fiercely debated. In a meta-analysis of approximately
100 European evaluation studies of ALMPs, Kluve (2010) finds positive effects
on transitions from unemployment to work for employment services and
private sector incentive programmes such as wage subsidies and at most
modest effects for training programmes, whereas direct public employment
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creation even has a detrimental effect. Extending this study with an assessment
of about 200 evaluation studies of European and US ALMPs, Card et al. (2010)
confirm Kluve’s findings and show that employment services have positive
effects particularly in the short run, whereas training programmes are likely
to be more effective in the long run. However, even if ALMPs are effective, it
is debatable whether the benefits offset the costs, such as the tax burden,
displacement effects and dead-weight loss. Although the cost-effectiveness
of different ALMPs evidently does play a role in the policy-making processes,
we leave these kind of labour economics variables out of the study, mostly
because of data availability, and focus instead on variables from the European-
isation and political economy literature.
Europeanisation
Generally, Europeanisation can be defined as the impact of European integra-
tion on member states (Radaelli, 2003). More specifically, Europeanisation may
refer to the impact on policies, polities and politics. Although the focus of the
present study is on policies – the result of Europeanisation – it is explicitly
taken into account that changes in national policies are the outcome of national
policy-making processes and that the process of Europeanisation thus proceeds
through polities and politics. National policy-making processes may be in-
fluenced through different Europeanisation mechanisms, arising from different
types of EU policies. With regard to ALMPs, two types of EU policy are relevant,
namely the EES and the EMU.
European Employment Strategy
As an intergovernmental means of EU governance, the EES coordinates national
labour market policies, using a set of non-binding instruments such as
guidelines and benchmarks. It is a comprehensive set of governance instru-
ments that influences national policies as a whole. Instead of one single mech-
anism, it is the combination of a number of mutually enforcing mechanisms,
such as mutual learning and peer pressure, that is supposed to affect domestic
policies (Zeitlin and Pochet, 2005). These mechanisms can be distinguished
analytically to find out how the specific means of the EES are related to national
labour market policies. Making such a distinction is uncommon in many
Europeanisation studies where EU pressure, for example the implementation
of a directive, is treated as a constant factor. However, since the EES is an
annual process, with iterative monitoring, reporting and learning, its pressure
varies across countries and over time (Mosher and Trubek, 2003).
The EES offers specific norms that can affect national ALMPs. First of all,
the employment guidelines define targets, for instance with respect to the
employment rate, the unemployment rate and the activity rate. Perhaps more
importantly, the guidelines provide specific policy norms, stating that member
states should focus more strongly on ALMPs (Heidenreich and Bischoff, 2008).
The guidelines support the diffusion of a paradigm of activation through the
member states, aimed at influencing domestic policy-making arenas. This
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process can trigger and catalyse policy reforms at the domestic level that are
in line with the goals of the EES (Büchs and Friedrich, 2005; Ferrera and Sacchi,
2005). Indeed, the case-study literature provides abundant evidence that the
EES has contributed to shifts in ALMPs (Zeitlin and Pochet, 2005; Heidenreich
and Zeitlin, 2009). Therefore, we hypothesise that the EES has a positive effect
on the effort on activation.
To enforce the EES guidelines, member states receive recommendations
from the Council on the progression in their policies regarding the guidelines
on an annual basis. These recommendations deal with various policy issues,
such as gender mainstreaming, deregulation for firms and reducing early
school leaving. In this study, the recommendations on activation are relevant.
Although these recommendations are sometimes focused on a specific type
of ALMP, such as strengthening the provision of employment services or labour
market training, they are also aimed at reinforcing ALMPs in general. Since
a recommendation is a form of ‘naming and shaming,’ it creates pressure from
the European Commission, the Council and other member states on politicians
to comply with the guidelines by reforming national policies, as was the case
when Denmark did not fulfil the goal of activating jobless people after 6 or
12 months (Mailand, 2009). Furthermore, recommendations may influence
policy reforms by changing domestic opportunity structures. Ministers, op-
position parties or social partners may, depending on timing, use recommenda-
tions strategically for their own purposes in the policy-making process
(Jacobsson, 2005). Tucker (2003: 40) argues that treating each recommendation
as a separate source of pressure stretches the concept and that instead ‘there
is evidence that the mere number of recommendations a state receives in the
EES-OMC is symbolically more important than a thorough analysis might
suggest.’ Heidenreich and Bischoff (2008: 511) also argue that it is the number
itself that creates pressure, since ‘the number of recommendations reflected
the relative position of the country.’ Therefore, we test the hypothesis that
the number of council recommendations received by a country is positively
related to efforts in relation to ALMPs. However, case studies also suggest that
over the years the pressure from recommendations has diminished, because
governments have become used to them (Büchs and Friedrich, 2005) and
because they can negotiate the content of the recommendations with the
Commission (Mailand, 2009).2
Mutual learning is a second mechanism to diffuse policies in the framework
of the EES. In a process that can be conceptualized as mimicking, actors imitate
the successful policies of others. Policy-makers can extend their repertoire of
2 It may also be expected that countries spending less on ALMP receive more recommenda-
tions. To account for this, we included the recommendations as a lagged variable in the
regression analysis. Furthermore, this inverse effect could be mainly expected with levels
or shares of ALMP expenditure as the dependent variable. Therefore, we also examine
first differences of ALMP expenditure.
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effective policies and avoid the costs of learning through trial and error (Heme-
rijck and Visser, 2003: 26). Regarding the EES, there are two ways in which
this cognitive mechanism influences member states. Firstly, policy-makers learn
informally from colleagues in their international network and from all EES
documents on benchmarks and best practices. In addition, learning results
from a formally institutionalised setting. In the peer review programme, in
which activation of LMP is a major theme, bureaucrats and experts from differ-
ent countries get together at meetings to exchange best practices and to learn
from the experiences of their international peers. Zeitlin (2009: 229-230) found
that mutual learning is ‘among the most widely attested findings about the
OMC’s national influence’ and that the progress in identifying effective ALMPs
has been mainly achieved through the peer review programme. In contrast,
Casey and Gold (2005) concluded that the peer reviews have established a
learning process, but that its impact has been limited. This conclusion has been
criticized because the authors conceptualized impact as a direct policy transfer
from one country to another (Nedergaard, 2006; Zeitlin, 2009). Instead, follow-
ing the idea of ‘contextualised learning’, the EES explicitly leaves room for
countries to take their domestic situations into account. Therefore, learning
through peer review can be expected to create more indirect effects such as
analogical inspiration or ‘mirror effects,’ learning more about one’s own
practices, as Hamel and Vanhercke (2009) found for Belgium and France.
Furthermore, policy-makers can combine insights from several participants
and adapt them to domestic LMPs and political contexts. For instance, in an
examination of peer reviews on modernizing and strengthening public employ-
ment services, Visser (2009) illustrates how Finnish reforms with regard to
an individualized approach to reintegrating the unemployed draw on practices
from Sweden, the Netherlands, Denmark and Austria. This and other studies
(for example, Büchs and Friedrich, 2005) also indicate that learning occurs
mostly among like-minded member states, which may be strengthened through
the self-selection of participants in the peer reviews.
Ferrera and Sacchi (2005) found that the frequency of the governance
processes of the EES is an important determinant of its influence. In this respect,
policy-learning is generally more successful when groups meet regularly
(Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 146). Hence, Nedergaard (2006: 317) argues
that an increasing number of encounters makes mutual learning in the EES
more likely. Learning through peer review may not only trigger policy reforms
because ‘policy success, breaking the pessimism of failure and offering
prospects of job growth, create the political and intellectual precondition for
further reforms’ (Visser, 2009: 49). It may also intensify the emphasis on
activation in already ongoing national reforms (Büchs and Friedrich, 2005).
Therefore, we expect that participation in the peer review programme has
contributed to an increased emphasis on activation in national labour market
policies.
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Economic and Monetary Union
The introduction of EMU is another source of Europeanisation (Dyson, 2000).
The literature has advanced two central arguments underlying the expected
impact of EMU on national labour market policies. The first states that EMU
has limited the repertoire of responses to economic shocks available to national
policy-makers to supply-side strategies because member states are restricted
in applying monetary and budgetary policies (Scharpf, 2002: 649). This means
that we can expect deregulation, flexibilisation of labour market conditions
and more ALMPs. The second mechanism relates to social policy programmes
in general, and implies that the Maastricht convergence criteria, especially the
target of budget deficits smaller than 3 percent of the GDP, can be expected
to lead to cuts in social expenditures. Although governments can choose any
combination of retrenchments and tax increases to reach the targets, it can
be expected that cuts in social spending are most likely, since these expend-
itures constitute a large share of the public expenditures. Indeed, case studies
indicate that political actors have used EMU strategically as a lever for welfare
state reforms (Featherstone, 2004). Combining the two arguments, EMU has
limited the repertoire of national policy-makers to non-expensive supply-side
policies. Hence, we hypothesise that EMU has a negative effect on spending
on activation. However, this negative impact may have been mitigated by the
launch of the EES. An important reason for introducing the EES was to improve
the functioning of labour markets and to bolster economic convergence in the
EMU, but also to counterbalance economic integration with a social side. Thus,
in the shadow of the EMU, the EES has led to new configurations of policies
(Hemerijck and Ferrera, 2004). Under the budgetary constraints of EMU, the
EES is aimed at guiding member states as to which types of policy they could
best spend their resources on. For example, Van Vliet (2010a) shows that
member states have changed their policy configurations and that they spend
relatively more on employment services.
Domestic politics
A central insight of the Europeanisation literature is that the influence of the
EES and EMU on national policies depends on the domestic political actors and
the institutional conditions in which these actors operate. With regard to the
labour market policy-making process, two types of actors are relevant, namely
political parties and social partners.
First, a central hypothesis in the welfare state literature states that the
direction of a policy reform depends on the preferences of political parties
(Allan and Scruggs, 2004). Generally, left-wing parties can be expected to be
more in favour of costly ALMPs such as training than right-wing parties. This
is particularly the case since social democratic parties have embraced the
objective of employment next to decommodification (Huo et al., 2008). Hence,
the EES guidelines give leftist politicians a means to back up their own pro-
posals on costly ALMPs in the domestic arena, as the Dutch social democratic
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minister of employment did (Visser, 2005). In line with the general argument
regarding social spending, we expect leftist coalitions to increase ALMP spend-
ing, whereas rightist coalitions aim at retrenchments.
Besides political parties, social partners are important actors in the reform
processes of LMPs (Martin and Swank, 2004). When governments aim to make
LMPs more activating, either they can push reforms unilaterally or they can
achieve broad social consensus. Since social partners have considerable veto
power, governments prefer the latter route. After all, trade unions have the
power to call for strikes and to influence electoral arenas. On the other hand,
social partners have an interest in avoiding unilateral state intervention
(Ebbinghaus and Hassel, 2000). They offer social acceptance in exchange for
influence over the policy reforms. Traditionally, trade unions were com-
pensated for wage moderation with increased welfare benefits. But, owing
to the shift from Keynesian to neoclassical policies by most governments over
the past two decades, strengthened by the adoption of EMU, the need for
compensation by governments has diminished. High wage settlements would
be punished by unemployment, resulting in decreasing wages. However, to
avoid rising unemployment, it is still in the interest of governments to nego-
tiate with social partners on wage moderation. As the room to negotiate for
unions is rather limited, at least they can try to bargain over a price for wage
moderation (Hassel, 2003). Hence, expansion of ALMPs is the best compensation
employees can get because this is in line with the supply-side orientation of
governments (Falkner, 1997; Brandl and Traxler, 2005). Although ALMPs are
not directly in the interest of union members, owing to increasing taxes and
wage competition (Rueda, 2007), employers favour an increase in labour
supply. The likelihood of achieving a broad social consensus depends on the
institutional setting in which the government and the social partners bargain
(Martin and Swank, 2004). A corporatist tradition of a tripartite council
increases the chances that the actors reach agreements that are in the common
interest (Ebbinghaus and Hassel, 2000). We hypothesise that the presence of
a tripartite council has a positive effect on ALMP spending.
Political actors do not just operate in the defined national policy-making
institutions; they also participate in the new national processes of the EES. In
fact, participation of social partners is an explicit goal of the EES. Earlier
research points out that EES processes such as drafting National Action Plans
are in some countries entirely dominated by governmental actors, whereas
in other countries social partners are very much involved (De la Porte and
Pochet, 2005). Since participation by potential veto-players could contribute
to the legitimacy of policy proposals (Heidenreich and Bischoff, 2008: 503),
we expect that high involvement of social partners in the national EES processes
leads to higher effort in relation to ALMPs.
The ministries of employment are probably the most important actors in the
bureaucratic EES process. However, since there is no cross-national variation in
the involvement of these ministries, the involvement is high in all countries (De
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la Porte, 2007), and including them in the analysis does not explain anything.
The role of finance ministries, however, does vary across countries. We hypo-
thesise that high levels of involvement by finance ministries lead to relatively
lower ALMP spending. There are two reasons to expect this. First, ministries
of finance may be more concerned than ministries of employment about public
finance and are therefore more reserved in spending on labour market training
and subsidised employment. Secondly, finance ministries are more ‘neo-liberal’
oriented than ministries of employment and may therefore prefer activation
through other instruments that are not reflected in ALMP spending, such as
benefit sanctions and earned income tax credits (Visser, 2005).
5.3 DATA, MEASURES AND METHOD
Data and Measures
Dependent variable
The dependent variable of this study is ALMP effort. For ALMP expenditure data,
the study relies on the OECD Social Expenditure Database (2009). ALMP expend-
iture as a percentage of GDP is the most common indicator of ALMP effort.
However, this measure may be problematic for two reasons (Armingeon, 2007).
First, it does not take into account that ALMP expenditures are directly related
to the level of unemployment. Second, ALMP as a percentage of GDP does not
provide information about the relative size of passive labour market policies.
Therefore, it is not possible to analyse a shift from passive to active labour
market policies, which is relevant for analysing the EES’s emphasis on activa-
tion. Following Armingeon (2007), we use two measures that do not have these
shortcomings. First, an indicator for the efforts of governments on activation
per unemployed person is included, measured as ALMP expenditures per
unemployed relative to GDP per capita, which is a commonly used indicator
for cross-country comparisons (for example, Scarpetta, 1996). This indicator
slightly differs from Armingeon’s indicator – ALMP expenditures as a per-
centage of GDP standardized by the unemployment rate – but we use it because
it is easier to interpret.3 Second, we include a measure that expresses ALMP
expenditures as a share of expenditures on all labour market policies, defined
as the sum of active and passive spending. This measure indicates govern-
ments’ emphasis on activation policies relative to all labour market policies.
As will be discussed below, some countries score quite similarly on both
3 Note that the indicator ALMP expenditures as a percentage of GDP standardized by the
unemployment rate can be understood as spending per unemployed person as a percentage
of GDP per member of the labour force, since (ALMP expenditures / GDP) / (unemploy-
ment / labour force) = (ALMP expenditure / unemployment) / (GDP / labour force). Our
results also hold for this indicator.
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indicators, whereas other countries do not. As a result, the correlation between
the two indicators does not exceed 0.57.
Independent variables
The analyses are performed to indicate whether and, if so, how Europeanisa-
tion matters. Therefore, the EES is treated as a dichotomous variable in the first
analyses, and in the following analyses more fine-grained measures are added
to examine the variation in the impact of the EES. We expect the impact of the
EES, started in 1997, to be visible from 1998 onwards. Hence, the dummy vari-
able is given a score of 0 for the years before 1998 and 1 afterwards. In addi-
tion, we distinguish between peer review programme and Council recommendations,
to account for the EES governance processes. The variable peer reviews indicates
the yearly frequency of countries participating, either as a visitor or as an
organiser, in peer review sessions focused on activation. It is obvious that
measuring the frequency does only some justice to the processes of policy
learning. However, in order to generalise the effect of the peer review pro-
gramme across countries and over time, it is the best indicator at hand. As
mentioned before, the EES also facilitates informal learning among policy-
makers, for which the EES dummy is the only variable that is currently avail-
able. The variable Council recommendations measures the number of Council re-
commendations on activation received per country per year. For both the peer
review programme and the Council recommendations, our study relies on our
own data collected using the documents of the respectively governance pro-
cesses.
Next, we examine the impact of the role of national actors in national EES
processes. To test the effect of the involvement of national social partners and
the ministries of finance in drafting the National Action Plans (NAP), we use
an index constructed by De la Porte (2007). Based on national case studies,
EC documents of various years and surveys on national social partner par-
ticipation, this index ranges from no participation to involvement in the
finalisation of the NAPs.
To investigate the impact of EMU on national ALMP spending, we include
a dummy variable scored 1 for Austria and Finland from 1995 onwards and
for the other EMU countries from 1993 onwards. In line with the EMU argument,
we also examine the effect of public finances on ALMP expenditures, using the
government balance as a percentage of GDP (OECD, 2010a). To analyse the
impact of domestic politics on labour market policy changes, we use the per-
centage of total cabinet posts held by left-wing or right-wing parties, with the
centre parties as the reference category, from the Comparative Political Data
Set (Armingeon et al., 2008). Finally, we investigate the effect of corporatist
policy-making, using a dummy variable for the presence of tripartite councils.
These data are taken from the Database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade
Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts (Visser, 2008).
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Control variables
In our models, we control for the macroeconomic characteristics of countries.
Theoretically, the unemployment rate can have two contradictory influences
on ALMPs. On the one hand, it can be expected that rising unemployment leads
to retrenchments in ALMP spending, since financing ALMPs at existing levels
becomes more costly. On the other hand, increasing levels of unemployment
may lead to stronger political demands for ALMP spending. But, since other
studies (Franzese and Hays, 2006; Armingeon, 2007) have found a negative
impact of unemployment on ALMP spending, we also expect that the unemploy-
ment rate has a negative impact. The World Development Indicators and the OECD
Main Economic Indicators databases (OECD, 2007a; World Bank, 2007) include
data for unemployment rates. Furthermore, we control for GDP per capita, using
data from the Penn World Table (Heston et al., 2009). Because more economical-
ly developed countries usually have more generous social protection systems
and higher social expenditures, a positive impact on ALMP expenditures can
be expected. Finally, we control for the effects of the economic openness of a
country, using Dreher’s (2006a) composite index of economic integration.
International economic integration could theoretically lead to a social race to
the bottom and thus to lower ALMP expenditures. However, according to the
compensation argument, governments should invest more in ALMPs in order
to smooth people’s adjustment to the labour market insecurities resulting from
increased international competition (Rodrik, 1998).
Method
Isolating the impact of European integration on domestic policy-making from
that of national and global dynamics is a major issue in the Europeanisation
literature (Haverland, 2007). As discussed above, a number of variables is
included to control for domestic dynamics. Furthermore, a group of seven
non-EU countries – Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzer-
land, US – is included to control for any global trend of more attention for
ALMPs, in addition to 15 EU countries – Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden and UK.4 Since the data measuring the dependent variable are
available through the OECD Social Expenditure Database (OECD, 2009), it is
possible to include both EU and non-EU countries, but it does not enable us
to include new EU member states. Although these data are available through
the Eurostat databases, these data sets do not include data on non-EU countries.
This implies that the choice between OECD and Eurostat data is a trade-off
between non-EU countries and new member states (Draxler and Van Vliet,
4 As in many studies, some observations are missing. In our dataset, some cases are missing
with regard to the dependent variable for Austria, Denmark, Italy, Japan and Portugal in
the late 1980’s and some cases are missing with regard to government deficit for Luxem-
bourg. The role of social partners and the finance ministry is missing for Luxembourg.
92 Chapter 5
2010). Since the inclusion of the control group of non-EU countries is important
to examine whether the EES has influenced national policies, this study relies
on OECD data. As a result, we have data only for the period 1985-2005. The
selection of this period means that the changes in the EES guidelines and
national action plans after 2005 (EC, 2005) are not included in the study. Hence,
the EES-related variables do not suffer from a break in the time series, but it
precludes the possibility of examining the effect of the changes in the EES.
To analyse the time series cross-section data, we employ ordinary least
squares estimations. Recognising that the cross-national variation in efforts
on ALMP may be related to the variation in un-modelled country-specific effects,
such as other welfare state institutions in which ALMPs are embedded, educa-
tional systems, production regimes and cultural differences, both an F-test and
the Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test confirmed the presence of these
effects. Subsequently, the Hausman test to determine whether a random-effects
or a fixed-effects model is appropriate informed us that we should use a fixed-
effects model. In addition, we use panel-corrected standard errors to correct
for panel-heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous spatial correlation (Beck
and Katz, 1995). Since the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data
shows that there is autocorrelation, a Prais-Winsten transformation is applied.
Acknowledging that it may take some time before the dependent variable
responds to changes in the independent variables, we lagged the independent
variables one year. However, with regard to the political party variables, it
is unlikely that the government composition at t-1 influences ALMPs at t, while
the government composition at an earlier or later stage does not. Following
Armingeon (2007), we therefore averaged the cabinet seat shares for the year
under study and the two preceding years.
5.4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Descriptive statistics
Table 5.1 shows the development of expenditures on ALMP as a share of
expenditures on all LMPs and per unemployed relative to GDP per capita,
participation in the peer review programme and the number of Council recom-
mendations received. Interestingly, average spending on ALMP as a share of
total LMP spending increased between 1985 and 2005, while average ALMP
spending per unemployed decreased. Underlying these trends, there is quite
some variation across the countries. For instance, while Spain spent 10.7 per
cent of all labour market policy expenditure on activation in 1985, in Sweden
the share of ALMP expenditure was over 70 per cent. Indeed, Sweden’s ‘best
pupil in the class’ labour market policies were already largely in line with
the EES before the EES was adopted, and, at some points, Sweden had even
more ambitious policy goals than the EU (Jacobsson, 2005). Even after sub-
stantial reductions in ALMP expenditure from 1985 on, in terms of a share and
per unemployed Sweden ranked among the highest spenders in 2005. How-
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ever, as an outlier, it influences the analyses only modestly.5 Furthermore,
the data illustrate how the two variants of the dependent variable differ. In
Belgium, for example, expenditure on ALMPs per unemployed increased on
average, while expenditure on ALMP as a share of expenditures on all labour
market policies decreased. This indicates that, although expenditures on ALMPs
grew, expenditures on passive labour market policies increased even more.
There is also substantial variation in the governance processes of the EES.
Whereas Ireland participated only 6 times in total in the peer review pro-
gramme, the UK participated 17 times from the start of the programme.6 With
respect to Council recommendations, Greece received over twice as many
recommendations as the Netherlands and Denmark. Although the descriptive
statistics provide some preliminary insights, we continue with regression
analyses to examine the relation between the EES and efforts on activation while
controlling for other variables.
Regression results
The results of the regressions are presented in Table 5.2. Model 1 indicates
that the EES is positively and significantly related to ALMP spending as a share
of all LMPs, which is in line with our hypothesis. Countries subjected to the
EES spent 1.79 percentage points more of their total LMP expenditure on activa-
tion. In terms of real spending at constant 2000 price levels, this implies, for
example, amounts of C= 813.5 million in Germany, C= 207.3 million in Italy, and
C= 227.6 million in the Netherlands. However, the insignificant effect for the
EES in the model of ALMP spending per unemployed suggests that the EES leads
to more effort on activation only relative to passive LMPs. The results for EMU
support the expectation that EMU has constrained expenditure on activation.7
5 Estimating Model 2 without Sweden indicates that the result for tripartite councils is
influenced by the situation in Sweden, where the withdrawal of the Swedish Employers’
Confederation from all tripartite bodies in 1990 introduced the end of central collective
bargaining (Jacobsson, 2005: 111). However, when Sweden is omitted in Model 8, the
variable is still significant at the five percent level. Furthermore, in Model 2, the EMU
variable does not reach a significance level of ten percent without Sweden. Nevertheless,
it remains significant when Sweden is omitted in Model 8. Finally, the result for the role
of social partners (Model 5) seems to be influenced by Sweden, but Model 10 indicates
already that this result is not robust.
6 Interestingly, also Norway has participated a few times in the peer review programme.
Therefore, we also estimated Model 3 including Norway, confirming the results presented
in Table 3. Furthermore, we estimated Model 1 with a value 1 for the EES variable for
Norway, which did not alter the results either. However, because Norway does not fully
participate in the EES, we present the results with a value 0 for the EES variable and with
only the EU countries in Model 3.
7 Since lower public expenditure may also be due to lower tax revenues, we estimated the
models with a variable for total tax revenues as a percentage of GDP. The coefficient of
this variable was insignificant and the inclusion of the variable did not alter the results
for the impact of the EMU. Note that tax revenues are implicitly included in the models,
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Since the countries participating in the EES and EMU overlap, the negative effect
for EMU mainly reflects the dynamics in the EMU-countries in the period 1993-
1997. Indeed, earlier studies (Featherstone, 2004) have documented substantial
welfare state reforms in this period. The negative sign for EMU in the model
of ALMP spending as a share indicates that the cuts in active spending were
even larger than the cuts in passive spending. This is probably owing to the
fact that, in the short run, spending on passive programmes is less discretion-
ary than spending on activation programmes. Furthermore, the positive effect
for the EES suggests that the introduction of the EES has mitigated the constrain-
ing effect of EMU, leading to an increased emphasis on activation from 1998
onwards.
Among the domestic politics variables, tripartite councils are not related
to the share of LMP expenditures spent on activation, but they are positively
and significantly related to ALMP spending per unemployed. This relationship
suggests that, in countries with tripartite councils, governments succeed in
getting support from social partners for increasing ALMP expenditures, but
not at the expense of passive LMP spending. The results for the effect of govern-
ment composition indicate that left cabinet parties have supported increases
in the activation effort per unemployed. However, this result does not hold
for the share of LMP spending used for activation, which is probably due to
the preference of left parties for passive LMPs. In this respect, it may be
expected that right parties prefer to limit total labour market spending per
unemployed and to use these financial resources to activate the unemployed.
Contrary to this expectation, the results for left and right parties are fairly
similar.
Regarding the control variables, the effect of the government deficit
supports our hypothesis that deficits have been followed by retrenchments
in ALMP expenditures. In line with earlier studies (Franzese and Hays, 2006;
Armingeon, 2007), we find a negative sign for the effect of unemployment.
Furthermore, GDP per capita is positively related to ALMP spending, and
economic openness is positively related to ALMP spending as a share of total
LMP spending, which provides support for the compensation hypothesis.
Whereas the analyses above are devoted to the question of whether the EU
has influenced ALMP reforms, for which reason a control group of non-EU
countries was included, in the next set of regressions we examine the mechan-
isms and governance means of the EES, focusing on variation within the EU.
Therefore, only EU-countries are included. Furthermore, we include only ALMP
spending as a share of all LMPs, since the results above already suggest that
the EES is related only to this measure.
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Table 5.2 ALMP expenditures in OECD-22 countries, 1985-2005 
 
 Hypotheses Model 1 
 
ALMP as share of LMP 
Model 2 
 
ALMP per unemployed 
Europeanisation    








Domestic politics    




Left cabinet seats  





Right cabinet seats  
       (mean t, t-1, t-2) 




Control variables    




Unemployment (t-1) - -0.45 ** 
(0.20) 
 
GDP per capita (x 10-3)  
(t-1)  












    
Rho  0.76 0.81 
N x T  410 415 
Adj. R2  0.51 0.37 
 
Notes: Unstandardized coefficients; panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses.  
* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 Two-tailed hypothesis for openness. All other hypotheses are one-tailed. 
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The results presented in Table 5.3 tend to support the expectation that involve-
ment in the peer review programme is positively associated with a higher
emphasis on activation.8 On the other hand, there is no evidence for a positive
impact of Council recommendations on the efforts devoted to ALMP. Instead,
the negative sign tends to reflect the fact that countries with higher efforts
on activation receive fewer recommendations. As to the role of national actors,
Model 5 suggests that higher involvement of social partners in EES processes
leads to more support for ALMPs, which is consistent with our hypothesis.
Model 6 suggests that a stronger role of finance ministries is related to higher
ALMP spending, which does not support the expectation that finance ministries
tend to limit ALMP expenditures. The results for the domestic politics and
control variables resemble the results presented in Table 5.2, indicating that
the model is quite robust.
To achieve the goal of more ALMPs, as advocated by the EES, national policy
reforms are required. Therefore, we subsequently examine whether the Euro-
peanisation variables are related to changes in ALMP expenditure. We use an
error correction model, which captures both short-term and long-term effects,
by modelling levels and changes. Given the rather high estimates of rho for
Models 1-6, error correction models provide reliable estimates in the event
of non-stationarity (Beck, 1991; De Boef and Keele, 2008).9 The results of the
estimation of the error correction models are presented in Table 5.4, confirming
the findings for the EES, the peer reviews and EMU.
Interestingly, the EES also reaches significance in the model of changes in
ALMP spending per unemployed, which strengthens our argument that the
EES has contributed to an increased emphasis on activation. The role of social
partners loses its significance, which implies that the results for the role of
social partners in Table 5.3 are not robust. The results for recommendations
are replicated and the role of finance ministries is not significant (neither
shown). Finally, the results for the domestic politics and control variables are
largely in line with the estimations of the previous models, albeit generally
the short-term effects are related to changes in ALMP expenditure, and the
lagged level effects do not reach significance.
8 In analyses available upon request, we included an interaction term of the peer reviews
and the cabinet seats to account for the interaction between the EES and domestic political
processes (Kröger, 2009). The results were not significant.
9 The Fisher test for unit roots (an augmented Dickey-Fuller test), which allows for unbalanced
panels, indicates that at least one country may have a unit root. However, estimations with
a panel specific autocorrelation structure indicate that only 3 of the 22 countries reach a
rho of 0.9. This indicates that the results do not suffer from non-stationarity, which is
confirmed by the replication of the results by the error correction model.
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Table 5.3 ALMP expenditures as share of LMP expenditures in EU-15 countries, 1985-
2005 
 














Europeanisation      
Peer reviews (t-1) + 0.20 * 
(0.12) 
   
Recommendations (t-1) +  -0.74 a
(0.29) 
  
Role social partners +   0.53 * 
(0.33) 
 
Role finance ministry -    0.48 a 
(0.28) 








Domestic politics      








Left cabinet seats  









Right cabinet seats  









Control variables      
















GDP per capita (x 10-3)  
(t-1)  
























      
Rho  0.78 0.78 0.81 0.80 
N x T  280 280 265 265 
Adj. R2  0.44 0.46 0.44 0.45 
      
 
Notes: Unstandardized coefficients; panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses.  
* Significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level.  
Two-tailed hypothesis for openness. All other hypotheses are one-tailed; a: significant, but in opposite direction.  
Each regression also includes country dummies (not shown here). 
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Table 5.4 Error correction models of ALMP expenditures, 1985-2005 
 
 Model 7 
 
Δ ALMP 












as share of LMP 
Europeanisation     





Peer reviews (t-1)  
 
 0.23 * 
(0.15) 
 
Role social partners    0.22 
(0.18) 








Domestic politics     








Left cabinet seats  









Δ Left cabinet seats  









Right cabinet seats  









Δ Right cabinet seats  









Control variables     






















Δ Unemployment -1.04 *** 
(0.25) 
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5.5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The empirical evidence available to date regarding the impact of European
integration on national ALMPs is largely based on case studies of different
countries. This study aims at generalising the findings of the earlier research
on whether European integration has influenced the national LMPs and on
tracing the explanatory mechanisms of this impact. Relying on a systematic
comparison across countries and time that includes a number of control
variables to acknowledge that the EES is only one of several factors, our results
suggest that the EES has contributed to relative shifts from passive to active
labour market policies across the member states. This is in line with the goal
of the EES, with the general impression in the qualitative literature that the
EES has supported a paradigm of activation (Zeitlin and Pochet, 2005; Heiden-
reich and Zeitlin, 2009), and with the findings of Armingeon’s (2007) quantitat-
ive study. Furthermore, the EES seems to have mitigated the constraining effect
of EMU on the effort devoted to ALMPs. This may have led to new policy
configurations, as has been indicated in earlier research (Hemerijck and Ferrera,
2004). Hence, the combined impact of the EES and EMU on domestic labour
market policy reforms seems to be a promising direction for future case-study
research.
Furthermore, we examined the interaction processes between the European
and the national level. Focusing on the governance means of the EES, our
  
















     
 

















     
Countries 22 22 EU-15 EU-15 
N x T 405 411 276 261 
Adj. R2 0.20 0.18 0.16 0.19 
     
 
Notes: Unstandardized coefficients; panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses.  
* Significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level. 
 Two-tailed hypothesis for openness. All other hypotheses are one-tailed. 
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results tend to support earlier findings that the peer review programme has
contributed to an increased emphasis on ALMPs (Zeitlin, 2009). Acknowledging
the limitations of our indicator, further in-depth research is required to reveal
how mutual learning through peer review actually percolates to policy reforms.
Moreover, an important alternative explanation for our findings that needs
to be considered is that countries participating in the peer review programme
are a priori more interested in activation. However, self-selection of participants
in the peer reviews may also foster policy-learning (Visser, 2009). Another
reason that necessitates us to be cautious with the interpretation of the results
is the use of expenditure data. These data give a good indication of the general
emphases countries place on activation, and therefore do justice to the concept
of indirect learning rather than direct policy transfer (Hamel and Vanhercke,
2009), but activation policies of countries with the same levels of expenditures
can vary significantly. Furthermore, activation can also take place with other
policy measures like availability requirements, benefit sanctions or activating
tax and benefit schemes.
Regarding the Council recommendations, our results do not support
arguments that recommendations have created pressure on governments to
reform LMPs (Mailand, 2009), but seem to be more in line with findings that
the pressure stemming from recommendations has declined over the years
(Büchs and Friedrich, 2005). However, since the process of issuing recom-
mendations has changed in 2005, it is important to note that our results are
limited to the period before 2005. Therefore, future studies are required to
investigate the effect of the change from 2005 onwards. Such additional investi-
gation will also shed a light on the national policy reforms that occurred after
2005.
With respect to the role of national actors in the EES processes, the results
provide no systematic evidence that social partners utilize their role to expand
activation policies. One explanation for this may be that social partners prefer
to influence the policy process in existing national patterns of bargaining. Here
they can link the issue of employment policies to the issue of wage nego-
tiations, which is an incentive to move the debate from the EES process to the
formal national institutions (De la Porte, 2007). Furthermore, the results suggest
that the findings of some case studies that finance ministries tend to use their
position to limit the spending on activation (Visser, 2005), cannot be
generalised. This also shows that the implicit assumption that actors and
interests are treated as homogenous and unidirectional across countries and
time does not always hold.
Finally, the analyses presented here suggest that the EES influences the
policy-making of the member states. That the peer review programme seems
to contribute to this influence makes a case for paying more attention to the
cross-country and cross-time variation in the processes of the EES in examining
its impact.

6 Private Social Security and International
Economic Integration
Abstract
Private social security has gained increasing importance in most advanced
western societies over the last few decades. However, this phenomenon seems
to be under-analysed in the political economy literature. This study aims to
explain the variation in the expenditure on private social security across
countries and over time. By using voluntary private social expenditure as the
dependent variable, this study tests whether economic integration leads to
higher demands for social security to compensate for increased economic risks;
political mechanisms are not expected to interfere with the relationship. Based
on data for 20 OECD countries over the period 1980-2005, the results indicate
that increased trade openness is positively related to voluntary private social
expenditure. Furthermore, the study finds empirical evidence that the growth
of private social security is induced by retrenchments on public social ex-
penditure and institutional reforms.
This chapter is a minor revision of a paper that is under review.
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6.1 INTRODUCTION1
Over the last few decades, the role of private arrangements has become more
important in the provision of social security (Adema and Ladaique, 2009). This
development may have significant consequences, since shifts from public to
private social programmes lead to lower levels of income redistribution
(Goudswaard and Caminada, 2010). Interestingly, around 75 per cent of the
expenditure on private social security is voluntary spending, suggesting that
the growth in private social insurance is driven by a higher demand for social
insurance. A popular explanation for increases in the demand for public social
security is that people aim to insure themselves against the economic risks
stemming from international economic integration. This proposition is known
as the compensation hypothesis (Garrett and Mitchell, 2001). Although the
development of private social arrangements varies substantially across coun-
tries, the variation in private social expenditure has not systematically been
analysed to date. Yet, this study aims to analyse how international economic
integration influences a country’s voluntary private social expenditure.
The analysis, using regression analyses on data for 20 OECD countries over
the period from 1980 – 2005, makes two contributions. First, analysing the
variation in private social expenditure is a contribution in itself, since only
a few studies on private social expenditure are available (Adema, 2001; Cami-
nada and Goudswaard, 2005; Adema and Ladaique, 2009; Goudswaard and
Caminada, 2010). To my knowledge, there is no study that aims to explain
the cross-country and longitudinal variation in private social expenditure.
Second, while the relationship between internationalisation and public social
expenditure is largely indirect due to intermediating political mechanisms,
the use of private social spending provides a direct indication of the demand
for social security. Hence, this study contributes to the debate on how inter-
national economic integration influences welfare states.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 6.2 begins with
a review of the internationalisation-welfare state literature. Section 6.3 high-
lights the concept of private social security as the dependent variable of this
analysis. In section 6.4, the mechanisms underlying the impact of international
economic integration on the provision of social security schemes will be
discussed and hypotheses will be formulated. Then, the data, measures and
method used in the empirical analysis will be described in section 6.5.
Subsequently, section 6.6 presents the results of the analysis. Section 6.7 con-
cludes the paper by discussing the implications of the findings and points out
possible extensions to this work.
1 An earlier version of this article was presented at a research seminar of Marquette Univer-
sity. I would like to thank all participants for helpful suggestions. In addition, I would like
to thank Duane Swank, Cecilia Testa, Ferry Koster, Koen Caminada and Kees Goudswaard
for their useful comments.
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6.2 WELFARE STATES AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
Despite the fact that the impact of international economic integration on
welfare states has been widely debated and thoroughly researched, to date
it is still undecided which of the two rival hypotheses concerning this issue,
the efficiency and the compensation hypothesis, is the most accurate.
The efficiency hypothesis states that, due to increased economic integration,
governments reduce their social protection levels to offer attractive conditions
for firms. Hence, policy competition among countries leads to a social race
to the bottom (Scharpf, 1999; Sinn, 2002). However, these internationalisation-
induced retrenchments may be mitigated by citizens’ preferences. Location
decisions of firms depend on total labour costs in relation to the productivity
of labour. The generosity of the social security system, and hence the division
between wage and non-wage costs, therefore fully reflects the preferences of
employees. Consequently, increased economic integration does not necessarily
lead to lower levels of social protection. Indeed, despite some selective re-
trenchments of moderate level such as the German Hartz reforms, many
empirical studies have shown that on average the financial effort to provide
social protection policies has simply increased in most of the western countries
over the last few decades (i.e. Caminada et al., 2010).
The compensation hypothesis states that social protection systems are
expanded to compensate the increased risks faced by people due to inter-
national economic integration (Rodrik, 1998). This hypothesis has been analysed
in many political economic studies. In a first strand of the literature, the
relationship between economic integration and the welfare state has been
examined at a macro level, typically using pooled time series cross-section
data for several western countries. The results are mixed. While some studies
found that economic integration is negatively related to social expenditure
(Garrett and Mitchell, 2001; Jahn, 2006) or to public spending in general
(Burgoon, 2001), other studies found evidence that economic integration is
positively related to social spending (Agell, 1999; Bretschger and Hettich, 2002).
Moreover, some studies have not found a significant relationship between
economic integration and social expenditure at all (Dreher, 2006b; Dreher et
al., 2008). The inconclusiveness of these results may be partly explained by
differences in research design across the studies, such as the selected countries
and time periods, variation in the quality of studies, and the inclusion of
different measures (Koster, 2009). Other explanations for the mixed results
are more substantive.
First, the empirically tested relationship between economic integration and
public social expenditure is highly indirect. As illustrated in the left column
of Figure 6.1, it is assumed that the increased uncertainty due to economic
integration determines the voting behaviour of people. Thereupon, it is
assumed that the aggregation of these political preferences in democratic
processes leads to the adoption of more generous welfare state policies (i.e.
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Walter, 2010). However, the relationship between economic integration and
welfare state efforts appears to be mediated by political institutions (Swank,
2002; Ha, 2008). Hence, the inconclusive results in the literature might be due
to omitted or misspecified variables to capture the conditioning effect of
political institutions. Second, the compensation hypothesis refers to different
underlying causal mechanisms. Whereas most studies theorise that economic
integration increases economic insecurity, others stress that economic integra-
tion leads to increased income inequality. Although both insecurity and in-
equality can trigger a process that leads to more social protection, the nature
of the process differs due to differences in political demand and preferences
of the political actors involved. This difference in mechanisms could be relevant
in the selection of measures, countries and periods, but is neglected in several
studies. Third, empirical results may be obfuscated by the fact that inter-
nationalisation variables measure net effects. The effect of an increased demand
for social security, as predicted by the compensation hypothesis, could be
neutralised by the constraining effect of policy competition on the supply of
social security, as predicted by the efficiency hypothesis.
In a second strand of the literature, the relationship between international-
isation and preferences for social policies has been investigated with micro-
level information. The findings in this strand of the literature tend to support
the compensation hypothesis (Scheve and Slaughter, 2004; Balcells Ventura,
2006; Walter, 2010). An advantage of these studies is that they can focus on
the different variables in the causal chain. For instance, the relationship
between economic integration and the perception of insecurity can be tested
explicitly. In addition, micro studies are better able to take other types of
variables into account, like the type of industry and the skill level of em-
ployees. Nevertheless, a disadvantage of the micro-level literature is that by
relying mainly on survey data, the results refer to intentions and opinions
rather than to actual behaviour in terms of political action and resulting
changes in the level of social protection.
The present study proposes a more direct method of testing the influence
of international economic integration on the demand for social security. In
this study we argue that the relationship can be tested more directly by focuss-
ing on private instead of public social security arrangements. If people de-
manded more social security to insure themselves against internationalisation-
induced economic risks, this would be most clearly indicated by their indi-
vidual actions of voluntarily purchasing private social security.2 Therefore,
2 Voluntary private social insurance provided in employment contracts is the result of
collective bargaining between social partners. Hence, industrial relations institutions may
be related to the provision of voluntary private social security. As will be discussed below,
this study controls for changes in the public policy framework which enable the supply
of private social insurance. Political processes leading to these public policy changes as
well as collective bargaining within the policy framework are however beyond the scope
of this study.
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voluntary private social security will be analysed, defined as social insurance
programmes that are provided by private bodies, in which people can parti-
cipate voluntarily. Leaving out the intermediating effect of political mechanisms
results in a more direct, private variant of the compensation hypothesis, as
is illustrated in the right column of Figure 6.1.
  

























6.3 PRIVATE SOCIAL SECURITY
Social security comprises a set of institutions which are related to the income
and expenditures of people over their life cycle. Generally, the provision of
social security has three main functions, namely insurance against the risk
of income loss, redistribution between people, and reallocation of resources
over the life cycle (De Mooij, 2006). The first function is at the centre of the
compensation hypothesis, since economic uncertainty can increase as a con-
sequence of higher international economic integration.
It is mainly because of the first two functions that most social security is
provided publicly. With respect to the insurance function, one important
problem involved with the provision of social security is that people with
particularly high risk profiles desire social insurance. This leads to the so-called
‘adverse selection’ problem. Due to asymmetric information, private insurance
providers would either provide different insurance packages for low and high
risk profiles, or an insurance market would not exist at all. Since governments
can make participation compulsory, adverse selection is a reason to provide
social security publicly (Barr, 1992). Another problem with social security is
that people are inclined to take more risks when they are insured, since the
consequences of their behaviour will be transferred to the collectivity. This
moral hazard problem can be dealt with better by the private sector, since
it has stronger incentives for cost containment than the public sector (De Mooij,
2006). However, because of adverse selection and the function of redistribution,
social insurance cannot be provided privately completely.3
Programmes can be classified as social when two conditions are simultane-
ously satisfied (Adema and Ladaique, 2009). First, they have to be intended to
serve a social purpose.4 Second, they have to involve either inter-personal
redistribution or compulsory participation. Subsequently, the distinction
between public and private social security is based on the institution which
controls the financial flows, namely public agencies or private bodies. Private
social security can be categorized into mandatory and voluntary programmes.
The latter implies that people can decide whether or not to participate in these
social insurance plans. Therefore, this type of social security is highly useful
to examine the demand for social insurance empirically. Voluntary private
social security includes a wide range of programmes, such as private old-age
arrangements, private incapacity-related benefits, private health insurance,
and a category of other private social security areas. These arrangements are
3 An additional issue with the private provision of social insurance arrangements is that
the risk that insured individuals become unemployed is correlated with the business cycle.
Governments are better able to bear this risk than private firms, since governments can
finance the increase in spending on unemployment with tax revenues (De Mooij, 2006).
4 According to Adema and Ladaique (2009), policy areas with a social purpose are: old-age,
survivors, incapacity-related benefits, health, family, active labour market policies, un-
employment, housing and a category of other social security areas.
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often tax-advantaged and take the form of supplemental social insurance. In
the United States for instance, supplementary unemployment compensation is
available (Adema and Ladaique, 2009: 29). Again, since voluntary private social
security arrangements are classified as ‘social’, they have to contain an element
of interpersonal redistribution. This implies that purely private insurance which
is the result of direct market transactions by individual people given their
individual risk profiles is not included (Adema and Ladaique, 2009).
6.4 HYPOTHESES
Compensating the impact of economic integration
Generally, economic integration can refer to both the opening of product
markets and of production factor markets. Previous empirical research has
mainly focused on the former. The basic argument of the compensation hypo-
thesis is that exposure to international trade leads to vulnerability and insecur-
ity, for which the workforce demands compensation in the form of social
security (Rodrik, 1997; Rodrik, 1998).5 Increased trade openness may induce
economic insecurity for two reasons. First, the integration of goods markets
makes the demand for domestic labour more elastic, since consumers and
producers can more easily substitute final and intermediate goods for foreign
goods. Therefore, tougher competition for domestic producers may trigger
structural adjustments in economies, leading to economic risks for employees.
In line with this argument, empirical evidence indicates that enhanced trade
openness may lead to increased unemployment in the short run (Dutt et al.,
2009). Second, as countries opening up to trade are exposed to turbulent world
markets, labour market outcomes become more volatile. Due to the increased
elasticity of labour demand, fluctuations in the good markets, and so in the
demand for labour, lead to relatively larger adjustments in wages and working
hours, resulting in greater volatility in income and consumption (Rodrik, 1997).
Hence, increased economic risks induced by economic integration lead to a
higher demand for social insurance.
With respect to the integration of markets for factors of production, labour
has been relatively underemphasized in the empirical globalization-welfare
state literature, since the international mobility of labour is rather limited.6
5 In another version of the compensation hypothesis, the focus lies more on inequality than
on insecurity. The argument is that economic integration raises inequality, which leads
to a higher demand for redistribution and therefore to higher efforts on social protection
(Balcells Ventura, 2006). Since this argument can only be tested with public social security
as dependent variable, the present study is directed at the insecurity element of the com-
pensation hypothesis.
6 In many countries, there is no free entry for immigrant workers. Furthermore, even in the
European Union which has a free-movement agreement, mobility is low or even negligible
(Fertig and Schmidt, 2002).
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Regarding the opening of capital markets, empirical studies indicate that
international capital mobility is not systematically and directly related to public
social policies (Swank, 2002; Swank, 2010). However, Scheve and Slaughter
(2004) found that international capital mobility contributes to greater economic
insecurity of individuals also. In line with the reasoning for the impact of trade
openness, the explanation for this is that multinational firms can relatively
easily substitute away from domestic labour toward other production factors,
and move some of the production stages abroad. Hence, more foreign direct
investment increases labour-demand elasticities. As a result, income and
employment become more volatile, which leads to more insecurity for employ-
ees. Therefore, this study also accounts for capital openness, but it mainly
focuses on international commodity trade.
Although preferences for insurance levels vary with individual degrees
of risk aversion, increased exposure to international markets may lead on
average to an increased demand for social security. Thus, the compensation
hypothesis presumes that personal perceptions of economic risks lead to
specific actions of individuals. While the individual action in the public social
security version of the compensation hypothesis amounts to voting in elections,
in the private social security version the individual action would be the
voluntary participation in an insurance programme. Therefore, the impact of
economic integration on the demand for social insurance can be tested more
directly with voluntary private social security as dependent variable.
H.1 Increases in international economic integration lead to increases in voluntary
private social expenditure
In order to further analyze the relationship between economic integration and
social security, the impact of trade between developed and low-wage countries
can be distinguished from the impact of trade among developed countries.
The important differences between the two country types are the factor endow-
ments. According to the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem, a country has a comparative
advantage in the good that uses its relatively abundant factor intensively in
production (Jones, 1956). Therefore, the country exports this good. Since
developed economies are relatively abundant in high-skilled labour and capital,
the former implies that they export products intensive in high-skilled labour
and capital, and import low-skilled labour intensive products, which are
exported by low-wage countries.
As a result, trade between developed and low-wage countries is mainly
inter-industry trade, while trade among developed economies is mainly intra-
industry trade. This distinction is important, since the distributional conse-
quences from inter-industry trade differ from the distributional consequences
generated by intra-industry trade (Alt et al., 1996). In developed economies,
inter-industry trade leads to substitution of domestic production lines with
imported goods from low-wage countries, and to the movement of whole
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sectors abroad. Hence, employees have to find new jobs in other sectors.
Depending on the particular factor specificity, such adjustments may lead to
increased economic risks. In contrast, intra-industry trade between countries
with comparable factor endowments relies more on increasing returns to scale
and product differentiation, than on inter-country differences in factor endow-
ments and inter-industry differences of factor intensities. An important differ-
ence compared to inter-industry trade is that, due to product differentiation,
intra-industry trade does not entail direct substitution of production lines. As
a result, employees may have to find new jobs in different firms, but within
the same sector, and the distributional consequences are rather neutral. Thus,
intra-industry trade involves smaller adjustments for employees than inter-
industry trade. Hence, trade with low-wage countries leads to more economic
insecurity and therefore to a higher demand for social security than trade with
developed economies (Burgoon, 2001).
In addition, the Stolper-Samuelson (1941) theorem predicts that an increase
in the price of a good raises the return to the factor that is intensively used
in the production of the good, and lowers the return to the other factor. Since
the demand for high-skilled labour intensive products increases, whereas the
demand for low-skilled labour intensive products decreases when developed
economies trade with low-wage countries, the incomes for high-skilled labour
increase, while the incomes for low-skilled labour decrease. Thus, economic
insecurity increases relatively more as a result of low-wage trade, than as a
result of trade between developed economies. Accordingly, when developed
countries trade with low-wage countries, the demand for social security will
be higher than when developed countries trade with other developed countries.
H.2 More trade with low-wage countries as a proportion of overall trade leads
to increases in voluntary private social expenditure
An important factor in the progression of economic integration and trade
liberalisation is regional integration, which can be understood as an
institutionalised form of economic integration among a group of countries.
Among western countries, the most important manifestation of regional in-
tegration is the European Union. The reduction of trade obstacles due to the
creation of the common market has stimulated intra-EU trade. An increase in
trade with developed countries as a proportion of the overall trade of devel-
oped countries implies an increase in intra-industry trade. Indeed, a large share
of intra-EU trade is intra-industry trade (Sapir, 1992). Hence, in line with the
discussion above, an increase in intra-EU trade leads to relatively lower
demands for social security.
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H.3 Trade with EU countries as a proportion of overall trade is negatively related
to voluntary private social expenditure
Welfare state institutions
A first factor that should be controlled for while estimating the demand for
private social insurance is the generosity of the public social protection system
(Hacker, 2002). When the demand for insurance against economic insecurity is
fulfilled by a public social protection system, the demand for private social
security will be lower. This also implies that public welfare state retrenchments
can be expected to lead to increases in private social expenditures.7 Empirical-
ly, the fact that the cross-country variation of total social expenditure (the sum
of public and private) is lower than the variation of public social expenditure
alone, suggests that public and private social expenditures are substitutes to
some extent (Caminada and Goudswaard, 2005; Goudswaard and Caminada,
2010).
H.4 Public social expenditure and voluntary private social expenditure are
negatively related
Despite the fact that insurance which is the result of direct market transactions
by individuals is not categorised as ‘social’, the level of private social ex-
penditure does to some extent depend on the equilibrium on the market of
private social security. In order to isolate the effect of changes in the demand
side, the study should control for changes on the supply side too. Quite often,
policy changes are needed to enable changes in the supply of private social
arrangements. For instance, governments have to decide on institutional
reforms which open up the market for providers of specific private social
arrangements. Several policy objectives may underlie such reforms, for instance
the alleviation of government budgets. Since private providers are faced with
stronger incentives for cost reductions, they may be expected to operate more
efficiently (Goudswaard and Caminada, 2010).
H.5 Institutional reforms which enlarge the potential supply of voluntary private
social security have a positive impact on voluntary private social expenditure
In summary, the main hypothesis to be tested is that increased international
economic integration has led to increases in voluntary private social ex-
penditure. International trade is assumed to lead to higher perceived economic
risks, due to both structural adjustments of uncompetitive sectors and increased
income volatility, which induces a higher demand for social insurance. The
use of voluntary private social expenditure as dependent variable provides
7 Vice versa, increases in the provision of public social insurance, triggered by increased
international economic integration or by other factors, may lead to lower levels of private
social expenditure. Therefore, as will be discussed below, public social expenditure will
be modeled as an endogenous independent variable.
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a relatively direct method to test the relationship, but this advantage does not
come without any costs. The limited provision of private social insurance
against labour market risks, resulting from adverse selection problems, may
confine the implications of the findings of the present study for the existing
literature. Whereas a significant relationship between economic integration
and voluntary private social expenditure strengthens the empirical foundation
of existing theories, a rejection of the hypothesis would not necessarily dispute
the findings on the relationship between economic integration and public social
spending.
6.5 DATA, MEASURES AND METHOD
Dependent variable
The dependent variable of the study is the use of voluntary private social
security arrangements. As in almost all studies on the impact of international
economic integration on welfare states, the study takes social expenditure as
percentage of GDP as measure for the dependent variable. This study uses data
on voluntary private social expenditure (on data sources see Appendix 6A). The
study includes 20 countries, all advanced societies and capitalist economies,
both EU and non-EU countries. Constrained by data availability, the empirical
study covers the years 1980 up till 2005.8 The main categories of social arrange-
ments included are spending on old age, incapacity related benefits, health
care, and a residual category of social programmes which are not attributable
to other categories. For instance, this category includes supplementary un-
employment compensation schemes in the United States.
Interestingly, most of the critics on the use of public social expenditure
as an indicator in cross-country research do not apply to private social ex-
penditure. Generally, this criticism is twofold (Van Vliet, 2010a). First, since
a certain spending level can refer to a variety of underlying policies, changes
in social expenditure would only give a limited indication of policy reform.
However, in this study, private social expenditure is not used as a measure
for policy change. In fact, as it will be discussed below, policy change is
explicitly modelled as an independent variable. Second, when public social
expenditure is used as a measure for welfare state generosity, the comparability
of social expenditure across countries is limited as the impact of taxes on social
benefits differs across countries. Also this issue applies less to private than
to public social expenditure, since in this study private social spending is
regarded as a measure for the purchase of private social security, rather than
as a measure for generosity.
8 As in many time-series cross-section data studies, some cases are missing. In the current
dataset, some observations are missing with regard to the dependent variable for Greece,




For the main independent variable, economic integration, the study uses several
measures. First, to indicate the increased exposure to external risk, trade open-
ness is included, measured as the average between exports and imports as a
percentage of GDP. According to Rodrik (1998), it is actually the volatility of
income, stemming from exposure to the unpredictable world market, that
causes uncertainty and vulnerability. In fact, in a world with no market im-
perfections, the volatility of the terms of trade is the only relevant measure
to test the compensation hypothesis (Rodrik, 1998). Therefore, terms of trade,
prices of exports relative to prices of imports, are included as the second
measure. Following Rodrik (1998), fluctuations in the external terms of trade are
measured as the five years moving standard deviation of the first differences
of the natural logarithm of the terms of trade.
Third, the sum of inflows and outflows of foreign direct investment as a
percentage of GDP indicates the exposure to risk due to capital mobility. The
fourth measure, capital restrictions, gives an indication of the extent to which
a country’s policies are restrictive regarding the cross-border movement of
payments and receipts of capital. This indicator is a policy measure, indicating
the potential openness, rather than the actual flows of capital. It takes into
account that actual flows depend on more factors than only on openness, for
instance on differences in interest rates across countries.
Subsequently, a variable is included for the imports from developing countries
to test the hypothesis on trade with ‘low-wage’ countries. Finally, the measure
trade with EU countries gives an indication of economic integration in the EU.
It is measured as the percentage of a country’s exports to EU countries.9 More
generally, this measure is known as the intraregional trade share, which is
a common indicator for regional integration (Sapir, 1992).
Welfare state institutions
As discussed above, changes in private social expenditure may be triggered
in the first place by changes in the broader context of the social security system
as a whole. Therefore, the sum of public and mandatory private social expenditure
as a percentage of GDP is included. Whereas changes in public social policies
or in legislation on mandatory private social arrangements are reflected
through the variable public social expenditure, institutional reforms which
enlarge the market for voluntary private social expenditure are not. Guided
by steep changes in voluntary private social expenditure (see Table 6.1) and
a close analysis of the disaggregated data on the programme level, two dummy
variables are constructed, based on primary legislation and case studies, to
capture these institutional reforms. Included reforms are, for instance, a measure
in the 1995/1996 Australian federal budget, that introduced employee con-
9 All EU countries are included.
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tributions into the superannuation funds, and the British Social Security Act,
which was adopted in 1986 and came into force in 1988.10
Socio-economic variables
A number of socio-economic conditions can be expected to influence voluntary
private social expenditure. To control for the impact of domestic economic
structural changes on the demand for social protection, Iversen and Cusack’s
(2000) indicator of deindustrialisation is included. Furthermore, the study
includes a measure for the education level of a country’s labour force, indicating
the average years of schooling in the population aged 15 years and older.11
While increased exposure to international trade benefits high-skilled employees,
it increases the economic risks for low-skilled employees in advanced western
countries. Therefore, especially low-skilled employees will desire high social
protection levels implying that the education level of a country’s workforce
should be negatively related to the demand for social security.12 Another
control variable is the unemployment rate. When unemployment levels increase,
people perceive higher economic risk, leading to an increased demand for
social security.
To control for the economic development of a country, the study includes
real GDP per capita. With respect to public social expenditure, it is argued in
many studies that people are prepared to spend larger shares of their income
on the provision of social security when income rises, which is called Wagner’s
Law (Meltzer and Richard, 1983). This implies that the income elasticity of
social security is higher than one. Indeed, economically more developed
countries have often more generous welfare states. In line with this argument,
it can also be expected that people are willing to spend more on private social
security when income grows. In the short run, however, economic growth
could reduce the perception of economic insecurity and therefore lower the
demand for social insurance.
Household saving is measured as the net saving rate as a percentage of GDP.
Reallocation of income over the life cycle in order to smooth consumption is
the main reason for people to save. Since reallocation of income over the life
10 Another included institutional reform is the adoption of the Welfare reform and pension
Act in the United Kingdom which came into force in 2000. Finally, two major Belgian re-
forms are included, namely the Colla Law, which came into force in 1996, and the Vanden-
broucke Law, that entered into force in 2004.
11 This variable has been linearly inter- and extrapolated. Since there is only little variation
in the original data due to the use of population averages, the estimated values will not
deviate much from the real trend.
12 Since high-skilled employees have better economic risk profiles than low-skilled employees,
high-skilled employees can be expected to participate relatively more in private insurance
schemes because they face lower insurance premiums. However, from the fact that purely
private insurance which is the result of direct market transactions is not categorised as
social security, it follows that this effect will not influence the relationship between education
level and voluntary private social expenditure.
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cycle is also a function of social security, a substitution effect can be expected.
Moreover, according to the precautionary motive, people save a part of their
income to create a buffer in order to be able to counterbalance income losses.
Since the insurance against income risks is also a main reason for people to
buy social insurance, a substitution effect between saving and private social
spending can also be expected for this reason (Hubbard et al, 1995). The
population aged 65 and above as percentage of total population is included to
control for demographic pressure. With the ageing of populations, private
expenditure on retirement programmes can be expected to increase. Finally,
the natural logarithm of total population controls for the county size. Since small
countries have smaller domestic markets which are relatively more oriented
on the world market, citizens in small countries may perceive higher levels
of insecurity.
Method
In order to analyse the data, we run a number of pooled time series cross-
section regression analyses, based on OLS estimation procedures. Regressing
the dependent variable on the one period lagged dependent variable gives
a first order autocorrelations’ rho of > 1. In order to deal with this non-station-
arity, the study relies on an error correction model (Beck, 1991; De Boef and
Keele, 2008), which is a conventional estimator in the political economy
literature to analyse the impact of integrating markets on welfare states (Iversen
and Cusack, 2000; Busemeyer, 2009). A further advantage is that by modelling
levels and first differences, this estimator is able to capture both short-term
transitory effects, and long-term structural effects. One of the control variables,
public social expenditure, is used as the dependent variable in the lion’s share
of the literature about the impact of internationalisation on welfare states.
Therefore, public social spending is obviously also an endogenous variable
in the present study, which is confirmed by the Durbin-Wu-Hausman-test.
To address the endogeneity problem, this study uses a two-stage least squares
model. In such a model, it is necessary to find a good instrument, defined as
a variable that correlates to the endogenous explanatory variable, and that
does not correlate to the error term of the original equation (Wooldridge, 2002).
The instrument used here is a country’s membership of the Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU), which is modelled as a dichotomous variable. The EMU
is strongly and significantly related to public social expenditure in the first-
stage regression, whereas it is not significantly related to voluntary private
social expenditure.13 Hence, the estimating equation for the empirical model
is:
13 In the first-stage regression, the regression coefficient of EMU is -1.05, indicating its disci-
plinary effect on public expenditure, which is significant at the 1 percent level.
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and where X denotes a vector of control variables. Since the inclusion of both
a lagged dependent variable and country fixed effects renders the estimator
inconsistent (Nickell, 1991), the model does not include fixed effects. Nonethe-
less, estimating the model with country-specific effects generally replicates
the main results of the impact of international economic integration on
voluntary private social spending.14 Panel-corrected standard errors are
applied to correct for panel-heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous spatial
correlation (Beck and Katz, 1995). Finally, a dummy variable is included to
account for breaks in the time series data.
6.6 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Descriptive statistics
Table 6.1 shows the development of voluntary private social expenditure as
a percentage of GDP for the included countries from 1980 until 2005. Voluntary
private social expenditures vary substantially across countries. Over the whole
period, the United States have the highest expenditures,15 starting just above
the 4 percent of GDP in 1980 and ending around the 9.5 percent in 2005,
followed by the Netherlands with around 7.5 percent in 2005 and the United
Kingdom with around 6.5 percent in 2005. In contrast, New Zealand, Spain
14 With respect to the fixed effects variant of Model 1, trade openness and capital mobility
are positively and significantly related to voluntary private social expenditure. The co-
efficients for the terms of trade volatility are positive but do not reach significance. Model
2 yields positive and significant results for trade openness, terms of trade volatility and
capital mobility, but fails to replicate the finding for the interaction term.
15 Therefore, the United States could be considered as an outlier (see also Super (2008)).
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and Italy have the lowest voluntary private social expenditures, with less than
1 percent of GDP over the whole period.
Interestingly, the average expenditure as a share of GDP, has been more
than doubled over the whole period, increasing from less than 1.4 percent in
1980 to 2.9 percent in 2005. Furthermore, expenditures as a percentage of GDP
have increased in all countries between 1980 and 2005. This illustrates that
private social security has gained importance across western societies since
the 1980s. Within the group of countries, there is considerable variation in
the development of spending over time. While in some countries, like France,
Spain and Sweden, voluntary private social expenditure steadily increased,
in other countries, such as Ireland and New Zealand, there have been periods
of decline too. In the remainder of this section, we aim at explaining this
variation with regression techniques. The descriptive statistics of other variables
can be found in Appendix 6B.
  
 
Table 6.1 Voluntary private social expenditure (% GDP) 
 
       
 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
       
Australia 1.0 0.7 0.9 2.7 3.6 2.6 
Belgium 0.9 0.8 1.6 2.1 2.4 4.5 
Canada 1.6 2.3 3.3 4.4 5.0 5.5 
Denmark 1.4 1.3 1.6 1.9 2.1 2.4 
Finland 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.2 1.1 
France 0.6 0.7 1.7 1.8 2.1 2.6 
Germany 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.9 
Greece : 0.0 2.1 1.9 2.3 1.7 
Ireland 1.3 1.6 1.4 1.7 1.3 1.3 
Italy : : 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.6 
Japan : : : : 3.1 2.5 
Netherlands 3.6 4.5 5.6 6.1 6.6 7.6 
New Zealand 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.4 
Norway 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 
Portugal 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.8 1.1 : 
Spain 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.5 
Sweden 1.1 1.1 1.2 2.1 2.2 2.4 
Switzerland : 0.8 1.0 1.3 1.2 1.1 
United Kingdom 3.4 4.4 4.8 6.1 7.1 6.3 
United States 4.2 5.9 7.1 7.9 8.8 9.8 
       
Mean 1.4 1.6 2.0 2.4 2.7 2.9 
Coefficient of variation 0.9 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 
       
 
Source: OECD (2009d); author’s own calculations. 
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Determinants of voluntary private social expenditure
The results of estimation of voluntary private social expenditure as a per-
centage of GDP are presented in Table 6.2. Model 1 indicates that trade open-
ness and the volatility of the terms of trade are positively related to voluntary
private social expenditure. These results lend support to the hypothesis that
international economic integration leads to a higher demand for social security.
However, these results only apply in the long run, since the coefficients for
the change variables are insignificant and tend to be even negative for the
volatility of the terms of trade. Following Rodrik (1998), Model 2 contains an
interaction variable between trade openness and the volatility of the terms
of trade. The positive coefficient for the interaction of the lagged levels in-
dicates that the positive impact of trade openness increases with higher levels
of volatility in the terms of trade. Thus, in countries with both high levels of
trade openness and high levels of terms of trade volatility, there is a high
demand for private social insurance. These findings for private social ex-
penditure are in line with the results for public social expenditure as found
by Rodrik (1998). There is also weak evidence to suggest that higher levels
of capital mobility lead to an increased demand for private social insurance.
With respect to public social expenditure, the results indicate a negative
relationship between public and private social expenditure. In line with the
hypothesis, this suggests that public and private social insurance are substitutes
to some extent. When the demand for social protection is fulfilled by public
welfare state institutions, the demand for private social insurance is lower.
In other words, retrenchments in the public social protection system lead to
an increase in private social expenditure. However, this substitution effect can
only be identified for the short run.
As to institutional reforms concerning private social insurance markets,
the results indicate that the first institutional reforms have had a significant
and positive impact on voluntary private social expenditure. Consistent with
the hypothesis, this indicates that when governments open up the market for
providers of private social arrangements, supply increases and the level of
expenditure increases too. The second wave of institutional reforms has also
had a significant impact, albeit in the opposite direction as expected. This is
probably due to the fact that the steep increase in private expenditure in the
United Kingdom in 2000 has been followed by sharp declines (see Table 6.1),
which are also captured by the dummy variable. Although more research
is needed to understand these dynamics, the model includes at least a variable
that controls for this sudden change in the private social insurance market.
Turning to the socio-economic variables, the results indicate that de-
industrialisation is positively and significantly related to private social ex-
penditure. This result is in line with Iversen and Cusack’s (2000) findings for
public expenditure. It suggests that due to the limited transferability of skills,
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shifts in employment from agriculture and industry to the service sector have
led to increased uncertainty and therefore to an increased demand for social
insurance.
As expected, the education level of the workforce is negatively related to
private social spending. This indicates that economic insecurity and the
demand for arrangements to insure this insecurity decreases with the education
level of employees. The positive coefficients for the transitory effects suggest
that the education level affects insecurity only in the long run. This could be
understood against the background of the only marginally changing average
education level of the labour force on an annual base.
Since the results do not indicate a positive effect of GDP per capita on the
demand for private social security, a private variant of Wagner’s Law is not
supported. In contrast, the negative coefficients for the change variables suggest
that economic growth influences social expenditure counter cyclically in the
short run. Moreover, these results may reflect a denominator effect, since social
expenditure is expressed as a percentage of GDP.
Household saving appears to be significantly and negatively associated
with voluntary private social expenditure. This finding supports the theoretical
expectation that, in order to insure economic risks and to smooth income over
the life cycle, people use savings as substitutes for social insurance. In equil-
ibrium, a reduction in household saving of 1 percent point of GDP would
  
 


























   








   
N x T 302 302 
Adj. R-Squared 0.382 0.380 
   
 
Notes: Unstandardized coefficients; panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses.  
p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01;  
a: significant, but in opposite direction. b: border significant.  
Two-tailed hypothesis for GDP per capita. All other hypotheses are one-tailed.  




increase voluntary private social expenditure with 0.89 per cent point of GDP.16
This ratio makes theoretically sense, since an essential characteristic of insur-
ance is efficiency. For a sum insured equivalent to a certain savings balance,
insurance premiums are lower than savings, due to the pooling of risks.
The ageing of populations is positively and significantly related to private
social expenditure, which is consistent with the hypothesis and with the results
in the literature with respect to public social expenditure. However, the
negative coefficients for the long-term effects indicate that this relationship
only holds for the short run. Finally, the results for country size are not in
line with the argument that citizens in small countries perceive higher levels
of insecurity and suggest even the opposite.
Table 6.3 contains model specifications using alternative measures of inter-
national economic integration. Model 3 indicates that the extent to which a
country’s policies are restrictive regarding the cross-border movement of capital
is not significantly related to voluntary private social expenditure. Models 4
and 5 present the results for the models which include measures to distinguish
between the impact of trade with low-wage countries and the impact of trade
with developed economies. The results for the imports from developing
countries as a proportion of overall trade provide no support for the hypothesis
that this type of trade leads to increases in the demand for private social
insurance. This is at variance with the findings for public social expenditure
of Burgoon (2001). Subsequently, trade with EU countries as a share of overall
trade is positively related to voluntary private social expenditure in the short
run. This result seems to reject the hypothesis that intra-industry trade leads
to relatively less economic insecurity and therefore to a relatively low demand
for social insurance. Instead, it suggests that also the far-reaching integration
of the European markets leads to economic insecurity, even though most intra-
EU trade is intra-industry trade.
With respect to the results of the other variables in Table 6.3, the coefficients
for the effect of capital mobility have lost their significance. This implies that
the results for capital mobility in Table 6.2 are not robust. Furthermore, the
coefficients for institutional reforms do not reach significance in all models.
On the other hand, the results for trade openness and the terms of trade
volatility are robust. Finally, also the results for public social expenditure and
the socio-economic variables are largely in line with the results of the first
two models.
16 Long-term effects in error correction models are estimated by dividing the coefficient for
the level variable by the negative coefficient for the lagged level dependent variable. Thus
for household saving in model 1 this gives: (-0.008 / -(-0.009)) = 0.89.
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Capital restrictions t-1 -0.001 
(0.001) 
  
∆ Capital restrictions -0.000 
(0.002) 
  
Imports from developing countries  t-1  0.008 
(0.010) 
 
∆ Imports from developing countries  -0.040 a 
(0.014) 
 
Exports to EU countries t-1   -0.004 
(0.004) 
∆ Exports to EU countries   0.010 a 
(0.006) 
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6.7 CONCLUSIONS
Private social security has gained increasing importance in most advanced
western societies over the last few decades. However, this phenomenon seems
to be under-analysed in the political economy literature. This study aims to
examine to what extent the international integration of economic markets has
influenced the dynamics in the expenditure on private social security across
countries and over time. By using voluntary private social expenditure as the
dependent variable, this study tests whether economic integration leads to
higher demands for social security to compensate the increased economic risks,
while political mechanisms are not expected to interfere with the relationship
The results indicate that increased trade openness is positively related to
voluntary private social expenditure. As such, this result supports the hypo-
thesis that economic integration increases economic insecurity, triggering a
higher demand for social insurance (Cameron, 1978). In addition, the positive
association between the volatility of the terms of trade and the demand for
private social insurance is consistent with Rodrik’s (1998) argument and with






























   








   
N x T 302 302 
Adj. R-Squared 0.382 0.380 
   
 
Notes: Unstandardized coefficients; panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses.  
p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01;  
a: significant, but in opposite direction. b: border significant.  
Two-tailed hypothesis for GDP per capita. All other hypotheses are one-tailed.  
Each regression also includes a dummy variable for data breaks (not shown here). 
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Also a country’s broader context of welfare state institutions in which
private social arrangements are embedded, is an important determinant of
private social expenditure. The generosity of the public social protection system
tends to be negatively related to the level of private social spending. Interest-
ingly, this finding lends support to the view that the increases in private social
expenditure over the last few decades are induced by welfare state restraints.
Furthermore, the results suggest that institutional reforms which increase the
potential supply of private social arrangements may have contributed to the
increases in voluntary private social expenditure.
A remarkable finding is that trade with EU countries seems to lead to a
similar effect on private social expenditure as trade in general. The fact that
these results contradict recent findings with respect to the impact of intra-EU
trade on public welfare state institutions (Beckfield, 2009), inquires further
research on the impact of trade among EU countries. One promising line of
thought may be that European economic integration leads to a relatively higher
demand for social protection, since being part of the further integrated single
market leads to tougher competition and more insecurity than the world
market (Koster, 2010). Furthermore, future investigations could advance the
present study in terms of modelling the domestic sources of risk exposure.
In particular, fruitful refinements may be directed at the measurement of the
skills level of the labour force (Walter, 2010), the characteristics of education
systems (Cusack et al, 2006), differences between tradables and non-tradables
industries, and the heterogeneity among firms (Melitz, 2003).
As a wider implication, the results of the study are also relevant for
research on public welfare state policies. On the other hand, the limited private
provision of unemployment insurance is an important difference between
private and public social security and forms therefore a notable limitation of
the study. Nonetheless, after controlling for other motives for purchasing social
insurance, economic integration leads to an increased demand for social
security. Policy makers should bear this in mind when further international-
isation leads to increased dynamics on domestic labour markets.
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APPENDIX 6A: LIST OF VARIABLES AND DEFINITIONS
· Voluntary private social expenditure, per cent of GDP. Source: OECD Social Expenditure
Database (2009d).
· Trade openness: Average between exports and imports, per cent of GDP. Source:
OECD Trade Indicators database (2010c).
· Terms of trade volatility: Standard deviation of the first differences of the natural
logarithm of the terms of trade. Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank,
2009).
· Capital mobility: Total inflows and outflows of foreign direct investment, per cent
of GDP. Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2009).
· Capital restrictions: Index of the absence of national restrictions on the cross-border
movement of payments and receipts of capital. Source: (Quinn, 1997).
· Imports from developing countries: Percentage of a country’s total imports that
comes from developing countries. Source: UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics (2009).
· Exports to EU countries: Percentage of a country’s exports to EU countries. Source:
UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics (2009).
· Public and mandatory private social expenditure, per cent of GDP. Source: OECD
Social Expenditure Database (2009d).
· Institutional reform 1: Dummy variable equal to one for the United Kingdom from
1988 onwards, for Australia from 1995 onwards, for Belgium from 1996 onwards.
Source: Own data.
· Institutional reform 2: Dummy variable equal to one for the United Kingdom from
2000 onwards, for Belgium from 2004 onwards. Source: Own data.
· Deindustrialisation: 100 minus sum of employment in industry and agriculture
as percentage of the total civilian employment. Source: OECD Annual Labour Force
Statistics (2009a).
· Education: Average years of schooling in the population aged 15 years and older.
Source: Barro and Lee (2000).
· Unemployment rate: Number of people unemployed as percentage of the labour
force. Source: OECD Main Economic Indicators (2009b).
· GDP per capita: Real GDP per capita in constant (2005) international prices. Source:
Penn World Table (Heston et al., 2009).
· Household saving: Net saving rate per cent of GDP. Source: OECD National Accounts
(2009c).
· Population 65+: Population aged 65 and above as percentage of total population.
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2009).
· Total population: Natural logarithm of the population in thousands. Source: OECD
National Accounts (2009c).
· EMU: Dummy variable equal to one for Austria and Finland from 1995 onwards
and for the other EMU countries from 1993 onwards. Source: Own data.
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APPENDIX 6B: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
  
Table A6.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Voluntary private social expenditure 2.22 2.09 0.00 9.77 
Trade openness  32.27 15.75 8.05 92.37 
Terms of trade volatility 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.19 
Capital mobility 4.34 5.76 -9.99 40.23 
Capital restrictions 87.12 16.07 37.50 100.00 
Imports from developing countries  19.71 12.69 5.03 66.16 
Exports to EU countries 106.78 45.49 14.76 163.16 
Public and mandatory private social expenditure 21.11 5.38 10.24 36.27 
Deindustrialisation  64.18 8.31 36.12 78.64 
Education 9.19 1.86 3.73 13.47 
Unemployment 7.71 4.06 0.20 23.90 
GDP per capita 20707.93 5119.50 9802.19 36098.15 
Household saving 7.20 4.42 -5.59 24.71 
Population 65+  13.92 2.21 9.04 19.33 
Total population 40330.94 59575.75 3144 296036 







7 Conclusion: Main findings, implications
and outlook
The impact of European integration on the welfare states of EU countries has
been fiercely debated among Europeanisation scholars and welfare state
scholars, as discussed in the previous chapters. This study contributes to these
debates by disentangling and examining several effects of European integration.
It has been analysed to what extent welfare state reforms have amounted to
patterns of convergence across the EU, whether and through which mechanisms
soft forms of EU governance have contributed to these patterns, and how
economic integration affects welfare state reforms by influencing the demand
for social insurance. The combination of insights from the convergence litera-
ture, the comparative political economy literature, and the Europeanisation
literature on the one hand, and the use of a large-N approach in a field that
has been dominated by case studies on the other, provides a number of con-
tributions to the literature on the impact of European integration on welfare
states. This final chapter summarises the study’s main empirical findings,
followed by a discussion of the theoretical and methodological contributions
of the study, its implications for the scholarship of the Europeanisation welfare
states, and its policy implications.
7.1 MAIN FINDINGS
The goal of this study is to gain insight in how European integration influences
social and labour market policy reforms in the member states of the EU. Hence,
the study attempts to identify to what extent welfare state policies have con-
verged and to explain the variation in policy reforms across the EU. The results
of the convergence analyses in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 show that at an abstract
level, welfare states of EU countries have converged over the past 25 years
or so. Furthermore, social protection levels have been increased in most of
the countries. Even when the data were corrected for changes in the direct
needs of social protection, due to unemployment and ageing of the population,
social expenditure has increased across countries. This indicates that govern-
ments have spent more on welfare state programmes, and that welfare states
became more generous. Thus, welfare state reforms in EU countries have
resulted in a trend of upward social convergence. Furthermore, the data show
that welfare state policies of EU countries have converged more than the
welfare state policies of a more diverse group of advanced capitalist countries.
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For some periods, this contrast was even sharper, as the social programmes
of EU countries converged, while the policies of non-EU countries tended to
diverge. Interestingly, this EU-specific convergence pattern might be an indica-
tion of the impact of European integration on welfare states. In addition, the
results also provide some evidence of converging welfare regimes.1 This shows
that not only the differences in generosity levels have become smaller within
Europe, but that the configurations of welfare state programmes are more
similar too.
Remarkably, however, no pattern of convergence has been found for the
group of countries that entered the EU in 2004. For the period under study,
there is no evidence of convergence within the group of new member states,
and also the variation between the welfare states of the old and new EU coun-
tries has not decreased. Not only is the social protection level in the new
member states considerably lower than the social protection level in the old
member states. A cluster analysis indicated that also the systems of social
protection differ strongly across the old and new member states. As such, these
findings do neither provide evidence for influences of the EU on the welfare
states of the Central and East European Countries, nor for an effect of the
enlargement of the EU on welfare states of the old member states during the
period 2000-2006.
After analysing trends of welfare state change across the board, the study
zoomed in at the particular policy area of active labour market policies. As
has been argued in Chapter 1, in the case of the EES the chance of finding any
effect of the OMC on domestic policies is the highest, due to its strong
institutionalisation relative to other modalities of this governance means in
other policy areas. Chapter 4 presented expenditure data for a broad range
of active labour market policies, including employment services, labour market
training, youth programmes and subsidized employment. Furthermore, ack-
nowledging that activation could also be pursued by making passive labour
market policies less passive, changes in income taxes and in the characteristics
of unemployment benefits have been examined. In the period 1995-2002, active
labour market policies have not converged much, as countries have opted for
different configurations of active labour market policies. However, there has
been an EU-specific trend of shifting resources from passive to active labour
market policies. Taken together, these results could be an indication of the
influence of the EES. Since the EES does not prescribe specific policy instruments,
governments can opt for those policies that suit their domestic situation best,
while all policies in themselves are intended to reduce unemployment and
increase employment through activation.
In sum, the main findings of the convergence analyses are that welfare
states have converged, and that, when cyclical and demographic trends are
taken into account, the welfare states within the EU are converged more than
1 For further evidence on the convergence of regimes see Van Vliet and Kaeding (2007).
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the developed welfare states of non-EU countries. In the particular policy area
of active labour market policies no clear evidence of convergence has been
found, but there is an EU-specific trend of making labour market policies more
activating. The purpose of the subsequent chapters was to examine whether
and how European integration, among other factors, can explain the changes
in the welfare states policies.
First, the study focused on the impact of the EES on national labour market
policies as a form of positive integration. In this regard, a main finding of the
examination presented in Chapter 5 is that indeed, as the results of the con-
vergence analyses already suggested, the EES has contributed to an increased
emphasis on activation in domestic policy-making processes. In line with the
goals and the guidelines of the EES to combat unemployment and to increase
employment, governments have shifted resources from passive policies to
ALMPs. This suggests that the EES has counterbalanced the constraining effect
of the EMU, especially the Maastricht convergence criteria with respect to
smaller budget deficits, on public expenditure on activation to some extent.
With regard to the composition of the expenditure on ALMPs and the national
policy priorities within the area of labour market policies, the results presented
in Chapter 4 suggest that the impact of the EES in combination with the impact
of the EMU have resulted in new policy configurations.
Subsequently, this study also provides insight in the mechanisms through
which the OMC influences domestic policy-making. Rather than instruments
to enforce judicial compliance, the OMC provides instruments aimed at facilita-
ting mutual learning and external pressure. The findings suggest that the
facilitation of mutual learning among policy-makers from different counties
is a central mechanism through which the EES influences national labour market
policies. Here, mutual learning is conceptualised as a mechanism that diffuses
policies indirectly through analogical inspiration, rather than as direct policy
transfer from one country to another. As such, the attention for activation in
the peer review programme of the EES may trigger domestic labour market
policy reforms, but it can also influence the direction of already on-going
reforms. Conversely, the impact of the EES was not found to depend on vertical
peer pressure from the European Commission and the Council. The study also
investigated to what extent the domestic influence of the EES was intervened
by domestic actors. In particular, the study focused on the role of social part-
ners and the ministry of finance. Although both types of actors could be
expected to have considerable amounts of veto power, the variation in the
role of these domestic actors in the governance processes of the EES appears
to be of little relevance for explaining the variation in the impact of the EES.
With respect to the impact of negative European integration on the shape
of welfare states, the dissertation’s main finding is that international economic
integration fuels the demand for social protection. Although societies as a
whole may benefit from international trade, this does not necessarily imply
that each individual benefits from it too. As markets open up, opportunities
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of growing exports of goods and foreign investments in local firms are
beneficial for the domestic employment. However, as a result employees not
only compete with other employees on the domestic labour market, but also
with people abroad. Due to the higher mobility of goods and capital, firms
can relatively easily move stages of the production abroad or import goods
from abroad instead of manufacturing themselves domestically. Hence, integra-
tion into the world market leads to, at least to the perception of, increased
economic insecurity for employees. Consequently, this insecurity leads to an
increased demand for social insurance. Even though this finding applies to
international economic integration in general, rather than to European eco-
nomic integration in particular, it could be taken as an indication of the mech-
anism that is triggered by negative European integration. However, it could
also be expected that economic integration within the EU leads to relatively
less insecurity because the creation of the internal market has mainly led to
an increase in the intra-industry trade. The study therefore examined the
influence of European integration on private social expenditure specifically.
Interestingly, the results indicate that European economic integration has
fuelled the demand for social insurance. This result is also consistent with the
finding of an EU-specific trend of upwards convergence as has been presented
in the convergence analysis (Chapter 3).
Beyond identifying the relationship between international economic integra-
tion and the demand for social protection, the examination of private social
expenditure has revealed a number of other interesting findings too. First, the
dynamics in the magnitude of private social security are to some extent related
to the dynamics in public welfare state arrangements. The finding of a negative
association between the efforts on public social protection and private social
spending indicates a substitution effect. When the demand for social protection
is not fulfilled by public welfare state arrangements, the demand for private
social insurance is higher. A comparable mechanism can be seen for savings.
Household saving is also negatively related to private social spending. Indeed,
savings can be used as close substitutes for social insurance to insure the risks
of income loss and to smooth income over the life cycle. Thus, people rely
on a variety of arrangements to protect themselves against economic risks,
namely public social security, private social insurances, and savings. Further-
more, economic insecurity does not only come from the exposure to the forces
on international markets, but also from the transformation of the domestic
employment structure. The results of the study show that deindustrialisation,
defined as the shifts in employment from agriculture and manufacturing
industry to the service sector, is positively related to expenditure on voluntary
private social security. Since employment skills that were valuable in the
traditional sectors can be used in the service sector only to a limited extent,
employment losses in agriculture and manufacturing lead to economic insecur-
ity and to a higher demand for social protection. A final finding is that also
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unemployment increases people’s perceptions of economic insecurity and so
the demand for (private) social insurance.
7.2 CONTRIBUTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
This dissertation makes a number of contributions to the scholarship of the
convergence, the Europeanisation and the political economy of western welfare
states. First, the study contributes to the debate about whether welfare states
are actually converging or not. Interestingly, the findings of this study are at
odds with theoretical arguments which expect continuing diversity rather than
welfare state convergence and with findings in the qualitative literature sup-
porting these arguments (e.g. Pierson, 2001; Hvinden, 2004). Also the findings
of the present study indicate that there is still substantial variation across
European welfare states, but this variation has declined over the past two
decades. In this respect, it is important to recall that the concept of policy
convergence does not refer to a static state of the degree of similarity of policies
across countries, but to a process of declining cross-national variation in
policies over time. As will be discussed below, the difference in findings
between qualitative and quantitative studies is probably due to methodological
differences.
The study also makes a contribution to the quantitative convergence
literature, especially to the strand of the literature in which welfare state
convergence has been related to Europeanisation. Applying a simple technique
to correct the data for demographic and cyclical dynamics makes it plausible
that the convergence of social expenditure reflects an underlying trend of
converging welfare state policies. The inclusion of a control group of non-EU
countries makes it possible to examine whether this trend is specific for the
EU or not. From an empirical perspective, the study contributes to the con-
vergence literature by including a broad range of indicators for several policy
programmes, which have not been analysed before, and by also including the
ten member states which acceded the EU in 2004.
The convergence analyses also provide a methodological contribution.
Based on an analysis of a number of indicators for several welfare state pro-
grammes and policy instruments at different aggregation and abstraction levels,
the results indicate that patterns of convergence can be better perceived at
higher aggregation levels. Interestingly, these findings shed light on the con-
trasting conclusions of qualitative small-N and quantitative large-N studies.
In the case of ALMPs for instance, the data illustrate that countries have opted
for different policy configurations, but that at a higher abstraction level, there
is a general trend of more activating labour market policies. However, with
a small-N approach, focusing on specific law reforms in two or three countries
for a few years, this trend cannot be captured. Instead, the focus will be on
the differences between the policies. Hence, expenditure data on welfare state
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programmes, corrected for demographic and cyclical trends, are useful in
analysing whether countries have changed their policies into the same
direction. In fact, social expenditure data can function as a common de-
nominator.
With respect to the influence of the EES, the results of this study are com-
plementary to the insights of the existing literature. Case studies had found
that the EES has led to the incorporation of the concept of activation in policy
goals and in the paradigms and discourses of policy-makers. However, the
results of the case studies are inconclusive with respect to the question whether
the EES has also contributed to actual policy reforms (Zeitlin and Pochet, 2005).
The results of this study indicate that not only policy goals and paradigms
have been changed, but that these changes are also percolated to actual policy
changes.
A theoretical contribution of the examination of the EES is that also the
variation in the processes at the EU-level can be considered as an explanatory
factor for the variation in the domestic influence of the EES. Since the OMC is
a continuing process, the pressure of the OMC, and so its domestic influence,
can vary across countries and over time. For instance, as the study has shown,
countries may be more or less involved in the peer review programme on
labour market policies. At this point, the research on the OMC deviates from
research on other types of Europeanisation. After all, the pressure that stems
from for instance the commitment to the transposition of a directive is theoret-
ically rather constant. Hence, the finding that variation in the governance
processes of the OMC explains parts of the variation in the developments of
domestic policies, may have implications for future research on the influence
of the OMC. The variation in the interaction between the EU level and the
national level deserves more attention in attempts to explain the variation in
the EU-impact across countries.
Furthermore, a methodological contribution of this study is that it provides
a systematic comparative analysis across 15 EU countries and over two decades,
while it controls for a number of domestic and international factors. This
approach makes it possible to test the relative importance of the different
mechanisms through which the OMC exerts influence on the domestic policy
making. As a result, the study obtains generalisable explanations for the
variation in the impact of the OMC, although the findings can only be
generalised to the western European countries and until 2005. In order to
analyse the mechanisms through which the OMC influences the domestic
policies, new measures have been proposed and analysed. Hence, the study
illustrates that notwithstanding the limitations of quantitative indicators for
grasping the complex mechanisms of Europeanisation, more precise measures
which are grounded in theory and earlier qualitative studies, can enhance the
understanding of the domestic impact of European integration. As an implica-
tion to the research on the impact of the OMC, the result that the EES influences
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the national policy-making mainly through mutual learning may guide further
research.
Another contribution of this dissertation is that it analyses the impact of
both positive and negative European integration on welfare states, whereas
most studies focus on only one type of integration. In Chapter 5, where the
study analyses the influence of the EES, the focus lies on positive integration,
but it explicitly controls for negative integration by including a variable for
economic integration. However, the results for economic integration are not
consistent across the different model specifications. In some specifications,
economic integration tends to have a positive and significant impact on ALMPs,
which is in line with the compensation hypothesis and the findings in Chap-
ter 6. In other models, economic integration does not have a significant in-
fluence. As has been argued above and in Chapter 6, this may be due to the
fact that such a variable measures a net effect of opposite influences from
economic integration. While policy competition that is triggered by inter-
national economic integration would lead to lower social protection levels,
the compensation of increased economic insecurity would lead to higher social
protection levels, and the resulting net effect could be insignificant. This is
a common and underestimated problem in the literature on internationalisation
and welfare states. As a contribution to this literature, a new approach has
been proposed in order to estimate the impact of economic integration on the
demand for social insurance. It has been argued that this relationship can be
analysed more directly with the use of data on private social expenditures.
Finally, elaborating on earlier research in this area by Adema (2001) and
Adema and Ladaique (2009), my analysis of the variation in the efforts on
private social security itself is a contribution to the welfare state literature.
Although the private component in western welfare states has gained im-
portance, the scholarly attention for this development has remained limited.
This study offers a theoretical and empirical account for the dynamics in the
demand for private social insurance at a macro-level.
7.3 OUTLOOK
The results of this study suggest that both EU employment policies and Euro-
pean economic integration have influenced national welfare states. Economic
integration leads to an increased demand for social protection. As such, the
study has found empirical support for one side of the globalisation dilemma
(Rodrik, 1997). Whether economic integration actually leads to policy com-
petition among governments of EU member states is still highly debated in
the contemporary political economy literature (Hays, 2009; Plümper et al, 2009).
However, if economic integration indeed narrows the tax base while the
demand for social protection increases, then further deepening or widening
of the EU creates a Europeanisation dilemma for governments. As suggested by
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the data, one response to this dilemma might be that more and more social
insurance will be provided privately. This would imply that in future research
on welfare state reforms the size and the dynamics of a country’s private
provision of social insurances should play a more important role. Whereas
welfare state research has been mainly focussed on the consolidation and
recalibration of public welfare state policies, the interaction between public
and private social security adds a new dimension to the dependent variable.
In addition, the availability and accessibility of private alternatives for public
social arrangements may influence the decision making of governments in
welfare state reforms. As a societal implication, a shift from public to private
social security may have only modest consequences for the insurance and
allocation functions of social security, but it has probably larger consequences
for the redistribution function. Because private social security may be less
redistributive than public social security, the substitution of public welfare
state arrangements by private social security could lead to more income
inequality and higher poverty rates in western societies.
Also the finding that EU ‘soft law’, a legally non-binding means of
governance, can influence national policies, may have implications for policy
makers. Based on a systematic comparative analysis across countries and over
time, this study yielded more generalised findings about the influence of the
OMC on domestic policies. However, it is important to note that this general-
isability is bounded too. First of all, since the findings of this study are entirely
based on the OMC in the field of labour market policies, the EES, the findings
do not necessarily apply to OMCs in other welfare state policy areas. Both the
precise institutionalisation of the OMC and the domestic policy-making pro-
cesses vary across policy area. Therefore, further systematic comparative
research on other OMCs is required, for instance on the OMC of pensions (see
Van Vliet, 2010b). A second reason to be careful with the generalisation of
the findings is that they are based on data which run until 2005. This implies
that the changes in the procedures of the EES which were adopted in 2005,
have not been taken into account.2 In the third place, the member states that
acceded in 2004 and 2007 were not included in the analysis on the OMC. In
this respect, the results of the convergence analysis do not suggest that the
new member states have been influenced by the OMC. When data come avail-
able for more recent years and more EU countries, future research should point
out how far the generalisibility of the findings of this study stretches.
2 As has been explained in the previous chapters, the reason for the inclusion of data until
2005 is the limited availability of data. It should be noted, however, that this limitation
in data years cannot exclusively be observed in quantitative studies and is instead a wider
phenomenon in the OMC literature. De la Porte (2010: 5) found that although two-thirds
of the reviewed OMC literature was published in 2007 or more recently, a large share of
it is devoted to the period before 2005.
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Nevertheless, the findings regarding the domestic influence of the OMC
could have some policy implications. First of all, the finding that the OMC may
influence domestic welfare state policies could be an argument to use this type
of governance more often in order to achieve further European integration.
However, this does not say anything about the desirability of formulating or
coordinating welfare state policies at the EU-level itself. Furthermore, also the
findings with respect to the effectiveness of the specific governance means
of the EES could be useful for policymakers, since the OMC is the primary policy
tool for the Europe 2020 strategy. Given the fact that the OMC is still a relatively
new governance means, it is conceivable that the equipment of the OMC will
be polished further. In such reforms, the results could give reason to two
specific institutional changes. First, the findings suggest that council recom-
mendations do not contribute that much to the effectiveness of the EES. There-
fore, less council recommendations could perhaps increase the cost-effectiveness
of the OMC. Second, it seems that especially mutual learning through the peer
review programme yields effect. Hence, policy makers could perhaps increase
the effectiveness of the OMCs by focussing on mutual learning. Also other
insights of this study would improve the effectiveness of the OMC and so to




DE POLITIEKE ECONOMIE VAN SOCIALEZEKERHEIDS- EN ARBEIDSMARKTBELEID
Europese verzorgingsstaten zijn sinds de jaren ’80 van de vorige eeuw veelvul-
dig hervormd. De voortschrijdende Europese integratie kan één van de factoren
zijn die aanleiding heeft gegeven tot of van invloed is geweest op deze hervor-
mingen. Hoewel sociale convergentie al een expliciete doelstelling is sinds
het Verdrag van Rome in 1957, heeft de Europese Raad pas in respectievelijk
1997 en 2000 Europees arbeidsmarkt- en socialezekerheidsbeleid ingevoerd.
Daarom was het ook pas vanaf dat moment dat Europese integratie een
relevante factor werd in de verzorgingsstaatliteratuur en dat socialezekerheids-
en arbeidsmarktbeleid als interessante beleidsterreinen werden beschouwd
in de literatuur over Europeanisering. Echter, in beide stromingen in de
literatuur is het onduidelijk in hoeverre Europese integratie van invloed is
op het sociaal beleid van de lidstaten, of Europese integratie heeft bijgedragen
aan convergentie van sociaal beleid en of Europese integratie een verklaring
kan bieden voor de variatie in hervormingen van verzorgingsstaten in Euro-
pese landen. Om inzicht te krijgen in deze zaken, staat in deze studie de
volgende vraag centraal:
Wat is de invloed van Europese integratie op nationaal socialezekerheids- en arbeids-
marktbeleid van lidstaten van de Europese Unie en welke factoren kunnen een verkla-
ring bieden voor de verschillen in de mate waarin lidstaten hun beleid vervolgens
hebben veranderd?
Europese integratie kan een aantal effecten hebben op nationaal socialezeker-
heids- en arbeidsmarktbeleid. Deze effecten zijn afkomstig van twee typen
Europese integratie, namelijk negatieve en positieve integratie. Negatieve
integratie heeft betrekking op maatregelen die beogen de marktintegratie te
bevorderen door het terugdringen van nationale handelsbelemmeringen en
verstoringen van mededinging. Positieve integratie verwijst naar gemeenschap-
pelijk Europees beleid om omstandigheden te creëren waaronder markten
(beter) kunnen functioneren. Voor wat betreft negatieve integratie zijn veel
maatregelen genomen om in 1993 de Europese interne markt te bewerkstelli-
gen, waarop mensen, goederen, diensten en kapitaal zich vrij kunnen bewegen.
Volgens één van de belangrijkste hypothesen in de politieke economie met
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betrekking tot internationale economische integratie zou het bevorderen van
de internationale handel en de mobiliteit van kapitaal leiden tot meer strate-
gisch gedrag van regeringen. In het streven naar meer werkgelegenheid en
economische groei, zullen landen proberen om bedrijven aan te trekken door
het verlagen van de belasting- en premiedruk en dus van het niveau van
sociale bescherming, wat uitmondt in concurrentie tussen landen.
Positieve integratie op het gebied van sociaal en arbeidsmarktbeleid heeft
gestalte gekregen in de vorm van de Europese Werkgelegenheidsstrategie,
die in 1997 werd aangenomen. Deze strategie is gericht op het verbeteren van
het functioneren van de arbeidsmarkt in termen van lagere werkloosheid en
meer werkgelegenheid. In het kader van deze strategie worden de lidstaten
van de EU aangespoord om meer nadruk te leggen op actief arbeidsmarkt-
beleid. De Werkgelegenheidsstrategie stoelt op een aantal juridisch niet-binden-
de instrumenten, zoals richtsnoeren, doelstellingen en aanbevelingen. Op de
EU-top in Lissabon in 2000 zijn deze instrumenten geïnstitutionaliseerd in een
nieuwe methode van Europees bestuur, die de methode van open coördinatie
is genoemd. Deze methode werd gezien als het primaire instrument voor het
bereiken van de doelstellingen van de Lissabonstrategie. Sindsdien wordt deze
methode ook toegepast op andere beleidsterreinen, zoals sociale insluiting,
pensioenen, gezondheidszorg en ouderenzorg. Vanwege het niet-bindende
karakter van de methode van open coördinatie, is het vaststellen van de
invloed van deze Europese coördinatie een methodologische uitdaging. Door
de ontwikkelingen in de lidstaten van de EU systematisch met elkaar te vergelij-
ken in de tijd, levert deze studie een bijdrage aan het onderzoek naar de
Europeanisering van verzorgingsstaten.
Structuur
Deze dissertatie bestaat uit twee delen. Het eerste deel, bestaande uit hoofdstuk
2, hoofdstuk 3 en hoofdstuk 4, gaat in op de vraag in hoeverre convergentie
is opgetreden in verzorgingsstaatbeleid en –uitgaven in de EU en in welke mate
eventuele patronen van convergentie specifiek zijn voor de EU. Trends en
patronen die specifiek zijn voor de EU kunnen duiden op effecten van Europese
integratie. In het tweede deel van deze studie, dat bestaat uit hoofdstuk 5 en
hoofdstuk 6, wordt ingegaan op de factoren die verklaringen kunnen bieden
voor deze patronen van overeenkomsten en verschillen tussen landen en door
de tijd. Hierbij is hoofdstuk 5 gerelateerd aan positieve integratie, terwijl in
hoofdstuk 6 wordt ingegaan op negatieve integratie.
In hoofdstuk 2 staat de ontwikkeling van verzorgingsstaten over een
langere periode (1980-2003) centraal. Eerst wordt besproken waarom en op
welke wijze kan worden verwacht dat Europese integratie en de methode van
open coördinatie leiden tot convergentie van socialezekerheidsbeleid in de
lidstaten van de EU. Vervolgens wordt de bestaande literatuur op het terrein
van convergentie van Europese verzorgingsstaten geïntroduceerd. Het blijkt
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dat de indicatoren die gebruikt zijn in eerder onderzoek moeilijk zijn te ver-
gelijken tussen landen vanwege een aantal problemen zoals verschillen in de
fiscale behandeling van sociale uitkeringen. Het doel van het empirische
gedeelte van dit hoofdstuk is om te corrigeren voor veel van deze problemen
door gebruik te maken van een groot aantal sociale indicatoren. We hebben
convergentietesten uitgevoerd voor indicatoren op verscheidene beleidsterrei-
nen, zoals de oudedagvoorziening, arbeidsongeschiktheid, werkloosheid, actief
arbeidsmarktbeleid en bijstand. Ook zijn armoedecijfers opgenomen, ten einde
een beeld te kunnen schetsen van de ontwikkeling van de sociale cohesie in
de EU.
In hoofdstuk 3 ligt de focus op hervormingen en convergentie van verzor-
gingsstaten in landen uit Centraal- en Oost-Europa. Daarmee wordt beoogd
om een belangrijk hiaat ten dele te dichten in zowel de convergentieliteratuur
als de literatuur over de methode van open coördinatie, waarin de nieuwe
lidstaten van de EU sterk ondervertegenwoordigd zijn. De convergentieanalyse
in dit hoofdstuk bevat 25 EU-landen, zowel oude (15) als nieuwe (10) lidstaten.
De resultaten wijzen uit dat geen convergentie is opgetreden tussen de niveaus
van sociale bescherming van deze twee groepen landen. Dit leidt tot de ver-
volgvraag of de verschillen tussen de socialezekerheidsstelsels van West- en
Oost-Europese landen meer fundamenteel van aard zijn. Om deze vraag te
beantwoorden wordt gebruik gemaakt van een clusteranalyse.
In hoofdstuk 4 worden de convergentieanalyses toegespitst op de periode
waarin de Europese Werkgelegenheidsstrategie en de methode van open
coördinatie werden ingevoerd. De analyse begint met een maatstaf om sociale
zekerheidsuitgaven te corrigeren voor conjuncturele en demografische factoren.
Daarna worden patronen onderzocht in de totale uitgaven aan actief arbeids-
marktbeleid en in uitgaven aan specifieke programma’s zoals arbeidsbemidde-
ling, scholing, programma’s voor jongeren en gesubsidieerde arbeid.
De analyse in hoofdstuk 5 richt zich vervolgens op het verklaren van de
variatie in uitgaven aan actief arbeidsmarktbeleid tussen landen en door de
tijd. In dit hoofdstuk wordt de invloed van de Europese Werkgelegenheidsstra-
tegie op hervormingen van nationaal arbeidsmarktbeleid onderzocht met panel-
data-regressieanalyses. Op basis van de bestaande literatuur over Europees
arbeidsmarktbeleid zijn nieuwe indicatoren ontwikkeld om de variatie in de
invloed van de Europese Werkgelegenheidsstrategie tussen landen en door
de tijd te verklaren.
Hoofdstuk 6 richt zich op de invloed van internationale economische
integratie op verzorgingsstaten. Een fel bediscussieerde hypothese in de
politieke economie luidt dat internationale economische integratie leidt tot
de uitbreiding van verzorgingsstaatarrangementen vanwege een grotere vraag
naar sociale bescherming. In dit hoofdstuk wordt betoogd dat de vraag naar
sociale zekerheid beter kan worden onderzocht aan de hand van uitgaven aan
private socialezekerheidsarrangementen dan op basis van uitgaven aan publie-
ke sociale zekerheid. De hoogte van de uitgaven aan publieke sociale zekerheid
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is de uitkomst van besluitvormingsprocessen in democratische instituties waar
politieke processen een belangrijke rol spelen. De uitgaven aan private sociale
verzekeringen zijn daarentegen vooral afhankelijk van beslissingen van indi-
viduen om al dan niet een verzekering af te sluiten. Daarom geven private
sociale uitgaven een beter beeld van de vraag naar sociale zekerheid dan
publieke sociale zekerheid. Om de variatie tussen landen en door de tijd in
de uitgaven aan private socialezekerheidsarrangementen te onderzoeken, wordt
gebruik gemaakt van panel-data-regressieanalyses.
Tot slot worden in hoofdstuk 7 de belangrijkste resultaten van deze disser-
tatie samengevat en worden de implicaties van de studie voor het onderzoek
naar de Europeanisering van verzorgingsstaten besproken.
Centrale bevindingen
De resultaten van de convergentieanalyses in de hoofdstukken 2, 3 en 4 laten
zien dat in de afgelopen 25 jaar het niveau van sociale bescherming in de
meeste landen is gestegen en dat de verschillen tussen landen kleiner zijn
geworden. Zelfs wanneer de data werden gecorrigeerd voor veranderingen
in de directe behoeften aan sociale bescherming vanwege werkloosheid of
vergrijzing van de bevolking bleek dat de sociale uitgaven waren gestegen.
Dit laat zien dat landen meer geld hebben besteed aan sociale programma’s
en dat verzorgingsstaten genereuzer zijn geworden. Kortom, hervormingen
van verzorgingsstaten in Europese landen hebben geresulteerd in een trend
van opwaartse sociale convergentie. De resultaten bieden dus geen steun voor
de hypothese dat Europese integratie leidt tot lagere niveaus van sociale
bescherming vanwege beleidsconcurrentie tussen regeringen. Bovendien laten
de data zien dat de convergentie van verzorgingsstaten sterker is in landen
van de EU dan in een meer diverse groep van OESO-landen. Interessant is dat
dit EU-specifieke patroon van convergentie mogelijk een indicatie is van de
invloed van Europese integratie op het sociaal beleid van de lidstaten. Een
andere interessante bevinding is dat niet alleen in sociale beschermingsniveaus
en specifieke beleidsprogramma’s convergentie is opgetreden, maar dat de
resultaten ook aanwijzingen bieden voor convergentie van verzorgingsstaat-
regimes. Dit betekent dat niet alleen de verschillen tussen de niveaus van
sociale bescherming kleiner zijn geworden in Europa, maar dat ook de configu-
raties van beleidsprogramma’s meer op elkaar zijn gaan lijken.
Opvallend is dat geen convergentie is gevonden voor de groep landen die
in 2004 tot de EU zijn toegetreden. In de periode 2000-2006 blijkt geen sprake
te zijn van convergentie binnen de groep van nieuwe lidstaten. Ook de variatie
tussen de verzorgingsstaten van de oude en de nieuwe lidstaten is niet afgeno-
men. Het niveau van sociale bescherming ligt in de nieuwe lidstaten beduidend
lager dan in de oude lidstaten en ook de stelsels van sociale zekerheid vertonen
sterke verschillen. In deze studie zijn geen aanwijzingen gevonden voor invloed
van de EU op de verzorgingsstaten van Centraal- en Oost-Europese landen.
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Ook is geen effect gevonden van de uitbreiding van de EU op de verzorgings-
staten van de oudere lidstaten.
Na het analyseren van trends in een groot aantal sociale programma’s,
is de studie toegespitst op een specifiek type beleid, te weten actief arbeids-
marktbeleid. In het geval van de Europese Werkgelegenheidsstrategie is de
kans om een effect van de methode van open coördinatie op nationaal beleid
te vinden namelijk het grootst, omdat die op dit terrein met sterkere coördina-
tie-instrumenten is uitgerust dan op andere beleidsterreinen. In hoofdstuk 4
zijn uitgaven aan een aantal typen actief arbeidsmarkt geanalyseerd. Omdat
activering eveneens kan worden bereikt door passief arbeidsmarktbeleid
minder passief te maken, zijn ook de veranderingen in de inkomstenbelasting
en de karakteristieken van werkloosheidsuitkeringen in de analyse opgenomen.
In de periode 1995-2002 is niet veel convergentie opgetreden in actief arbeids-
marktbeleid, doordat landen hebben gekozen voor verschillende configuraties
van beleidsinstrumenten. Echter, wel is een EU-specifieke trend waar te nemen
van een verschuiving in de uitgaven van passief naar actief arbeidsmarktbeleid.
Bij elkaar genomen, kunnen deze resultaten duiden op invloed van de Euro-
pese Werkgelegenheidsstrategie. Aangezien de Europese Werkgelegenheidsstra-
tegie geen specifieke beleidsinstrumenten voorschrijft, kunnen regeringen zelf
beleid voeren dat het beste aansluit bij hun binnenlandse situatie, terwijl iedere
beleidsconfiguratie op zichzelf gericht kan zijn op het verlagen van de werk-
loosheid en het vergroten van de werkgelegenheid door activering.
Vervolgens is onderzocht of en hoe Europese integratie verklaringen kan
bieden voor de veranderingen in beleid ten aanzien van sociale zekerheid en
arbeidsmarkt aan de hand van panel-data-regressie-analyses. De studie concen-
treert zich eerst op de Europese Werkgelegenheidsstrategie als een vorm van
positieve Europese integratie. Overeenkomstig de doelstellingen en de richt-
snoeren van de Europese Werkgelegenheidsstrategie om werkloosheid te
bestrijden en de werkgelegenheid te vergroten, hebben regeringen middelen
verschoven van passief naar actief arbeidsmarktbeleid. Dit suggereert dat de
Europese Werkgelegenheidsstrategie tegenwicht heeft geboden aan de beper-
kende effecten van de EMU, met name de convergentiecriteria van Maastricht
met betrekking tot begrotingstekorten, op de publieke uitgaven aan activering.
De resultaten in hoofdstuk 4 suggereren dat de invloed van de Europese
Werkgelegenheidsstrategie in combinatie met de invloed van de EMU heeft
geleid tot nieuwe configuraties van beleidsinstrumenten.
Ook biedt de studie inzicht in de mechanismen waardoor de methode van
open coördinatie het nationale beleid heeft beïnvloed. In plaats van instrumen-
ten die naleving op een juridische manier kunnen afdwingen, voorziet de
methode van open coördinatie in instrumenten die gericht zijn op het facili-
teren van wederzijds leren onder beleidsmakers van verschillende landen en
van externe druk. De bevindingen suggereren dat het faciliteren van wederzijds
leren onder beleidsmakers een centraal mechanisme is waardoor de Europese
Werkgelegenheidsstrategie nationaal beleid beïnvloedt. Onder het concept
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wederzijds leren wordt hier niet verstaan dat beleid uit het ene land letterlijk
wordt gekopieerd in een ander land, maar dat beleidsmakers ideeën uit andere
landen – rekening houdend met de situatie in hun eigen land – kunnen toepas-
sen in het eigen land. Als zodanig kan de aandacht voor activering in het peer
review-programma van de Werkgelegenheidsstrategie aanleiding geven tot
hervormingen van nationaal arbeidsmarktbeleid, maar het kan ook de richting
van reeds lopende hervormingen in lidstaten beïnvloeden. De invloed van
de Werkgelegenheidsstrategie blijkt daarentegen niet te worden veroorzaakt
door de druk van de Europese Commissie of de Raad op de lidstaten. Ook
is in deze studie onderzocht in welke mate binnenlandse actoren een inter-
veniërende rol spelen in de effecten van de Europese Werkgelegenheidsstrate-
gie op het nationale beleid. De studie richt zich in het bijzonder op de rol van
de sociale partners en de ministeries van financiën. Hoewel het aannemelijk
is dat beide typen actoren over een aanzienlijke hoeveelheid vetomacht beschik-
ken, blijkt de variatie in de rol van deze binnenlandse actoren in de bestuurlijke
processen van de Europese Werkgelegenheidsstrategie geen relevante verkla-
rende variabele te zijn voor de variatie in de invloed van de Europese Werk-
gelegenheidsstrategie.
Wat betreft de invloed van negatieve Europese integratie op verzorgings-
staten is de belangrijkste bevinding van deze dissertatie dat internationale
economische integratie de vraag naar sociale bescherming stimuleert. Een
samenleving als geheel kan baat hebben bij internationale handel, maar dat
impliceert niet noodzakelijkerwijs dat ook ieder individu erbij gebaat is.
Wanneer markten worden opengesteld, zijn een mogelijke groei in de export
en meer buitenlandse investeringen in lokale bedrijven voordelig voor de
binnenlandse werkgelegenheid. Echter, hierdoor concurreren werknemers niet
meer alleen met andere werknemers op de binnenlandse arbeidsmarkt, maar
ook met mensen in het buitenland. Als gevolg van de hogere mobiliteit van
goederen en kapitaal kunnen bedrijven delen van de productie relatief gemak-
kelijk verplaatsen naar het buitenland of goederen importeren in plaats van
die zelf te fabriceren in het binnenland. Daarom leidt integratie in de wereld-
markt tot – in ieder geval in de perceptie van velen – een hogere mate van
economische onzekerheid. Deze onzekerheid leidt vervolgens tot een grotere
vraag naar sociale zekerheid. Aangezien deze bevindingen betrekking hebben
op internationale economische integratie in het algemeen, is het de vraag of
die ook gelden voor Europese economische integratie in het bijzonder.
Enerzijds zou Europese economische integratie – volgens dezelfde rede-
nering als voor internationale economische integratie in het algemeen – kunnen
leiden tot meer economische onzekerheid. Anderzijds zou ook gesteld kunnen
worden dat economische integratie in de EU niet tot meer, maar tot minder
onzekerheid leidt, omdat de wording van de interne markt vooral heeft geleid
tot een toename van de intra-industriële handel. Daarom is in deze studie ook
specifiek de relatie tussen Europese integratie en private sociale uitgaven
onderzocht. Interessant is dat de resultaten aangeven dat ook Europese econo-
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mische integratie de vraag naar sociale verzekeringen heeft vergroot. Dit
resultaat is consistent met de bevinding van de EU-specifieke trend van op-
waartse convergentie in de convergentieanalyses. Naast internationale economi-
sche integratie blijken ook publieke verzorgingsstaatarrangementen, de spaar-
quote, de-industrialisatie en de werkloosheid een rol te spelen in de vraag
naar private sociale verzekeringen.
Bijdragen en implicaties
Deze studie levert een aantal bijdragen aan het onderzoek naar de convergen-
tie, de Europeanisering en de politieke economie van westerse verzorgings-
staten. In de eerste plaats draagt de studie bij aan het debat over de vraag
of verzorgingsstaten nu convergeren of niet. Interessant is dat de bevindingen
van deze studie niet overeenkomen met theoretische argumenten volgens welke
diversiteit in plaats van convergentie verwacht kan worden en met bevindingen
in de kwalitatieve literatuur die deze argumenten ondersteunen. Ook de
resultaten van deze studie laten zien dat sprake is van substantiële variatie
tussen Europese verzorgingsstaten, maar deze variatie is afgenomen in de
laatste twee decennia. Het verschil tussen de bevindingen van kwalitatieve
en kwantitatieve studies is waarschijnlijk te wijten aan methodologische
verschillen.
De studie levert ook een bijdrage aan het deel van de kwantitatieve conver-
gentieliteratuur waarin de convergentie van verzorgingsstaten wordt gerela-
teerd aan Europeanisering. Door sociale uitgaven te corrigeren voor demografi-
sche en conjuncturele effecten kan worden onderzocht of sprake is van een
onderliggende trend van convergentie van sociaal beleid. De toevoeging van
een controle groep van niet-EU landen maakt het vervolgens mogelijk om te
onderzoeken of deze trend specifiek is voor de EU. Verder levert deze studie
vanuit empirisch oogpunt een bijdrage aan de convergentieliteratuur door
een aantal indicatoren te analyseren die nog niet eerder waren onderzocht
in het kader van convergentie en Europeanisering en door tien lidstaten in
de studie op te nemen die in 2004 tot de EU zijn toegetreden.
De inzichten die betrekking hebben op de invloed van de Europese Werk-
gelegenheidsstrategie zijn complementair aan de inzichten in de bestaande
literatuur op dit terrein. De bevindingen laten zien dat niet alleen beleidsdoelen
en paradigma’s zijn veranderd, zoals in veel case studies is gevonden, maar
dat dit ook heeft geleid tot daadwerkelijke beleidsveranderingen. Een theoreti-
sche bijdrage van het onderzoek naar de Europese werkgelegenheidsstrategie
is dat ook de variatie in de processen op EU-niveau kunnen worden beschouwd
als een verklarende factor voor de variatie in de binnenlandse invloed van
de Europese Werkgelegenheidsstrategie. Omdat de methode van open coör-
dinatie een continu proces is, kan de druk die van deze methode uitgaat en
zo ook de invloed op nationaal beleid variëren tussen landen en door de tijd.
Landen kunnen bijvoorbeeld in meer of mindere mate betrokken zijn in het
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peer review-programma op het gebied van arbeidsmarktbeleid. Op dit punt
verschilt onderzoek naar de methode van open coördinatie van onderzoek
naar andere typen van Europeanisering. Immers, de druk die uitgaat van de
verplichting om een richtlijn te transponeren is in theorie tamelijk constant.
De bevinding dat de variatie in de bestuurlijke processen van de methode van
open coördinatie de variatie in de ontwikkeling van nationaal beleid ten dele
kan verklaren, kan implicaties hebben voor toekomstig onderzoek naar de
invloed van de methode van open coördinatie.
Een methodologische bijdrage van deze studie is dat die berust op een
systematische vergelijking van 15 EU landen voor een periode van meer dan
twee decennia, waarin wordt gecontroleerd voor een groot aantal binnenlandse
en internationale factoren. Door deze benadering is het mogelijk om het
relatieve belang te testen van de verschillende mechanismen waardoor de
methode van open coördinatie invloed kan uitoefenen op binnenlandse beleids-
processen. Hierdoor zijn generaliseerbare verklaringen verkregen voor de
variatie in de invloed van de methode van open coördinatie. Hierbij moet
worden opgemerkt dat deze generaliseerbaarheid is beperkt tot West-Europese
landen en tot en met het jaar 2005. Om de mechanismen te onderzoeken
waardoor de methode van open coördinatie nationaal beleid beïnvloedt, zijn
nieuwe indicatoren ontwikkeld en geanalyseerd. Deze studie toont aan dat,
ondanks de beperkingen van kwantitatieve indicatoren in het meten van
complexe mechanismen van Europeanisering, meer precieze indicatoren die
gebaseerd zijn op theorie en kwalitatieve studies het begrip van de invloed
van Europese integratie op lidstaten kunnen vergroten. De bevinding dat het
voornamelijk wederzijds leren is waardoor de Europese Werkgelegenheidsstra-
tegie van invloed is op het maken van nationaal beleid kan richtinggevend
zijn in toekomstig onderzoek naar de effecten van de methode van open
coördinatie.
Een andere bijdrage van deze dissertatie is dat het is gericht op de effecten
van zowel positieve als van negatieve Europese integratie op verzorgingsstaten,
waar de meeste studies slechts één type integratie onder de loep nemen. In
hoofdstuk 5 ligt de nadruk op de effecten van positieve integratie, maar in
de analyses wordt ook voor negatieve integratie gecorrigeerd door een varia-
bele voor economische integratie op te nemen. De resultaten voor economische
integratie zijn echter niet consistent voor de verschillende modelspecificaties.
Dit kan komen doordat een dergelijke variabele de resultante weergeeft van
tegengestelde effecten van economische integratie. Terwijl beleidsconcurrentie
zou leiden tot lagere niveaus van sociale bescherming, zou de compensatie
van de toegenomen economische onzekerheid leiden tot hogere niveaus van
sociale bescherming. Het resulterende effect kan vervolgens beperkt zijn. Dit
is een algemeen en onderschat probleem in de literatuur over internationali-
sering en verzorgingsstaten. Om het effect van economische integratie op de
vraag naar sociale verzekeringen te schatten, wordt gebruik gemaakt van een
nieuwe benadering. De redenering luidt dat deze relatie directer kan worden
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geanalyseerd door gebruik te maken van private sociale uitgaven. Bovendien
vormt de analyse van de variatie in uitgaven aan private sociale zekerheid
ook een bijdrage op zichzelf. De private component in westerse verzorgings-
staten is namelijk groeiende, maar de wetenschappelijke aandacht voor deze
ontwikkeling is tot op heden relatief beperkt gebleven.
Tot slot, de bevinding dat de methode van open coördinatie van invloed kan
zijn op nationaal beleid ten aanzien van sociale zekerheid en arbeidsmarkt
zou een argument kunnen zijn om meer gebruik te maken van dit type coördi-
natie in het bewerkstelligen van verdere Europese integratie. Echter, dit zegt
op zichzelf niets over de wenselijkheid van dergelijke coördinatie van verzor-
gingsstaatbeleid op EU-niveau. Ook de bevindingen met betrekking tot de
effectiviteit van de specifieke instrumenten van de Europese Werkgelegenheids-
strategie kunnen van belang zijn voor beleidsmakers. De Europa 2020 strategie
berust namelijk grotendeels op de methode van open coördinatie. Aangezien
het hier gaat om een betrekkelijk nieuwe vorm van Europese coördinatie, is
het goed denkbaar dat die nog verder zal worden verfijnd. De bevindingen
in deze studie geven aanleiding tot twee aanpassingen. Ten eerste, de aan-
bevelingen van de Raad lijken weinig bij te dragen aan de effectiviteit van
de Europese Werkgelegenheidsstrategie. Daarom zouden minder van dergelijke
aanbevelingen de methode van open coördinatie mogelijkerwijs efficiënter
maken. Ten tweede, omdat wederzijds leren door het peer review-programma
wel effectief blijkt te zijn, zouden beleidsmakers de effectiviteit van de methode
van open coördinatie kunnen vergroten door meer te focussen op wederzijds
leren. Ook andere inzichten uit deze studie zouden de effectiviteit van de
methode van open coördinatie verbeteren en daarmee de verwezenlijking van
de Europa 2020 doelstellingen.
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